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   This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   prejudice	   that	   exists	   on	   the	   part	   of	   decision-­‐makers	  
responsible	   for	   determining	   refugee	   status	   and	   adjudicating	   asylum	   claims	   in	  
jurisdictions	   that	   accept	   claims	   based	   on	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   An	   analysis	   of	   case	   law	  
from	   both	   common	   law	   and	   civil	   law	   jurisdictions	   uncovers	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	  
judicial	   stereotypes	   about	   sexuality	   on	   refugees	   and	   asylum-­‐seekers.	   	   It	   follows	   the	  
increasing	   importance	   placed	   on	   proving	   the	   genuineness	   of	   the	   claimants’	   professed	  
sexual	  identity	  that	  has	  coincided	  with	  an	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  credibility,	  a	  trend	  that	  
has	  heightened	  the	  impact	  of	  decision-­‐makers’	  biases	  regarding	  sexuality.	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  analyzing	  case	  law,	  the	  opinions	  of	  lawyers	  and	  other	  experts	  are	  
included	   to	   add	   nuance	   and	   further	   illuminate	   decisions.	   	   The	   unique	   challenges	   that	  
distinguish	  lesbian,	  gay,	  bisexual	  and	  transgender	  (LGBT)	  claimants	  from	  other	  refugees	  
as	  well	   as	   the	   behavior	   of	   decision-­‐makers	   are	   subsequently	   interpreted	   through	   the	  
lens	  of	  sociologist	  Erving	  Goffman’s	  theories	  on	  stigma	  and	  self-­‐presentation.	  
	   The	   thesis	   then	   suggests	   that	   Western	   stereotypes	   about	   sexuality	   (and	   non-­‐
normative	   sexuality	   in	   particular)	   that	   revolve	   around	   appearance,	   demeanor,	   past	  
relationships,	   sexual	   activity,	   cultural	   values,	   and	   other	   experiences	   and	   elements	   of	  
identity	   are	   particularly	   problematic	   for	   LGBT	   refugees,	   most	   of	   whom	   come	   from	   a	  
non-­‐Western	   context.	   	   The	   thesis	   further	   asserts	   that	   to	   be	   understood	   properly,	   the	  
refugee	   narrative	   must	   be	   examined	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   intersection	   of	   multiple	  
identities—gender,	   ethnic,	   religious,	   and	   others.	   	   The	   conclusion	   ultimately	   drawn	   is	  
that	  LGBT	  refugees	  who	  are	  multiply	  marginalized	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  identities	  must	  be	  
seen	  as	  having	  been	  excluded	  from	  participation	  in	  the	  political	  and	  religious	  discourses	  
that	  regulate	  and	  restrict	   their	   lives	  who	  attempt	  to	  rectify	  this	   injustice	  through	  their	  
transgressions	  of	  social	  norms.	  	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  recommendations	  are	  made	  to	  consider	  
LGBT	   claims	   based	   on	   political	   opinion	   and	   religious	   grounds	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	  
membership	   in	   a	   particular	   social	   group	   which	   does	   not	   recognize	   the	   political	   and	  
religious	  dimensions	  of	  sexual	  identity.	  	  Recognizing	  the	  considerable	  difficulty	  of	  such	  a	  
shift,	   further	   suggestions	   are	  made	   with	   regard	   to	   combating	   stereotypes	   within	   the	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A.	  Problem	  and	  Significance	  
	   At	  least	  as	  long	  as	  groups	  of	  people	  have	  been	  labeled	  and	  singled	  out	  based	  on	  
their	  sexual	  activity	  as	  well	  as	  their	  sexual	  and	  gender	  identities,	  sexual	  minorities	  have	  
been	  victims	  of	  discrimination	  and	  violence	  around	  the	  globe.	   	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1960s,	  
with	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   gay	   rights	   movement,	   relatively	   safe	   environments	   began	   to	  
emerge	   in	   some	  societies	  where	   lesbians,	  gay	  men,	  bisexuals,	  and	   transgender	   (LGBT)	  
people	  could	  live	  freer	  and	  more	  open	  lives.	  
	   Meanwhile,	  originating	  with	   the	  1951	  UN	  Convention	  Relating	   to	   the	  Status	  of	  
Refugees	   and	  expanded	  by	   the	  Convention’s	   1967	  protocol,	   international	   refugee	   law	  
formalized	   the	   standards	   governing	   the	   protections	   and	   rights	   of	   people	   fleeing	  
persecution.	  	  The	  Convention	  defined	  a	  refugee	  as:	  	  
A	  person	  who	  owing	  to	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	  being	  persecuted	  for	  reasons	  of	  
race,	   religion,	   nationality,	   membership	   of	   a	   particular	   social	   group	   or	   political	  
opinion,	  is	  outside	  the	  country	  of	  his	  nationality	  and	  is	  unable	  or,	  owing	  to	  such	  
fear,	   is	  unwilling	  to	  avail	  himself	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  that	  country;	  or	  who,	  not	  
having	   a	   nationality	   and	   being	   outside	   the	   country	   of	   his	   former	   habitual	  
residence	  as	  a	  result	  of	  such	  events,	  is	  unable	  or,	  owing	  to	  such	  fear,	  is	  unwilling	  
to	  return	  to	  it.1	  
	  
The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  five	  grounds	  of	  persecution	  outlined	  in	  the	  definition	  has	  since	  
been	  the	  motor	  force	  in	  propelling	  the	  development	  of	  this	  area	  of	  law.	  
These	  concurrent	  advances	  yielded	  the	  foundation	  for	  sexual-­‐orientation	  based	  
refugee	   claims.	   	   By	   the	   1980s,	   such	   claims	   began	   to	   meet	   with	   limited	   success	   with	  
                                                
1	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees,	  (28	  July	  1951),	  Article	  2A.	  
 2	  
judges	   placing	   applicants	   primarily	   in	   the	   category	   of	   those	   suffering	   persecution	   by	  
reason	  of	  their	  membership	   in	  a	  particular	  social	  group.	   	  The	  particular	  social	  group	  in	  
question	  was,	  from	  the	  earliest	  cases,	  that	  of	  “homosexuals”.	  	  That	  this	  term,	  one	  with	  
roots	   in	  a	  pathologizing	  medical	  discourse	  and	  not	  a	   term	  of	  self-­‐description,	  was	  and	  
remains	  the	  most	  frequent	  descriptor	  of	  LGBT	  refugees	  hints	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sexual	  
identity	  in	  question	  is	  largely	  imposed	  on	  the	  refugee.	  	  In	  each	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  
claim,	  all	  of	  the	  actors	  involved	  participate	  in	  defining	  and	  redefining	  same-­‐sex	  sexuality	  
both	   generally	   and	   as	   it	   applies	   to	   the	   claim.	   	   A	   lack	   of	   objective	   indicators	   often	  
compels	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  testimony	  of	  the	  claimant	  alone.	  	  In	  determining	  
the	  credibility	  of	  such	  a	  testimony,	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  is	  constantly	  faced	  with	  the	  risk	  
of	   comparing	   the	   experiences	   of	   an	   individual	   refugee	   with	   a	   flawed	   construction	   of	  
sexual	   identity	   that	   is	   informed	  by	  stereotypes	  and	  unfounded	  assumptions.	   	  Focusing	  
primarily	   on	   those	   responsible	   for	   adjudication	   refugee	   claims,	   this	   thesis	  will	   explore	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  bias	  disadvantages	  LGBT	  refugee	  and	  asylum	  claimants.	  
B.	  Review	  of	  the	  Literature	  
	   Several	  authors	  provide	  a	  broad	  picture	  of	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  
a	   particular	   social	   group	   that	   led	   to	   its	   use	   as	   a	   context	   for	   sexual	   orientation-­‐based	  
asylum	   claims.	   	   These	   include	   Kristen	   L.	   Walker	   who	   surveys	   and	   compares	   relevant	  
jurisprudence	   from	   major	   common	   law	   countries2	   and	   T.	   Alexander	   Aleinikoff	   who	  
additionally	   includes	  civil	   law	  jurisdictions	   like	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  the	  Netherlands.3	  	  
                                                
2	  “Sexuality	  and	  Refugee	  Status	  in	  Australia,”	  12	  International	  Journal	  of	  Refugee	  Law	  2	  (July	  2000),	  176.	  
3	  “Protected	  characteristics	  and	  social	  perceptions:	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘membership	  of	  a	  
particular	  social	  group’”	  in	  Refugee	  Protection	  in	  International	  Law:	  UNHCR’s	  Global	  Consultations	  on	  
 3	  
Walker	   suggests	   that	   because	  of	   increasing	   “transjudicial	   communication”	   the	   lessons	  
learned	   from	   case	   law	   in	   one	   jurisdiction	   are	   valuable	   in	   understanding	   decisions	   in	  
others.4	   	   She	   provides	   as	   an	   example	   Re:	   GJ,	   a	   New	   Zealand	   case	   that	   canvassed	  
jurisprudence	   from	  the	  US,	   the	  UK,	  Canada,	   the	  Netherlands,	  Denmark,	  Germany,	  and	  
Australia	  to	  illuminate	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  homosexuals	  could	  be	  considered	  
a	  cognizable	  social	  group.	  	  The	  court	  ruled	  in	  the	  affirmative.	  
	   Other	  authors	  address	  the	  issues	  that	  have	  arisen	  limiting	  the	  success	  of	  asylum	  
claims	  since	  it	  became	  commonplace	  to	  accept	  that	  LGBTs	  could	  constitute	  a	  particular	  
social	  group.	  	  Among	  the	  first	  of	  these	  to	  emerge	  was	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  
LGBT	  refugee	  should	  be	  obliged	  to	  live	  “discreetly”	  to	  avoid	  persecution.	  	  Walker	  frames	  
this	   issue	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   “an	   unwillingness	   to	   recognise	   a	   right	   to	   express	   one’s	  
sexuality	   publicly	   […]	   a	   right	   to	   express	   one’s	   identity	   as	   gay,	   lesbian,	   transgender	   or	  
bisexual,	   to	   live	   openly	   in	   a	   sexual	   relationship	   with	   one’s	   partner	   of	   choice,	   and	   to	  
express	   intimacy	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   socially	   acceptable	   for	   heterosexual	   members	   of	  
society”.5	  	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  writing	  nearly	  a	  decade	  later,	  maps	  the	  progress	  in	  addressing	  
the	   problems	   of	   the	   discretion	   requirement.	   	   She	   identifies	   the	   expectation	   that	  
refugees	  should	  have	  to	  cooperate	  in	  their	  own	  protection	  by	  “exercising	  ‘self	  restraint’	  
such	  as	  avoiding	  any	  behaviour	   that	  would	   identify	   them	  as	  gay;	  never	   telling	  anyone	  
they	  were	  gay;	  only	  expressing	  their	  sexuality	  by	  having	  anonymous	  sex	  in	  public	  places;	  
                                                                                                                                            
International	  Protection,	  ed.	  Erika	  Feller,	  Volker	  Türk,	  and	  Frances	  Nicholson	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2003),	  263-­‐304.	  	  
4	  Walker	  (2000),	  181.	  
5	  Ibid.,	  205.	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pretending	   that	   their	   partner	   is	   a	   ‘flatmate’;	   or	   indeed	   remaining	   celibate”6	   as	   faulty	  
logic	   that	   subverts	   the	   Refugee	   Convention’s	   aim	   to	   provide	   surrogate	   protection	   by	  
making	   the	   refugee	   responsible	   for	   protecting	   himself.	   	   She	   further	   asserts	   that	   this	  
discretion	   requirement	   is	   applied	   discriminatorily	   to	   LGBT	   refugees,	   pointing	   out	   that	  
the	  right	  to	  be	  “‘openly’	  religious”	  is	  accepted	  as	  being	  protected	  under	  the	  Convention.	  	  
Millbank	   also	   describes	   attempts	   by	   decision-­‐makers	   to	   circumvent	   decisions	   that	  
delegitimize	   the	   discretion	   requirement	   by	   claiming	   that	   certain	   applicants	   were	  
“naturally	  discreet”.7	  The	  reason	  behind	  this,	  she	  writes,	  is	  a	  “profound	  and	  continuing	  
failure	  to	  comprehend	  the	  hegemonic	  and	  naturalised	  expression	  of	  heterosexuality	   in	  
all	  cultures”.8	  	  Millbank	  further	  explores	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  discretion	  question	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  UK,	  the	   last	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  to	  do	  away	  with	  the	  requirement.	  	  
She	   ties	   the	   prolongation	   of	   the	   issue	   there	   to	   a	   “discernible	   national	   response”	  
exemplified	   by	   the	   Wolfenden	   Report’s	   recommended	   solution	   of	   privacy	   for	   the	  
“‘problem’	  of	  homosexuality”.9	  	  This	  solution	  consisted	  in	  rendering	  gays,	  determined	  to	  
be	   offensive	   to	   public	   sensibilities	   but	   not	   criminals,	   invisible	   in	   a	   legal	   sense	   by	  
decriminalizing	  consensual	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  acts	  between	  adults.	  	  In	  turn,	  gay	  men	  were	  
supposed	  to	  cooperate	  with	  this	  progress	  by	  behaving	  discreetly	  and	  covering	  their	  non-­‐
normative	  sexuality.	  
                                                
6	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  “From	  discretion	  to	  disbelief:	  recent	  trends	  in	  refugee	  determinations	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,”	  13	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  2-­‐3	  (2009a),	  391-­‐414.	  
7	  See	  396-­‐398.	  
8	  Ibid,	  397.	  
9	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  “A	  Preoccupation	  with	  Perversion:	  the	  British	  Response	  to	  Refugee	  Claims	  on	  the	  Basis	  of	  
Sexual	  Orientation,	  1989-­‐2003”,	  14	  Social	  Legal	  Studies	  (2005).	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The	   issue	   of	   privacy	   is	   taken	   up	   by	   several	   authors	   as	   another	   source	   of	  
challenges	   for	   LGBT	   asylum	   claims.	   	   The	   general	   interpretation	   challenge	   in	   refugee	  
status	  determination	  and	  asylum	  law	  relating	  to	  whether	  the	  agent	  of	  persecution	  must	  
be	   the	   state	   for	   a	   claimant	   to	   be	   granted	   status	   or	   asylum	   is	   connected	   to	   the	   LGBT	  
divide	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  by	  Millbank	  who	  points	  out	   that	  either	  
the	  expression	  of	  LGBT	  identity	  or	  the	  act	  of	  persecution	  based	  thereupon	  or	  both	  take	  
place	   in	   the	  public	   sphere	   in	   the	  experiences	  of	   gay	  men	  while	   lesbians	   are	   rendered	  
invisible	  because	  both	  identity	  expression	  and	  persecution	  happen	  in	  the	  private	  realm	  
(at	  the	  hands	  of	  family	  members	  and	  the	  community).	  	  She	  does	  this	  primarily	  through	  
an	   analysis	   of	   Australian	   and	   Canadian	   caselaw.10	   	   Victoria	   Neilson	   provides	   a	   similar	  
analysis	  using	  American	  caselaw.11	  
	   Nearly	  all	  the	  authors	  in	  the	  field	  touch	  on	  the	  fundamental	  subject	  of	  credibility.	  	  
Christopher	  N.	  Kendall	  rejects	  the	  notions	  of	  “liberal	  discourses	  of	  law	  as	  objective”	  and	  
of	  “law	  as	  impartial	  fact	  finder”	  asserting	  that	  “self-­‐reflexive	  analyses	  call	  into	  question	  
legal	   decision-­‐makers’	   subjectivity”12.	   	   This	   opens	   the	   door	   for	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  
prejudice	   and	   stereotypes	   that	   affect	   decision-­‐making.	   	  Millbank,	   drawing	   conclusions	  
from	   1000	   publicly-­‐available	   cases	   from	   the	  UK,	   Canada,	   Australia,	   and	  New	   Zealand,	  
highlights	   the	   pitfalls	   of	   credibility	   assessment	   by	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   lower	   level	  
tribunals.	   	  She	  examines	  problematic	  reasoning	   in	  decisions	  made	  based	  on	  claimants’	  
                                                
10	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  “Gender,	  Sex	  and	  Visibility	  in	  Refugee	  Claims	  on	  the	  Basis	  of	  Sexual	  Orientation”,	  18	  
Georgetown	  Immigration	  Law	  Journal	  (2003).	  
11	  Victoria	  Neilson,	  “Homosexual	  or	  Female?	  Applying	  Gender-­‐Based	  Asylum	  Jurisprudence	  to	  Lesbian	  
Asylum	  Claims”,	  16	  Stanford	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Review	  (2005).	  
12Christopher	  Kendall,	  “Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Refugees	  in	  Australia:	  Now	  that	  ‘Acting	  Discreetly’	  is	  no	  Longer	  an	  
Option,	  will	  Equality	  be	  Forthcoming?”,	  15	  International	  Journal	  of	  Refugee	  Law	  4	  (2003),	  716.	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demeanors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  consistency	  and	  plausibility	  of	  their	  narratives,	  observing	  that	  
this	  reasoning	  is	  related	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  education	  and	  training	  as	  well	  as,	  most	  importantly,	  
the	  lack	  of	  “a	  critical	  space	  of	  reflection”—a	  context	  in	  which	  adjudicators	  decide	  cases	  
with	   one	   or	   more	   colleagues,	   benefit	   from	   peer	   reviews,	   and	   acknowledge	   that	  
objectively-­‐verifiable	  truth	  may	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  process	  of	  refugee	  adjudication.13	  	  Along	  
with	   Laurie	   Berg,	   she	   also	   ties	   the	   difficulties	   in	   credibility	   assessment	   with	   the	  
challenges	   of	   LGBT	   refugee	   narrative	   construction.	   	   They	   identify	   psychosocial	   issues	  
faced	   by	   refugees	   that	   may	   hinder	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   narrative	   as	   well	   as	  
preconceptions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  that	  may	  negatively	  impact	  the	  reception	  
of	  the	  narrative.14	  	  Such	  preconceptions,	  especially	  those	  that	  rely	  on	  a	  medicalized	  view	  
of	   homosexuality,	   are	   illuminated	   by	  Derek	  McGhee	   through	   the	  UK	   case	   of	  Vraciu.15	  	  
Barry	  O’Leary	  also	  focuses	  on	  decision-­‐makers’	  preconceptions	   in	  a	  UK	  context,	  calling	  
into	   question	   assumptions	   of	   decision-­‐makers	   there	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	  
sexual	   activity	   and	   sexual	   identity	   as	   well	   as	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   country	   information	  
relied	  upon.16	  Another	  barrier	  to	  fair	  credibility	  assessment,	  the	  availability	  of	  accurate	  
independent	   country	   information	   against	   which	   adjudicators	   analyze	   refugees’	  
                                                
13	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  “‘The	  Ring	  of	  Truth’:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Credibility	  Assessment	  in	  Particular	  Social	  Group	  
Refugee	  Determinations,”	  21	  International	  Journal	  of	  Refugee	  Law	  (2009b),	  29.	  
14	  Laurie	  Berg	  and	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  “Constructing	  the	  Personal	  Narratives	  of	  Lesbian,	  Gay	  and	  Bisexual	  
Asylum	  Claimants,”	  22	  Journal	  of	  Refugee	  Studies	  (2009).	  
15	  Derek	  McGhee,	  “Accessing	  Homosexuality:	  Truth,	  Evidence	  and	  the	  Legal	  Practices	  for	  Determining	  
Refugee	  Status	  -­‐	  The	  Case	  of	  Ioan	  Vraciu”,	  6	  Body	  and	  Society	  (2000).	  
16	  Barry	  O’Leary,	  “‘We	  cannot	  claim	  any	  particular	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  homosexuals,	  still	  less	  of	  
Iranian	  homosexuals’:	  The	  Particular	  Problems	  facing	  Those	  Who	  Seek	  Asylum	  on	  the	  Basis	  of	  Their	  Sexual	  
Identity”,	  16	  Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  (2008).	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narratives,	  is	  explored	  by	  Nicole	  LaViolette	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context.17	  	  She	  finds	  that	  in	  
many	   cases,	   the	  necessary	   evidence	   is	   either	  unavailable	  or	   lacking	   in	   sufficient	   focus	  
and	  detail.	  
	   While	  all	  of	  the	  above-­‐discussed	  authors	  judge	  the	  deployment	  of	  stereotypes	  to	  
be	  hurdles	  in	  the	  path	  of	  progress,	  at	  least	  one	  published	  author	  views	  the	  acceptance	  
of	   LGBT	   refugee	   claims	   as	   detrimental	   to	   traditional	   societal	   norms	   and	   therefore	  
understand	  decisions	  to	  limit	  such	  claims	  to	  be	  desirable.	  	  Michael	  A.	  Scaperlanda	  sees	  
“innovative	   statutory	   interpretation	   and	   administrative	   discretion	   “	   in	   “the	   area	   of	  
asylum	  and	  refugee	  law”	  as	  “provid[ing]	  	  the	  greatest	  long-­‐term	  potential	  […]	  to	  further	  
undermine	  traditional	  notions	  of	  marriage,	  family,	  and	  sexuality.”18	  	  One	  of	  the	  ways	  he	  
sees	   this	   happening	   is	   by	   the	   “blur[ring	   of]	   the	   distinction	   between	   orientation	   and	  
behavior,	   being	   and	   doing”	   in	   “cases	   and	   most	   […]	   academic	   commentary”.19	   	   Such	  
academic	  commentary	  might	  include	  that	  of	  O’Leary	  who	  understands	  sexual	  activity	  to	  
be	  part	  of	  sexual	  identity.20	  	  Scaperlanda	  and	  O’Leary	  would	  both	  agree	  that	  focusing	  on	  
conduct	   alone	   greatly	   reduces	   the	   chances	   for	   a	   successful	   asylum	   claim,	   but	   while	  
O’Leary	   sees	   this	   as	   a	  mistake21,	   Scaperlanda	  employs	   it	   as	   a	  method	  of	   analysis.	   	  He	  
interprets	  the	  US	  Ninth	  Circuit	  case	  Hernandez-­‐Montiel	  to	  be	  in	  error	  because	  it	  protects	  
                                                
17	  Nicole	  LaViolette,	  “Independent	  human	  rights	  documentation	  and	  sexual	  minorities:	  an	  ongoing	  
challenge	  for	  the	  Canadian	  refugee	  determination	  process”,	  13	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
2-­‐3	  (June	  2009)	  437-­‐476.	  
18	  Michael	  A.	  Scaperlanda,	  “Kulturkampf	  in	  the	  Backwaters:	  Homosexuality	  and	  Immigration	  Law”,	  11	  
Wideneral	  Journal	  for	  Public	  Law	  3	  (2002),	  483-­‐484.	  
19	  Ibid.,	  506.	  
20	  O’Leary,	  90.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  91.	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an	   asylum-­‐seeker	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   his	   conduct	   rather	   than	   for	   his	   identity.22	   	   In	   so	  
doing,	  he	  disconnects	  activity	  from	  identity,	  arguing	  that	  even	  if	  a	  person	  cannot	  change	  
his	  sexual	  orientation,	  he	  can	  change	   its	  outward	  manifestations	  and	  thus	  asserts	  that	  
because	   conduct	   is	   not	   immutable,	   it	   is	   not	  part	   of	   a	   protected	   characteristic	   on	   that	  
ground.	   23	  He	  responds	  subsequently	  to	  the	  question	  that	   logically	   follows:	  whether,	   if	  
the	  expression	  of	  sexual	  identity	  is	  not	  immutable,	  it	  is	  so	  fundamental	  to	  human	  dignity	  
that	  it	  should	  not	  have	  to	  be	  changed.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  Scaperlanda	  argues	  in	  the	  negative,	  
using	  a	  slippery	  slope	  argument	  in	  which	  he	  compares	  LGBTs	  to	  pedophiles.24	  	  While	  he	  
recognizes	  the	  immutability	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  (if	  only	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument),	  he	  
does	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  expression	  thereof	   it	   is	   fundamental	  to	  human	  dignity.25	   	   	   In	  
comparison,	   he	   holds	   the	   Toboso-­‐Alfonso	   decision	   (as	   he	   interprets	   it	   to	   focus	   on	  
identity	  alone)	  to	  be	  a	  preferable	  approach	  because	  it	  doesn’t	  “declare	  that	  a	  ‘millennia	  
[sic]	  of	  moral	  teaching’	  is	  morally	  repugnant	  or	  irrelevant	  in	  post-­‐modern	  America”26.	  	  In	  
his	   interpretation,	   the	   decision	   protects	   LGBTs	   for	   “being”	   LGBTs	   but	   not	   acting	   like	  
LGBTs.	  
	   Though	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  LGBT	  asylum	  claims	  is	  comparatively	  rich,	  
especially	   in	   articles	   detailing	   single-­‐country	   case	   studies	   or	   studies	   comparing	   two	  
countries,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  system-­‐wide	  analysis	  of	  judicial	  prejudice.	  	  Furthermore,	  
illuminating	  the	  trends	  described	  in	  earlier	  articles	  with	  recent	  jurisprudence	  will	  give	  a	  
more	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  Adding	  examples	  from	  the	  UNHCR	  
                                                
22	  Scaperlanda,	  507.	  
23	  Ibid.,	  509.	  
24	  Ibid.,	  509-­‐510.	  
25	  Ibid.,	  510.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  505-­‐506.	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refugee	   status	   determination	   (RSD)	   process	   and	   from	   non-­‐Anglophone	   sources	   will	  
further	  contribute	  to	  this	  provide	  a	  broader	  perspective.	  	  
	   	  	   	  
C.	  Methodology	  
i.	  Approach	  to	  the	  Problem	  
	   The	   primary	  means	   upon	  which	   I	   relied	   to	   uncover	   the	   beliefs	   of	   immigration	  
officials	  about	  sexuality	  and	  same-­‐sex	  sexuality	   in	  particular	  was	  through	  their	  written	  
decisions	   and	   transcriptions	  of	   their	   remarks	   appearing	   in	   court	   documents.	   	   Because	  
the	   decisions	   also	   report	   whether	   the	   adjudicator	   decided	   in	   favor	   of	   an	   applicant’s	  
claim	  or	  against	  it,	  this	  method	  of	  analysis	  allowed	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  which	  lines	  
of	   reasoning	   were	   privileged,	   showing	   the	   force	   of	   certain	   beliefs.	   	   For	   further	  
explanation	   of	   judicial	   prejudice	   and	   the	   particularities	   of	   sexual	   orientation-­‐based	  
claims,	  I	  turned	  to	  experts	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  refugee	  law,	  psychiatry,	  and	  refugee	  advocacy.	  	  
These	  interviews	  helped	  me	  identify	  trends	  and	  make	  connections	  between	  conclusions	  
I	  had	  drawn	  from	  case	  law.	  	  	  	  	  
After	  locating	  what	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  instances	  of	  judicial	  prejudice,	  I	  aimed	  
to	   explain	   them	   using	   the	   sociological	   perspectives	   of	   Erving	   Goffman,	   an	   expert	   on	  
social	   stigma	  and	  self-­‐presentation.	   	  Since	   the	  articulation	  of	  his	   theories	  on	  stigma	   in	  
the	  1960s,	  many	  authors	  have	  used	  his	  work	  specifically	  to	  elucidate	  the	  experiences	  of	  
LGBTs.27	  	  Rather	  than	  constructing	  purely	  legal	  arguments,	  I	  interpreted	  court	  decisions	  
                                                
27	  See,	  for	  example,	  Kenji	  Yoshino,	  Covering:	  The	  Hidden	  Assault	  on	  Our	  Civil	  Rights	  (2006).	  	  Yoshino	  
develops	  Goffman’s	  concept	  of	  “covering”,	  or	  minimizing	  the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  stigma	  while	  admitting	  to	  
possessing	  it,	  in	  an	  LGBT	  context.	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in	  a	  “law	  as	  culture”	  context	  that	  sees	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  system	  structurally	  as	  part	  and	  
parcel	  of	  society.	  	  When	  viewed	  this	  way,	  adjudicators’	  preconceptions	  are	  easily	  fit	  into	  
broader	  discourses	  of	  sexuality,	  gender,	  and	  morality.	  
	   Relying	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  transjudicial	  communication	  discussed	  by	  Walker28	  
and	  the	  hegemonic	  nature	  of	  heterosexism	  articulated	  by	  Millbank29,	  I	  have	  attempted	  
to	  synthesize	  the	  lessons	  from	  the	  various	  cases	  and	  sources	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  to	  
reveal	   a	   picture	   of	   system-­‐wide	   judicial	   stereotyping	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   it	  
disadvantages	  LGBT	  refugees.	  	  It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  such	  a	  picture	  will	  provide	  a	  foundation	  
for	   further	   research.	   	   Such	   research	   could	   seek	   to	   further	   understand	   the	   rationale	  
behind	  decisions	  through	  in	  depth	  oral	  interviews	  with	  officials.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  desirable	  
to	   interview	   both	   successful	   and	   unsuccessful	   claimants	   directly	   to	   understand	   their	  
experiences	   firsthand	   as	   well	   as	   how	   they	   contributed	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   sexual	  
identity	  in	  general	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  court	  context.	  	  Finally,	  given	  the	  trend	  both	  in	  
this	   thesis	   and	   in	   the	   field	  more	   broadly	   to	   focus	   primarily	   on	   gay	  men,	   it	   would	   be	  
invaluable	  to	  further	  pursue	  the	  unique	  features	  of	  claims	  made	  by	  lesbian	  and	  bisexual	  
female	  asylum-­‐seekers	  that	  I	  touch	  on	  in	  Chapter	  V.	  
ii.	  Terminology	  
	   As	   with	   any	   analysis	   relating	   to	   sexual	   orientation,	   choosing	   appropriate	  
terminology	  is	  inevitably	  problematic.	  	  I	  rely	  on	  the	  terms	  “LGBT”	  and	  “sexual	  minority”	  
to	  describe	  the	  communities	  and	  identities	  of	  people	  whose	  sexuality	  is	  not	  exclusively	  
                                                                                                                                            
	  
28	  Supra	  note	  3.	  
29	  Supra	  note	  7.	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oriented	   toward	   people	   of	   the	   opposite	   biological	   sex.	   	   The	   term	   LGBT	   incorporates	  
lesbians,	   gay	   men,	   bisexuals,	   and	   transgender	   individuals	   and	   is	   often	   used	   by	  
international	  organizations	  and	  agencies	   such	  as	  UNHCR.	   	  While	   this	   term	   is	  generally	  
criticized	   for	  not	   including	  other	  minority	  sexualities	   (non-­‐normative	  heterosexualities,	  
for	  example),	  the	  specific	  cases	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis	  all	  deal	  with	  applicants	  covered	  
under	  the	  LGBT	  rubric.	  	  Because	  the	  cases	  here	  revolve	  around	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  
claims,	   I	   have	   not	   used	   (nor	   encountered)	   any	   that	   involve	   exclusively	   heterosexual	  
transgender	  cases.	  	  	  
I	  recognize	  that	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  from	  the	  research	  of	  Alfred	  Kinsey	  and	  others	  
that	   the	  majority	  of	  people	   fall	   somewhere	  along	  a	   spectrum	  of	   sexualities	   stretching	  
from	   exclusively	   homosexual	   to	   exclusively	   heterosexual,	   the	   term	   “sexual	   minority”	  
may	  be	  erroneous.	  	  I	  believe,	  however	  that	  in	  the	  heteronormative	  context	  of	  societies	  
of	   origin,	   receiving	   countries,	   and	   the	   refugee	   adjudication	   system	   itself,	   those	   who	  
recognize	  and/or	  accept	  their	  non-­‐normative	  sexualities	   (be	   it	  privately	  or	  publicly)	  do	  
constitute	  a	  minority.	  	  	  
Because	   it	   is	   not	   a	   preferred	   term	   of	   self-­‐description	   and	   has	   medical	  
connotations,30	  I	  will	  avoid	  the	  term	  “homosexual”	  outside	  of	  the	  context	  of	   its	  use	  by	  
decision-­‐makers	   and	   authors.	   	   Instead,	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   “person’s	   capacity	   for	   profound	  
emotional,	  affectional	  and	  sexual	  attraction	  to,	  and	  intimate	  and	  sexual	  relations	  with,	  
                                                
30	  Walker	  (2000),	  176.	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individuals	   of	   […]	   the	   same	   gender”31	   or	   aspects	   of	   that	   sexuality	   included	   in	  
“bisexuality”,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  “same-­‐sex	  sexuality”.	  
	  
I.	  From	  Pariahs	  to	  a	  Particular	  Social	  Group	  
	   With	   homosexuality	   formally	   a	   grounds	   for	   exclusion	   from	   admission	   to	   the	  
territory	   of	   the	   US	   for	   most	   of	   the	   20th	   Century	   (until	   1990),	   LGBT	   individuals	  
systematically	  denied	  equal	   immigration	   rights	  with	   regard	   to	   family	   reunification	   in	  a	  
majority	  of	  countries,	  and	  laws	  restricting	  same-­‐sex	  consensual	  sexual	  activity	  between	  
adults	   effectively	   restricting	   the	   freedom	   of	   movement	   of	   sexual	   minorities,	   the	  
discrimination	   against	   and	   isolation	   of	   the	   LGBT	   community	   has	   long	   informed	  
immigration	   policy.	   	   Court	   decisions	   and	   intervention	   by	   intergovernmental	  
organizations	   over	   the	   past	   three	   decades,	   however,	   have	   largely	   transformed	   LGBT	  
individuals	   fleeing	   persecution	   from	   pariahs	   to	   members	   of	   a	   particular	   social	   group	  
protected	  under	  international	  law.	  	  The	  number	  of	  countries	  that	  grant	  asylum	  to	  LGBT	  
refugees	  has	  grown	  to	  at	   least	  20	  since	  the	  first	  successful	  claims	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  
America	  in	  the	  1980s.32	  	  This	  jurisprudential	  progress	  has	  occurred	  in	  phases,	  beginning	  
in	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  with	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  “particular	  social	  group”	  ground	  
                                                
31	  International	  Commission	  of	  Jurists,	  Yogyakarta	  Principles	  on	  the	  Application	  of	  International	  Human	  
Rights	  Law	  in	  relation	  to	  Sexual	  Orientation	  and	  Gender	  Identity	  (2007),	  preamble.	  
32	  These	  countries	  are	  Australia,	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Canada,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  
Ireland,	  Italy,	  Latvia,	  the	  Netherlands,	  New	  Zealand,	  Norway,	  South	  Africa,	  Spain,	  Thailand,	  the	  United	  
Kingdom,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  See	  Amnesty	  International,	  Sexual	  Minorities	  and	  the	  Law:	  A	  World	  
Survey	  (July	  2006);	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court,	  Appeal	  1447/2004	  (25	  July	  2007);	  and	  Swetha	  Sridharan,	  “The	  
Difficulties	  of	  US	  Asylum	  Claims	  Based	  on	  Sexual	  Orientation,”	  Migration	  Information	  Policy	  Institute	  
(2008)	  http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=700.	  	  A	  single	  successful	  sexual	  
orientation-­‐based	  asylum	  case	  in	  Israel	  was	  also	  reported	  in	  Michael	  Kagan	  and	  Anat	  Ben-­‐Dor,	  “Nowhere	  
to	  Run:	  Palestinian	  Asylum-­‐Seekers	  in	  Israel”,	  (Tel-­‐Aviv:	  Tel	  Aviv	  University’s	  Public	  Interest	  Law	  Program,	  
April	  2008),	  30.	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written	  into	  the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention,	  then	  turning	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  
asylum-­‐seekers	   should	  be	   required	   to	   cooperate	   in	   their	   own	  protection	  by	   living	  out	  
their	  sexuality	  “discreetly”,	  and	  finally	  to	  questions	  of	  credibility	  that	  require	  applicants	  
to	  prove	  their	  claims	  of	  sexual	  identity.	  
Decisions	  like	  Matter	  of	  Acosta	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  (AG)	  v.	  Ward	  set	  a	  standard	  
that	   would	  move	   the	   discussion	   from	  whether	   sexual	  minorities	   had	   any	   Convention	  
grounds	  on	  which	  to	  claim	  refugee	  status	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  
constitute	   particular	   social	   groups.	   	   This	   question	   was	   answered	   definitively	   in	   the	  
affirmative	   by	   cases	   such	   as	  Applicant	   A	   in	   Australia,	   Shah	   and	   Islam	   in	   the	   UK,	   and	  
Toboso-­‐Alfonso	   in	   the	  US.	   	   In	   civil	   law	   jurisdictions,	   the	   first	   two	  phases	  have	   taken	  a	  
similar	   course,	   though	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   threat	   of	   persecution	   has	   been	  
privileged	   over	   the	   specific	   Convention	   ground	   under	   which	   the	   refugee	   may	   be	  
classified.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  these	  determinations,	  under	  both	  common	  and	  civil	  law,	  
decision-­‐makers	  struggled	  with	  whether	   to	  grant	  LGBTs	   fleeing	  persecution	  protection	  
under	   the	  Convention	  or	  other,	   lesser	   forms	  such	  as	   leave	   to	   remain	  on	  humanitarian	  
grounds.	  	  This	  issue	  has	  largely	  been	  resolved	  as	  well.	  	  The	  third	  phase	  has	  consisted	  in	  a	  
shift	  from	  the	  categorical	  to	  the	  individual	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  claimants’	  ability	  to,	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  demonstrating	  that	  they	  belong	  to	  a	  particular	  social	  group,	  prove	  the	  
validity	  of	  their	  sexual	  identity.	  
Matter	   of	   Acosta,	   a	   1985	   US	   Board	   of	   Immigration	   Appeals	   (BIA)	   judgment,	  
aimed	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  particular	  social	  group	  criterion	  
established	  by	  the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention.	  	  Applying	  the	  principle	  of	  ejusdem	  generis,	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the	   judgment	   determined	   that	   because	   the	   other	   Convention	   grounds	   of	   persecution	  
(race,	   religion,	   nationality,	   and	   political	   opinion)	   hinge	   on	   “persecution	   aimed	   at	   an	  
immutable	   characteristic:	   a	   characteristic	   that	   is	   either	   beyond	   the	   power	   of	   an	  
individual	   to	   change	   or	   is	   so	   fundamental	   to	   individual	   identity	   or	   conscience	   that	   it	  
ought	  not	  to	  be	  required	  to	  be	  changed,”	  then	  persecution	  based	  on	  membership	  in	  a	  
particular	  social	  group	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  	  mean	  “persecution	  that	  is	  directed	  toward	  an	  
individual	   who	   is	   a	   member	   of	   a	   group	   of	   persons	   all	   of	   whom	   share	   common,	  
immutable	  characteristics.”	  33	  	  The	  echoes	  of	  this	  case	  were	  strongest	  in	  other	  common	  
law	  jurisdictions,	  such	  as	  Canada	  where	  a	  similar	  decision	  was	  reached	  by	  the	  Supreme	  
Court	  in	  1993.	  	  Canada	  (AG)	  v.	  Ward	  defined	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  as	  encompassing	  
any	  of	  three	  categories:	  	  	  
(1)	  groups	  defined	  by	  an	  innate,	  unchangeable	  characteristic;	  	  
(2)	  groups	  whose	  members	  voluntarily	  associate	  for	  reasons	  so	  fundamental	  to	  
their	  human	  dignity	   that	   they	   should	  not	  be	   forced	   to	   forsake	   the	  association;	  
and	   (3)	   groups	   associated	   by	   a	   former	   voluntary	   status,	   unalterable	   due	   to	   its	  
historical	  permanence.34	  
	  
Acosta	   and	   Ward	   have	   become	   the	   two	   leading	   cases	   in	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
particular	  social	  group	  ground.	  	  	  
Parallel	  conclusions	  were	  drawn	   in	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	   	  A	  year	  prior	   to	  
Ward,	  the	  Australian	  case	  of	  Morato	  v.	  Minister	  for	  Immigration,	  Local	  Government	  and	  
Ethnic	  Affairs	  determined	  that	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group,	  it	  is	  required	  
of	   an	   individual	   that	   she	   or	   he	   “belongs	   to	   or	   is	   identified	   with	   a	   recognisable	   or	  
                                                
33	  Matter	  of	  Acosta,	  A-­‐24159781,	  United	  States	  Board	  of	  Immigration	  Appeals	  (1	  March	  1985).	  
34	  Aleinikoff,	  269.	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cognisable	   group	   within	   society	   that	   shares	   some	   experience	   in	   common”.35	   	   Social	  
cognizability	  was	  again	  emphasized	  in	  Applicant	  A	  v.	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  and	  Ethnic	  
Affairs	   wherein	   McHugh	   J	   states	   that	   “the	   existence	   of	   a	   ‘particular	   social	   group’	  
depends	   in	  most,	  perhaps	  all,	   cases	  on	  external	  perceptions	  of	   the	  group	  because	   the	  
notion	  of	  persecution	  for	  reasons	  of	  membership	  of	  particular	  social	  group	  implies	  that	  
the	   group	   must	   be	   identifiable	   as	   a	   social	   group”.36	   	   In	   New	   Zealand,	   Re:	   GJ	   (1995)	  
reaffirmed	   that	   protected	   characteristics	   were	   vital	   in	   discerning	   what	   constituted	   a	  
particular	   social	  group	   reiterating	   that	  “making	  societal	  attitudes	  determinative	  of	   the	  
existence	  of	  the	  social	  group,	  virtually	  any	  group	  of	  persons	  in	  a	  society	  perceived	  as	  a	  
group	   could	   be	   said	   to	   be	   a	   particular	   social	   group”.37	   	   The	   Refugee	   Status	   Appeals	  
Authority	   thus	   aimed	   to	   avoid	   the	   “objective	   observer”	   approach	   which	   it	   saw	   as	  
enlarging	  the	  social	  group	  category	  to	  the	  point	  of	  meaninglessness.	  
	   The	   enduring	   criteria	   for	   determining	   whether	   an	   individual	   belongs	   to	   a	  
particular	   social	   group	   have	   most	   often	   revolved	   around	   a	   common	   immutable	   or	  
fundamental	   characteristic	   and	   social	   cognizability.	   	   However,	   other	   interpretations	  
have	   diverged	   significantly	   from	   the	   Acosta/Ward	   standards.	   	   In	   the	   1986	   case	   of	  
Sanchez-­‐Trujillo	   v.	   INS,	   the	   US	  Ninth	   Circuit	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   stated	   that	   “the	   phrase	  
‘particular	  social	  group’	  implies	  a	  collection	  of	  people	  closely	  affiliated	  with	  each	  other”	  
and	  that	  a	  “voluntary	  associational	   relationship	  among	  the	  purported	  members”	  must	  
                                                
35	  (1992)	  111	  ALR	  417	  in	  Kristen	  L.	  Walker	  (2000),	  180.	  
36Applicant	  A	  and	  Another	  v.	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  and	  Ethnic	  Affairs	  and	  Another,	  High	  Court	  of	  
Australia,	  (1997)	  190	  CLR	  225;	  142	  ALR	  331.	  
37	  Refugee	  Appeal	  No.	  1312/93,	  Re	  GJ,	  No	  1312/93,	  New	  Zealand:	  Refugee	  Status	  Appeals	  Authority	  (30	  
August	  1995).	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exist.38	  	  This	  kind	  of	  reasoning,	  though	  rejected	  in	  Applicant	  A	  as	  well	  as	  UK	  cases	  Shah	  
and	  Islam,39	  persists	  in	  some	  circuits	  of	  the	  federal	  appellate	  courts	  in	  the	  US.40	  
	   In	  1999,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  became	  the	  last	  major	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  to	  
adopt	  the	  protected	  characteristics	  standard	  through	  the	  joint	  decision	  issued	  on	  Shah	  
and	   Islam.	   	  The	   Immigration	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  drew	  on	  this	  decision	  and	  on	  Acosta	  and	  
Ward	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  characteristic	  that	  
is	   “‘immutable	   or,	   put	   summarily,	   is	   beyond	   the	   power	   of	   the	   individual	   to	   change	  
except	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  renunciation	  of	  fundamental	  human	  rights’”.41	  	  	  
In	   Shah	   and	   Islam,	   while	   dealing	   primarily	   with	   heterosexual	   claimants	   and	  
gender	  issues,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  also	  took	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  asylum	  
following	   several	   years	   of	   inconsistencies	   in	   the	   application	   of	   particular	   social	   group	  
criteria	  to	  lesbians	  and	  gay	  men.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  initial	  cases	  that	  would	  open	  the	  door	  for	  
sexual	   orientation-­‐based	   asylum	   claims	   did	   not	   involve	   lesbian	   or	   gay	   claimants	   but	  
sought	   secondarily	   to	   clarify	   how	   sexual	   minorities	   fit	   in.	   	  Ward,	   for	   example,	   was	   a	  
Canadian	  case	   in	  which	  the	  claimant	  sought	  asylum	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  membership	   in	  
the	  Irish	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  that	  led	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  delineate	  the	  
boundaries	   of	   particular	   social	   groups.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   Court	   explicitly	   included	  
homosexuality	   in	   response	   to	   the	   gross	   inconsistencies	   in	   LGBT	   cases	   from	  1991	  until	  
that	  time.	  	  There	  were	  in	  fact	  cases	  in	  Canada	  that	  defined	  homosexuals	  as	  constituting	  
a	   particular	   social	   group,	   but	   there	   were	   also	   several	   that	   denied	   homosexuals	   that	  
                                                
38	  Sanchez-­‐Trujillo,	  et	  al.,	  v.	  Immigration	  and	  Naturalization	  Service,	  801	  F.2d	  1571,	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  
Appeals	  for	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  (15	  October	  1986).	  
39	  Aleinikoff,	  277.	  
40	  Berg	  and	  Millbank,	  195.	  
41	  Montoya,	  Appeal	  No.	  CC/15806/2000	  (27	  April	  2001)	  in	  Aleinikoff,	  273.	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status	  on,	  among	  other	  grounds,	  the	  fact	  that	  sexual	  orientation	  did	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Human	  Rights.42	  	  Like	  Shah	  and	  Islam	  and	  Ward,	  the	  Australian	  
case	   Applicant	   A,	   mentioned	   earlier,	   followed	   the	   same	   pattern—the	   case	   involved	  
applicants	  afraid	  of	  persecution	  for	  their	  rejection	  of	  China’s	  “One	  Child	  Policy”	  but	  the	  
judges	   made	   sure	   to	   include	   the	   issue	   of	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   The	   process	   in	   the	   US	  
happened	   in	   two	   steps:	   Acosta	   defined	   a	   particular	   social	   group	   and	   then	   Toboso-­‐
Alfonso	  explicitly	  included	  homosexuals.	  	  Matter	  of	  Toboso-­‐Alfonso	  became,	  in	  1990,	  the	  
first	   of	   the	   principal	   decisions	   of	   this	   kind.	   	   The	   BIA	   overturned	   a	   decision	   by	   the	  
Immigration	   and	   Naturalization	   Service	   (INS)	   in	   which	   it	   was	   found	   that	   “socially	  
deviated	  behavior,	  i.e.	  homosexual	  activity	  is	  not	  a	  basis	  for	  finding	  a	  social	  group	  within	  
the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  Act”.43	  	  The	  BIA’s	  reversal	  of	  the	  INS	  decision	  came	  the	  same	  
year	   as	   immigration	   legislation	   was	   passed	   in	   the	   US	   Congress	   effectively	   removing	  
homosexuality	  from	  a	  list	  of	  grounds	  for	  exclusion	  from	  immigration.	  	  Four	  years	  later,	  
the	   US	   Attorney	   General	   declared	   Toboso-­‐Alfonso	   a	   binding	   precedent	   “in	   all	  
proceedings	  involving	  the	  same	  issue	  or	  issues”.44	  
While	  nearly	   fifteen	  years	  of	   cases	   in	   common	   law	   jurisdictions	  pinpointed	   the	  
meaning	   of	   a	   particular	   social	   group	   and	   clarified	   that	   sexual	   minorities	   fit	   into	   this	  
category,	   civil	   law	   systems	   generally	   privilege	   the	  determination	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   a	  
threat	  of	  persecution	  over	  social	  group	  membership.45	  	  The	  civil	  law	  jurisprudence	  thus	  
                                                
42	  Nicole	  LaViolette,	  “The	  Immutable	  Refugees:	  Sexual	  Orientation	  in	  Canada	  (AG)	  v.	  Ward”,	  55	  University	  
of	  Toronto	  Faculty	  of	  Law	  Review	  1,	  (1997).	  
43	  Matter	  of	  Toboso-­‐Alfonso,	  20	  I	  &	  N	  Dec	  819,	  822	  (1990).	  
44	  Attorney	  General	  Order	  No.	  1895-­‐94	  (June	  19,	  1994).	  
45	  See	  Aleinikoff,	  Re:	  GJ,	  and	  Françoise	  Stichelbaut,	  “Les	  obstacles	  à	  la	  reconnaissance	  du	  statut	  de	  
réfugiée	  des	  demandeuses	  d’asile	  lesbiennes,”	  7	  Work	  in	  progress	  :	  Etudes	  Genre	  (March	  2008).	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lacks	   the	   depth	   of	   analysis	   of	   the	   particular	   social	   group	   categories.	   	   Nevertheless,	  
countries	  like	  the	  Netherlands,	  Germany,	  and	  France	  have	  accepted	  sexual	  orientation-­‐
based	   claims,	   yielding	   similar	   results	   to	   the	   progress	   in	   the	   common	   law	   systems.	  	  
According	   to	   Thomas	   Spijkerboer	   in	   his	   discussion	   of	   Dutch	   refugee	   law,	   quoted	   in	  
Feller,	  “just	  which	  of	  the	  five	  persecution	  grounds	  is	  related	  to	  the	  (feared)	  persecution	  
is	   virtually	   considered	   immaterial”.46	   	   In	   a	   similar	  way,	  Germany,	  which	   has	   approved	  
sexual	   orientation-­‐based	   claims	   since	   the	   early	   1980s,	   long	   fit	   refugee	   claims	   into	   a	  
political	   persecution	   paradigm	   rather	   than	   determining	   which	   of	   the	   five	   grounds	   is	  
specifically	   involved.47	   	  Gay	  men	  have	   successfully	   been	   considered	   at	   risk	   of	   political	  
persecution	   for	   their	   status	   as	   homosexuals.	   	   France,	   like	   the	   US,	   had	   two	   phases	   of	  
progress.	   	   In	   the	  mid-­‐1980s,	   social	  group	  claims	  unrelated	   to	   sexuality	  were	  approved	  
and	   then	   in	   Ourbih	   in	   1997,	   a	   precedent	   was	   set	   that	   sexual	   minorities	   could	   be	  
recognized	  in	  refugees.	  
In	  both	  common	  and	  civil	  law	  systems,	  it	  often	  happened	  that	  refugees	  were	  not	  
granted	   asylum	   under	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   1951	   Convention,	   but	   were	   allowed	   on	  
humanitarian	  grounds	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  countries	  to	  which	  they	  fled.	   	  Lesbians	  and	  gay	  
men	   seeking	   asylum	   in	   the	   UK	   prior	   to	   Shah	   and	   Islam	   were	   sometimes	   granted	  
“exceptional	   leave	   to	   remain”	   (later	   replaced	   by	   the	   status	   of	   “humanitarian	  
protection”).	   	   These	   lesser	   forms	   of	   protections	   do	   not	   carry	   the	   same	   settlement,	  
travel,	   and	   family	   reunification	   rights	   as	   asylum.	   	   Later,	   during	   a	   brief	   interval,	   UK	  
asylum-­‐seekers	  found	  themselves	  protected	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
                                                
46	  284.	  
47	  See	  Case	  Abstract	  IJRL/004,	  1	  International	  Journal	  of	  Refugee	  Law,	  (1989)	  110-­‐111.	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Rights	  (ECHR)	  non-­‐refoulement	  guidelines.	  	  The	  application	  of	  these	  in	  the	  UK	  has	  since	  
become	  much	  more	   restrictive.48	   	   In	   Scandinavia,	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   lesbian	   and	   gay	  
refugees	   were	   given	   residence	   permits	   or	   permission	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   country	   on	  
humanitarian	  grounds	  but	  not	  granted	  refugee	  status.	   	  Denmark,	   for	  example,	  did	  not	  
initially	  interpret	  sexual	  orientation	  as	  grounds	  for	  asylum	  in	  the	  particular	  social	  group	  
context.	  	  	  
Given	  the	   inconsistencies	   in	  the	  application	  of	   international	   refugee	   law	  by	  the	  
mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  importance	  of	  facilitating	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  asylum	  claims	  began	  
to	  be	   recognized	   system-­‐wide	   and	   at	   regional	   levels	   (specifically	   in	   Europe).	   	   In	   1996,	  
UNHCR	  stated	  that	  	  
Homosexuals	   may	   be	   eligible	   for	   refugee	   status	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   persecution	  
because	   of	   their	   membership	   of	   a	   particular	   social	   group.	   It	   is	   the	   policy	   of	  
UNHCR	   that	   persons	   facing	   attack,	   inhumane	   treatment,	   or	   serious	  
discrimination	   because	   of	   their	   homosexuality,	   and	   whose	   governments	   are	  
unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  protect	  them,	  should	  be	  recognized	  as	  refugees.49	  	  	  
	  
In	   2000,	   the	   practice	   of	   granting	   leave	   to	   remain	   rather	   than	   full	   Convention	   refugee	  
status	  was	  addressed	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  in	  Recommendation	  1470	  as	  follows:	  	  
The	  Assembly	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  homosexuals	  who	  have	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  	  
of	  persecution	  resulting	  from	  their	  sexual	  preference	  are	  refugees	  under	  Article	  
1.A.2.	  of	  the	  1951	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	  as	  members	  of	  
a	   particular	   social	   group,	   and	   consequently	   should	   be	   granted	   refugee	   status.	  
The	   present	   practice	   in	   some	  Council	   of	   Europe	  member	   states	   to	   grant	   them	  
leave	  to	  stay	  on	  humanitarian	  grounds	  may	  be	  detrimental	  to	  their	  human	  rights,	  
and	  cannot	  of	  itself	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  satisfactory	  solution.50	  
	  
                                                
48	  See	  Millbank	  (2005).	  
49	  UNHCR,	  Protecting	  Refugees:	  Questions	  and	  Answers,	  UNHCR/PI/Q&A-­‐UK1.PM5/Feb.1996	  (1996).	  
50	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Recommendation	  1470	  (2000)	  on	  Situation	  of	  Gays	  and	  Lesbians	  and	  their	  Partners	  in	  
Respect	  of	  Asylum	  and	  Immigration	  in	  the	  Members	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  (30	  June	  2000),	  1470.	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   While	   the	   cohesiveness	   requirement	   exemplified	   by	   Sanchez-­‐Trujillo	   and	   the	  
undesirable	  substitution	  of	  leave	  to	  remain	  for	  full	  protection	  were	  explicitly	  addressed	  
by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s,	   other	   hurdles	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   LGBT	   refugees	   remain.	  	  
These	   hurdles	   have	   more	   to	   do	   with	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   sexual	   identity	   of	   the	  
applicant	   than	   with	   technicalities	   of	   international	   law	   or	   the	   selection	   of	   which	   legal	  
approaches	  are	  most	  appropriate	  for	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  claims.	  


















II.	  Activity	  and	  Identity	  
	   The	   divides	   in	   notions	   of	   sexual	   identity	   that	   exist	   in	   adjudication	   belong	   to	  
broader	   social	   discourses.	   	   Among	   the	   most	   problematic	   is	   the	   debate	   over	   the	  
relationship	  between	  sexual	  activity	  and	  sexual	  identity.	  	  In	  an	  asylum	  context,	  	  
[t]here	   is	   a	   considerable	  measure	   of	   agreement	   that	   a	   particular	   social	   group	  
connotes	  a	  cognisable	  group	  in	  a	  society,	  and	  cognisable	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  
may	   be	   a	   well-­‐founded	   fear	   of	   persecution	   by	   reason	   of	  membership	   of	   such	  
group.	   In	   this	  context,	   the	  emphasis	   is	  on	  what	  a	  person	   is,	   i.e.	  a	  member	  of	  a	  
social	  group,	  not	  on	  what	  the	  person	  has	  done	  i.e.	  the	  acts	  or	  omissions	  of	  that	  
person.51	  
	  
The	  extent	  to	  which	  those	  “acts	  and	  omissions”	  inform	  or	  bespeak	  that	  identity	  is	  very	  
often	  unclear.	  	  When	  sexual	  activity	  and	  sexual	  identity	  are	  decoupled,	  an	  approach	  that	  
allows	  Western	  states	  to	  grant	  minimal	  protections	  to	  sexual	  minorities	  while	  retaining	  
the	   authority	   to	   regulate	  morality,52	   asylum-­‐seekers	   are	   put	   in	   a	   precarious	   position.	  	  
This	   is	   an	   approach	   that	   Scaperlanda	   advocates.	   	   He	   sees	   activity	   as	   a	   non-­‐essential	  
expression	  of	  an	  immutable	  identity	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  it.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  
premium	  attached	  to	  identity,	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  person	  who	  engages	  in	  same-­‐
sex	  sexual	  contact	  and	  a	  homosexual	  (or	  a	  gay	  man,	  a	  lesbian,	  a	  bisexual,	  a	  transgender	  
person,	   etc.)	   can	   be	   the	   difference	   between	   someone	   who	   does	   not	   merit	   refugee	  
protection	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  membership	   in	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  and	  someone	  who	  
does.	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  when	  sexual	  activity	  and	  sexual	   identity	  are	  conflated,	  LGBTs	  
                                                
51	  Re	  GJ	  
52	  Hollis	  V.	  Pfitsch	  “Homosexuality	  in	  Asylum	  and	  Constitutional	  Law:	  Rhetoric	  of	  Acts	  and	  Identity”,	  15	  
Law	  &	  Sexuality	  (2006),	  73.	  	  Pfitsch	  further	  suggests	  that	  a	  conflation	  of	  identity	  and	  conduct	  can	  also	  be	  
used	  toward	  the	  same	  ends.	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are	  also	  put	  at	  risk.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  Western-­‐introduced	  identity	  discourse	  in	  the	  post-­‐
colonial,	   practitioners	   of	   same-­‐sex	   contact	   who	   do	   not	   apply	   a	   sexual	   identity	   to	  
themselves	   might	   now	   be	   labeled	   and	   their	   activity	   politicized	   in	   a	   way	   it	   was	   not	  
before.	  
Joseph	  A.	  Massad,	  who	  has	  written	  at	  length	  on	  Orientalism	  and	  sexuality	  in	  the	  
Arab	   world	   (a	   major	   LGBT	   refugee-­‐generating	   region),	   argues	   that	   the	  
internationalization	   of	   the	   Western	   gay	   rights	   movement	   in	   recent	   decades	   has	  
transformed	  “practitioners	  of	  same-­‐sex	  contact	  into	  subjects	  who	  identify	  themselves	  as	  
homosexual	   and	   gay”.53	   	   He	   claims	   that	   a	   cohesive	   international	   gay	   rights	   régime	  
“produces	   homosexuals,	   as	   well	   as	   gays	   and	   lesbians,	   where	   they	   do	   not	   exist,	   and	  
represses	   same-­‐sex	   desires	   and	   practices	   that	   refuse	   to	   be	   assimilated	   into	   its	   sexual	  
epistemology”.54	  	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  in	  transforming	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  same-­‐sex	  
sexual	  contact	  into	  LGBTs,	  rights	  advocates	  create	  cognizable	  social	  groups	  that	  did	  not	  
exist	  before.	   	  By	  extension,	   then,	   the	  Western	  human	   rights	   régime	  creates	  groups	  of	  
people	  who	  may	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  persecution	  because	  of	  the	  foreignness	  of	  their	  new	  
identities	   and	   simultaneously	   provides	   a	   possibility	   of	   relief	   from	   that	   persecution.	  	  
Massad	  emphasizes	  that	  it	  is	  this	  foreign	  identity	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  persecution	  of	  LGBTs	  
in	  the	  Arab	  world	  rather	  than	  their	  sexual	  activities.	  	  	  
Katherine	  M.	  Franke	  of	  Columbia	  Law	  School	  sets	  forth	  a	  similar	  argument	  about	  
the	  novelty	  of	  sexual	  minority	  identities	  in	  the	  context	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  She	  says	  
                                                
53	  Joseph	  A.	  Massad,	  “Re-­‐Orienting	  Desire:	  The	  Gay	  International	  and	  the	  Arab	  World,”	  14	  Public	  Culture	  2	  
(2002),	  362.	  
54	  Ibid.,	  363.	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that	  though	  there	  is	  “ample	  evidence”	  of	  pre-­‐colonial	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  activity,	  “[s]exual	  
identity	   of	   object	   choice	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   desire	   was	   never	   the	   organizing	   force	  
behind	  pre-­‐colonial	  sexuality”.55	  	  The	  idea	  of	  homosexual	  and	  heterosexual	  identities	  is	  
a	  colonial	  artifact,	  according	  to	  Franke.	  	  Because	  a	  majority	  of	  LGBT	  refugees	  come	  from	  
countries	  once	  subject	  to	  colonization,	  this	  is	  an	  important	  argument.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  “gay”	  
or	  “homosexual”	   identity	   foreign	  according	  to	  Massad	  and	  Franke’s	  arguments,	  but	  so	  
too	   is	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   sexual	   identity	   itself,	   let	   alone	   sexual	   identity	   politics.	   	   Gay	  
rights	  and	  the	  concomitant	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identity	  politics	  are,	  in	  reality,	  a	  modern	  
Western	   solution	   to	   the	   injustices	   stemming	   from	   the	   modern	   Western	   concept	   of	  
sexual	  identity.	  	  Michel	  Foucault,	  the	  notable	  theorist	  of	  power	  and	  sexuality,	  describes	  
a	  unique	  shift	  in	  the	  19th	  Century	  West	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  same-­‐sex	  sexuality	  in	  
terms	  of	  acts	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  same-­‐sex	  sexuality	  in	  terms	  of	  identity.56	  	  Whereas	  
before,	   people	  were	  prosecuted	   for	   sexual	   acts	   they	  had	   committed,	   after	   the	   shift	   a	  
class	   of	   people	   known	   as	   “homosexuals”	   were	   pathologized,	   psychoanalyzed,	   and	  
discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  identity.	  	  It	  is	  thus	  identity-­‐based	  persecution	  
that	  Western	  asylum	  systems	  expect.	  
Though	  the	  colonial	  use	  of	  categories	  of	  heterosexual	  and	  homosexual	  was	  not	  
transposed	  into	  colonized	  societies	  on	  a	  social	  or	  cultural	  level,	  they	  were	  borrowed	  as	  
biopolitical	   tools	   by	   post-­‐colonial	   governments.	   	   Because,	   as	   Franke,	   drawing	   on	  
                                                
55	  Katherine	  M.	  Franke,	  “Sexual	  Tensions	  of	  Post-­‐Empire,”	  33	  Studies	  in	  Law,	  Politics	  and	  Society	  (2004),	  
67-­‐68.	  
56	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Histoire	  de	  la	  sexualité,	  vol.	  1	  :	  La	  volonté	  de	  savoir	  (Paris:	  Gallimard,	  1976),	  59.	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Foucault,	  points	  out,	  “sex	  is	  an	  especially	  dense	  transfer	  point	  for	  power”,57	  there	  was	  
special	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  means	  of	  controlling	  colonized	  
populations.	  	  Strangely,	  the	  sexual	  norms	  established	  by	  colonizing	  powers	  (specifically	  
the	  opposition	  to	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  view	  that	   it	   is	  a	  medical	  disorder)	  have	  been	  
recast	   as	   authentically	   indigenous.	   	   This	   allows	   post-­‐colonial	   leaders	   to	   retain	   the	  
colonial	   tool	   of	   the	   regulation	   of	   sexuality	   as	   a	  means	   to	   solidify	   a	   hold	   on	   power.58	  	  
Attempts	  to	  alter	  the	  dynamics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  roles	  within	  a	  country	  are	  thus	  
perceived	   as	   challenges	   to	   power,	   inevitably	   met	   with	   deep	   suspicion	   and	   hostility.	  	  
Those	  who	  accept	  Western	  solutions	   like	  gay	   rights	  are	   therefore	  seen	  as	   traitors	  and	  
saboteurs.	  	  	  
Because	   of	   the	   political	   implications	   of	   sexual	   identity,	   its	   relationship	   with	  
sexual	   activity	   has	   politicized	   the	   latter.	   	   There	   is	   frequently	   no	   longer	   room	   in	   post-­‐
colonial	   societies	   for	   those	  who	   “just”	   practice	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	   contact.	   	   As	   a	   result,	  
sexual	  minorities	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  fifth	  column	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  
not	   they	  self-­‐identify	  as	  homosexual	  or	  LGBT.	   	  This	   is	  made	  evident	  by	  the	  remarks	  of	  
Robert	  Mugabe,	  the	  president	  of	  Zimbabwe.	   	  He	   identified	  both	  non-­‐normative	  sexual	  
activity	   and	   homosexual	   identity	   as	   Western	   when	   he	   told	   Americans	   to	   keep	   their	  
“sodomy	  […	  and	  their]	  stupid	  and	  foolish	  ways	  to	  themselves.”	  	  Said	  the	  president,	  “Let	  
the	  gays	  be	  gays	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe,	  but	  they	  shall	  be	  sad	  people	  here”.59	  	  
                                                
57	  Franke,	  61.	  
58	  Ibid.	  
59	  James	  Roberts,	  “Mugabe’s	  ill-­‐fitting	  suit	  of	  moral	  outrage,”	  The	  Independent	  (27	  August	  1995).	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His	   party	   secretary	   for	   women’s	   affairs	   referred	   to	   “foreign	   behaviour”60	   rather	   than	  
foreign	  identity.	  
Mahmoud	  Ahmadinejad	   famously	   declared	   in	   a	   speech	   at	   Columbia	  University	  
that	  Iran	  has	  no	  homosexuals.	   	  While	  this	  may	  have	  been	  true	  in	  the	  past	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	   the	   category	   did	   not	   exist	   and	   therefore	   could	   not	   be	   applied	   to	   people	   with	   a	  
“capacity	  for	  profound	  emotional,	  affectional	  and	  sexual	  attraction	  to,	  and	  intimate	  and	  
sexual	   relations	  with,	   individuals	  of	   […]	   the	  same	  gender”,61	   the	   Iranian	  president	  and	  
his	  government	  are	  entrenching	  sexual	  identity	  politics	  in	  Iran	  by	  tying	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  
activity	   to	   a	   foreign	   identity.	   	   If	   there	   were	   no	   homosexuals	   before,	   Ahmadinejad	   is	  
directly	  involved	  in	  creating	  them	  now.	  	  	  
Given	   the	   detrimental	   effect	   of	   the	   separation	   of	   conduct	   from	   identity	   that	  
Scaperlanda	   advocates	   and	   the	   persecution	   committed	   and	   tolerated	   by	   states	   like	  
Zimbabwe	  and	   Iran	  because	  of	   the	  conflation	  of	   the	   two,	   it	   is	  easy	   to	  understand	   the	  
fragility	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   LGBTs	   find	   themselves	   everywhere	   in	   the	   world	  
whether	   they	   flee	   their	  countries	  of	  origin	  or	  not.	   	  The	  concept	  of	  sexual	   identity	  was	  
first	  abused	  in	  its	  deployment	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  categories	  used	  as	  tools	  to	  regulate	  
sexuality.	   	   Now,	   the	   use	   of	   these	   categories	   by	   leaders	   of	   post-­‐colonial	   states	   denies	  
people	   there	   the	  possibility	   to	  use	   a	   “foreign”	   tool	   to	   construct	   a	   genuine	   indigenous	  
sexual	  identity.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  synthesis	  is	  especially	  unviable	  when	  pre-­‐colonial	  labels	  are	  
used	   to	   describe	   politicized	   sexual	   identities	   to	   which	   they	   did	   not	   previously	  
correspond.	  	  While	  this	  cuts	  people	  with	  same-­‐sex	  desires	  off	  from	  a	  socially	  acceptable	  
                                                
60	  Ibid.	  
61	  International	  Commission	  of	  Jurists	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sexual	  identity	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  world,	  Scaperlanda	  seeks	  to	  contain	  LGBTs,	  whom	  he	  
considers	  “morally	  corrupt”,	  within	   the	  boundaries	  of	  an	   identity	  cut	  off	   from	   identity	  
expression	  (specifically	  sexual	  activity)	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  undermining	  “traditional”	  
mores.62	  	  	  
Norms	   in	   international	   law	   recognize	   that	   both	   identity	   and	   activity	   (as	   an	  
expression	  of	  identity)	  should	  be	  protected.	  	  As	  it	  relates	  to	  refugees	  and	  international	  
human	  rights	  law,	  this	  has	  been	  affirmed	  most	  recently	  in	  UNHCR’s	  2008	  Guidance	  Note	  
on	   Refugee	   Claims	   Relating	   to	   Sexual	   Orientation	   and	   Gender	   Identity	   which	   states	  
explicitly	   that	   like	   “race,	   religion,	   nationality,	   […]	   and	   political	   opinion”,	   “[s]exual	  
orientation	  is	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  human	  identity”;	  63	  and	  by	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Principles	  
which	   declare	   that	   “[s]exual	   orientation	   and	   gender	   identity	   are	   integral	   to	   every	  
person’s	  dignity	  and	  humanity	  and	  must	  not	  be	   the	  basis	   for	  discrimination	  or	  abuse”	  
and	  call	  upon	  states	  to	  “[r]epeal	  any	  law	  that	  prohibits	  or	  criminalises	  the	  expression	  of	  
gender	  identity”	  (emphasis	  added).64	  
In	  asylum	  courts,	   these	   international	  norms	  are	  meant	   to	   inform	  decisions,	  yet	  
both	  the	  conflation	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  activity	  and	   identity	  nevertheless	   jeopardize	  
claims.	   	  At	  one	  end	  of	   the	  spectrum,	  the	  conflation	  of	  activity	  with	   identity	   leaves	  the	  
sexual	   identity	   claims	   of	   refugees	   who	   have	   not	   been	   involved	   in	   a	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	  
relationship	   or	   other	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	   contact	   vulnerable	   to	   disbelief.	   	   Françoise	  
Stichelbaut	  gives	  an	  example	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  case	  of	  an	  Iranian	  lesbian	  asylum-­‐seeker	  
                                                
62	  Scaperlanda,	  504.	  
636.	  
64	  International	  Commission	  of	  Jurists.	  The	  Yogyakarta	  Principles	  were	  developed	  by	  the	  International	  
Commission	  of	  Jurists	  together	  with	  the	  International	  Service	  for	  Human	  Rights	  and	  were	  adopted	  during	  
in	  Yogyakarta,	  Indonesia	  in	  2006.	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in	   the	   UK.	   	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   same-­‐sex	   contact	   between	   women	   in	   Iran	   carries	  
penalties	   of	   whipping	   and	   death,	   the	   adjudicator	   disbelieved	   the	   applicant’s	   sexual	  
identity	   claim	   because	   she	   offered	   no	   proof	   of	   having	   been	   in	   a	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	  
relationship.65	  	  This	  lack	  of	  involvement	  may	  well	  have	  been	  the	  result	  of	  a	  suppression	  
of	  her	   identity	  because	  of	  a	  fear	  of	  persecution.	   	  This	  means	  that	  there	  must	  be	  other	  
indicators	  of	  sexual	  identity	  than	  sexual	  activity.	  
At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  the	  protection	  that	  applies	  to	  identity	  may	  not	  
be	  extended	  to	  expressions	  of	  that	  identity.	  	  This	  parallels	  the	  old	  precept	  that	  enjoins	  
people	  to	  “love	  the	  sinner,	  hate	  the	  sin”.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  LGBTs	  whose	  “disorder”	  may	  
in	   fact	   be	   innate	   or	   unchangeable	   should	   be	   pitied	   and	   protected	   from	   harm,	   but	  
certainly	  not	  encouraged	  to	  “indulge”	  in	  their	  desires.	  	  It	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  portray	  same-­‐
sex	  sexual	  contact	  as	  a	  deviant	  habit	  or	  a	  medical	  condition	  when	  it	  is	  characterized	  as	  
something	  someone	  indulges	   in	  rather	  than	  a	  manifestation	  of	  fundamental	   identity.66	  	  
Scaperlanda	  argues	   that	   if	   sexuality	   is	   assumed	  only	   to	  be	  what	  one	  does	  and	  not	   an	  
immutable	  characteristic	  or	  a	  characteristic	  fundamental	  to	  human	  dignity,	  then	  sexual	  
orientation	   falls	   short	   of	   being	   a	   protected	   characteristic	   under	   the	   Convention.	  	  
According	   to	   this	  view,	   the	   refugee	  can	  only	  be	  protected	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  her	   identity	  
and	  only	  her	  identity	  and	  not	  its	  expression	  can	  be	  protected.67	  	  	  
The	  supposed	  aberrations	  of	  homosexuality	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  ensure	  
the	  safeguard	  of	  heterosexual	  norms	  not	  only	  in	  the	  view	  Scaperlanda,	  but	  in	  the	  views	  
                                                
65	  Stichelbaut,	  25.	  
66	  See	  Millbank	  (2005),	  123-­‐125	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  loaded	  terminology	  in	  UK	  jurisprudence.	  
67	  Scaperlanda,	  507-­‐509.	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of	   some	   immigration	   officials	   as	   well.	   	   The	   heterosexual	   couple	   and	   the	   family	   they	  
found	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   fundamental	   to	   civilization	   and	   worthy	   of	   protection	   both	   in	  
terms	   of	   heterosexual	   identity	   and	   heterosexual	   activity.	   	   This	   is	   the	   same	   goal	   that	  
drives	  politicians	   like	  Mugabe	  and	  Ahmadinejad.	   	  There	   then	  exists	  a	  double	   standard	  
where	   heterosexual	   sexuality	   and	   its	   expression	   are	   so	   fundamental	   that	   their	  
protection	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  persecution	  of	  sexual	  minorities,	  but	  the	  expression	  of	  same-­‐
sex	  sexuality	  is	  considered	  incidental.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  non-­‐normative	  sexuality	  should	  be	  
repressed	   to	   preserve	   the	   heteronormative	   paradigm	   is	   espoused	   not	   only	   by	   post-­‐
colonial	   leaders,	   but	   also	  within	   the	   refugee	  adjudication	   system	   itself.	   	   Sean	  Rehaag,	  
who	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  sexual	  minority	  refugee	  claims,	  offers	  the	  example	  of	  a	  
Canadian	   case	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   in	   which	   an	   Immigration	   and	   Refugee	   Board	   (IRB)	  
member	  stated	  her	  belief	  that:	  
From	  man’s	  earliest	   recorded	  history	  we	   find	   that	  all	  human	  expression	   ...	  was	  
directed	  by,	  ...	  laws	  based	  on	  religion.	  ...	  
All	   [such	   religious	   laws]	   ...	   admonish	   their	   adherents	   to	   refrain	   from	   certain	  
sexual	  expressions	  ...	  
[T]hey	   all	   speak	   about	   the	   fundamental	   value	   of	   the	   family	   as	   a	   unit	   in	   the	  
pyramid	  of	  society.	  No	  ...	  nation	  could	  function	  without	  this	  basic	  unit68	  	  
	  
The	  member	  went	  on	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  agree	  to	  deny	  refugee	  status	  to	  the	  applicant,	  
asserting	  that	  because	  “international	  law	  recognizes	  the	  right	  of	  states	  to	  establish	  laws	  
regulating	   sexual	   behaviour”,	   “those	   who	   suffer	   mistreatment	   because	   they	   ‘flaunt’	  
their	   objection	   to	   these	   laws	   (i.e.,	   uncloseted	   homosexuals)	   do	   not	   fall	   within	   the	  
                                                
68	  Leistra	  in	  Sean	  Rehaag,	  “Patrolling	  the	  Borders	  of	  Sexual	  Orientation:	  Bisexual	  Refugee	  Claims	  in	  
Canada,”	  53	  McGill	  Law	  Journal	  (2008),	  66.	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refugee-­‐law	  definition	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group”.69	  	  What	  amounts	  to	  sympathy	  with	  
the	   goals	   of	   state	   and	   state-­‐tolerated	   persecutors	   in	   this	   early	   LGBT	   asylum	   case	   has	  
since	  been	  modulated	   into	  subtler	   forms	  of	  discrimination	  against	   LGBT	   refugees	  as	   it	  


















                                                




Taking	  the	  approach	  of	  separating	  identity	  expression	  from	  identity	  into	  account,	  
it	   follows	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  enduring	  mistakes	  adjudicators	  make	  is	   in	  applying	  the	  
“discretion	  requirement”.	  	  Even	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  court	  accepts	  both	  that	  the	  applicant	  
belongs	   to	   a	   sexual	  minority	   and	   that	   individuals	   in	   his	   or	   her	   country	   of	   origin	   who	  
express	   an	   LGBT	   identity	   face	   a	   genuine	   risk	   of	   persecution,	   it	   has	   been	   declared	  
reasonable	   to	   expect	   the	   applicant	   to	   live	   discreetly	   to	   avoid	   persecution.70	   	   This	  
problem,	  unlike	  the	  cohesiveness	  standard	  or	  the	   leave	  to	  remain	  approach,	  has	  been	  
virtually	   system-­‐wide.71	   	   In	   2006,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Sweden	   took	   steps	   toward	  
deporting	   Iranian	   LGBT	   asylum-­‐seekers	   only	   a	   year	   after	   both	   countries	   had	   placed	  
moratoriums	   on	   such	   deportations.	   	   When	   discussing	   her	   intention	   to	   lift	   the	  
moratorium	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Immigration	  Minister	  Rita	  Verdonk	  stated:	  
It	  appears	  that	  there	  are	  no	  cases	  of	  an	  execution	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  sole	  fact	  
that	  someone	  is	  homosexual.	  ...	  For	  homosexual	  men	  and	  women	  it	  is	  not	  totally	  
impossible	  to	  function	  in	  society,	  although	  they	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  coming	  out	  of	  
the	  closet	  too	  openly.72	  
	  
                                                
70	  See	  Walker	  (2000),	  203-­‐207.	  
71	  According	  to	  Brian	  F.	  Henes,	  “The	  Origin	  and	  Consequences	  of	  Recognizing	  Homosexuals	  as	  a	  ‘Particular	  
Social	  Group’	  For	  Refugee	  Purposes”,	  8	  Temple	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Journal	  (1994),	  5,	  “The	  
court	  stated	  that	  because	  homosexuality	  is	  not	  a	  mere	  preference,	  restricting	  a	  homosexual	  asylum	  
seeker	  to	  a	  hidden	  and	  inconspicuous	  life	  is	  similar	  to	  requiring	  a	  person	  to	  hide	  and	  deny	  his/her	  religious	  
beliefs	  or	  change	  his/her	  skin	  color.”	  	  This	  would	  suggest	  early	  precedent	  in	  the	  German	  asylum	  system	  
rejecting	  the	  discretion	  requirement.	  
72	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Netherlands:	  Asylum	  Rights	  Granted	  to	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Iranians	  (19	  October	  
2006).	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While	   public	   outcry	   later	   led	   to	   the	   extension	   of	   the	  moratorium	   in	   the	  Netherlands,	  
Sweden	  almost	   immediately	  ordered	  the	  deportation	  of	  a	  gay	  Iranian	  asylum-­‐seeker.73	  	  
It	   took	   nearly	   two	   years	   for	   the	   Swedish	  Migration	  Board	   to	   reconsider	   its	   position,74	  
one	   that	  was	  originally	  based	  on	   the	   idea	   that	  applicants	  had	   to	  show	  that	   they	  were	  
under	  legal	  investigation	  for	  homosexuality	  in	  their	  countries	  of	  origin.75	  	  Kristen	  Walker	  
enumerates	  a	  series	  of	  Australian	  cases	  that	  incorporate	  a	  discretion	  requirement.	  	  She	  
cites	  a	  passage	  from	  a	  1995	  case	  which	  reads,	  “It	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  for	  the	  applicant	  
to	  exercise	  discretion	  in	  giving	  expression	  to	  his	  homosexuality	  and	  …	  this	  restriction	  on	  
his	   activities	   would	   not	   constitute	   Convention	   persecution.”76	   	   The	   word	   “activities”	  
here	   disregards	   the	   possibility	   that	   this	   expression	   of	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality	   forms	   an	  
integral	   part	   of	   the	   claimant’s	   identity	   that	   should	   not	   have	   to	   be	   suppressed	   and	  
therefore	   amounts	   to	   persecution.	   Even	   as	   decision-­‐makers	   accept	   applicants’	  
assertions	   that	   they	   belong	   to	   a	   sexual	   minority,	   they	   deny	   the	   immutability	   or	  
fundamentality	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   and,	   in	   effect,	   reject	   it	   as	   a	   characteristic	   that	  
requires	   protection.	   	   Françoise	   Stichelbaut	   points	   to	   a	   2003	   case	   in	   the	   UK	   where	   a	  
judge	  decided	   that,	  despite	   the	  persecution	  of	   sexual	  minorities,	   it	  was	   reasonable	   to	  
return	  an	  Ethiopian	   lesbian	  who	  had	  previously	   lived	  her	  sexuality	   in	  absolute	  secrecy,	  
guarding	  it	  from	  her	  family	  and	  friends.	  	  The	  judge,	  suggests	  Stichelbaut,	  seems	  to	  have	  
been	  convinced	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  ability	  to	  live	  discreetly	  meant	  that	  her	  status	  as	  a	  
                                                
73	  James	  Savage,	  “Gay	  Iranian	  to	  be	  deported,”	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  (29	  September	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74	  “Sweden	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  Iranian	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75	  See	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lesbian	  was	  not	  fundamental.77	  	  This	  hearkens	  back	  to	  Binbasi,	  the	  first	  UK	  case	  of	  this	  
kind,	  wherein	   the	   court	   ruled	   that	  was	  not	   obligated	   to	  decide	  whether	  homosexuals	  
constitute	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  because,	  in	  Cyprus,	  the	  applicant	  faced	  no	  as	  long	  as	  
he	   remained	   “inactive”.78	   	   In	   the	   same	  year	   the	  Ethiopian	   lesbian	  woman	  was	  denied	  
asylum	   in	   the	   UK,	   it	   was	   recognized	   by	   the	   High	   Court	   in	   Australia	   in	   Appellants	  
S395/2002	   and	   S396/2002	   v.	   Minister	   for	   Immigration	   and	   Multicultural	   Affairs	   that	  
requiring	  LGBT	  people	  to	  conceal	  their	  sexuality	  could	  be	  tantamount	  to	  forcing	  them	  to	  
participate	   in	   their	   own	   persecution.79	   	   An	   initial	   decision	   in	   1999	   had	   accepted	   that	  
Bangladeshi	  applicants	  were	  homosexuals	  and	  that,	  indeed,	  homosexuals	  were	  at	  risk	  of	  
persecution	  in	  Bangladesh.	  	  The	  delegate	  for	  the	  Minister	  of	  Immigration	  and	  Citizenship	  
found,	  however,	  that	  they	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  remain	  discreet	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  could	  
avoid	   persecution.	   	   Commenting	   separately	   on	   each	   applicant’s	   situation,	   he	   came	   to	  
the	   same	   essential	   conclusion:	   “In	   his	   circumstances,	   if	   he	   believes	   that	   his	  
homosexuality,	   and	   his	   relationship,	   would	   not	   be	   acceptable	   to	   the	   community	   in	  
which	  he	  is	  living,	  it	  is	  only	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  should	  be	  discreet	  about	  such	  
matters.”80	   	   The	   applicants	   appealed	   to	   the	  RRT.	   	   The	   Tribunal	   rejected	   the	   appeal	   in	  
2001,	  agreeing	  with	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  “discretion	  test”.	  	  An	  appeal	  of	  the	  RRT’s	  decision	  
was	   dismissed	  by	   a	   Federal	   Court	   in	   2002,81	   but	   the	   appellants	  were	   then	   allowed	   to	  
appeal	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  where	  the	  discretion	  test	  was	  rejected	  and	  the	  case	  remitted	  
to	  a	  differently	  constituted	  RRT.	  In	  its	  ruling,	  the	  High	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  RRT	  erred	  in	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determining	   that	   the	   applicants	   “were	   naturally	   ‘discreet’”	   rather	   than	   having	   “acted	  
discreetly	   only	   because	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   live	   openly	   as	   a	   homosexual	   in	  
Bangladesh”;	  they	  had	  created	  a	  “false	  dichotomy”	  between	  “discreet	  and	  non-­‐discreet	  
homosexual	  males”.82	   	   This	   decision,	  Millbank	  notes,	   had	  a	  discernibly	  positive	   effect,	  
but	   she	   contends	   that	   adjudicators,	   especially	   at	   lower	   levels,	   have	   been	   slow	   in	  
accepting	   that	   sexual	  minorities	  are	   secretive	  about	   their	   sexuality	  not	  because	   it	   is	   a	  
choice,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  social	  pressures.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  0906110,	  
a	  recent	  Australian	  RRT	  decision	  clearly	  reflects	  the	  progress	  made	  in	  S395	  and	  S396:	  	  
…the	  Tribunal	  understands	  the	  applicant's	  case	  to	  be	  that	  he	  would,	  if	  returned	  
to	  Lebanon,	  be	  forced	  to	  either	  live	  discreetly	  or	  incite	  violence	  by	  living	  an	  
openly	  homosexual	  lifestyle.	  The	  Tribunal	  accepts	  that	  being	  forced	  to	  live	  
discreetly	  is	  a	  form	  of	  persecution	  where	  the	  “discreet”	  behaviour	  is	  motivated	  
by	  a	  fear	  of	  harm	  and	  shame	  that	  might	  result	  in	  living	  an	  openly	  homosexual	  
lifestyle.83	  
	  
And	   yet	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   decision	   by	   another	   Refugee	   Review	   Tribunal	   found	   in	  
2009	   that	  an	  “applicant	  was	  homosexual,	  but	   […]	   that	  he	  had	  never	  practised	  openly,	  
and	  had	  always	  been	  discreet,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  reason	  why	  he	  could	  not	  continue	  this	  
practice”.84	   	   A	   2005	   Federal	   review	   of	   another	   RRT	   decision	   not	   to	   overturn	   a	   lower	  
decision	  to	  grant	  asylum	  to	  a	  gay	  Lebanese	  man	  agreed	  that	  because	  the	  applicant	  was	  
“not	   promiscuous	   nor	   […]	   blatantly	   gay”	   but	   rather	   “naturally	   a	   discreet	   and	   private	  
person”85	  he	  did	  not	  merit	  refugee	  protection.	  	  They	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  illuminate	  what	  
“blatant	  gayness”	  might	  consist	  of.	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   Recent	   cases	   in	   Canada	   have	   used	   similar	   reasoning,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
discretion	   requirement	   “was	   rejected	   as	   an	   inherently	   discriminatory	   approach	   very	  
early	  on	  in	  Canadian	  jurisprudence”.86	  	  A	  2009	  decision	  issued	  by	  the	  Refugee	  Protection	  
Division	   reasoned	   that	   a	   gay	   Nigerian	   applicant	   had	   an	   internal	   flight	   alternative	  
because:	  	  
There	  was	   no	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   he	  would	   have	   to	   remain	   in	   hiding	   [in	  
Lagos],	  should	  he	  live	  there,	  although,	  as	  with	  respect	  to	  certain	  elements	  of	  his	  
life	  in	  Canada,	  he	  would	  possibly	  have	  to	  practice	  discretion	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  
sexual	  orientation	  in	  Nigeria.87	  	  	  
	  
Citing	   Sadeghi-­‐Pari	   v.	   Canada	   (Minister	   of	   Citizenship	   and	   Immigration),	   the	   Federal	  
Court	   called	   this	   kind	   of	   logic	   “perverse	   as	   they	   require	   an	   individual	   to	   repress	   an	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IV.	  Proving	  Sexual	  Identity	  
	  
	   Following	   S395	   and	   S396	   in	   Australia	   and	   analogous	   decisions	   elsewhere,	  
Millbank	  suggests	  “that	  there	  was	  a	  shift	   […]	  from	  ‘discretion’	  to	   ‘identity	  disbelief’”.89	  	  
Whereas	  before,	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  adjudicator	  was	  on	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  the	  demand	  
to	   ask	   a	   self-­‐identified	   LGBT	   refugee	   to	   live	   his	   sexual	   identity	   in	   secret	   to	   avoid	  
persecution,	  now	   turned	   to	   “a	   searching	  examination	  of	   applicant’s	   identity	   claims”.90	  	  
This	   transition	   drew	   LGBT	   claims	   further	   into	   the	   problems	   surrounding	   credibility	  
assessment	  inherent	  in	  refugee	  claims	  generally.	  	  According	  to	  Goffman,	  for	  	  
members	   of	   an	   audience[,]	   it	   is	   natural	   […]	   to	   feel	   that	   the	   impression	   the	  
performer	   seeks	   to	   give	   may	   be	   true	   or	   false,	   genuine	   or	   spurious,	   valid	   or	  
“phony”.	  	  So	  common	  is	  this	  doubt	  that	  […]	  we	  often	  given	  special	  attention	  to	  
features	  of	   the	  performance	  that	  cannot	  be	  readily	  manipulated,	   thus	  enabling	  
ourselves	   to	   judge	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   more	   misrepresentable	   cues	   in	   the	  
performance.91	  
	  
Because	   refugees	   are	   often	   unable	   to	   provide	   independent	   evidence	   to	   corroborate	  
their	  claims,	  there	  is	  little	  that	  is	  not	  manipulable.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  of	  LGBT	  claims	  
where	   the	   subjective	   experience	   of	   refugeehood	   meets	   the	   subjective	   experience	   of	  
sexuality.	  	  	  
Proving	   to	   an	   adjudicator	   that	   a	   person	   is	   a	   refugee—that	   elements	   of	   her	  
identity	   expose	   her	   to	   a	   risk	   of	   persecution	   and	   therefore	   entitle	   her	   to	   special	  
protection	   under	   international	   law—can	   be	   a	   harrowing	   process,	   one	   that	   is	   further	  
complicated	  when	  the	  claim	   is	  based	  on	  sexual	   identity.	   	  Sexuality	   is	   inextricable	   from	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gender,	  politics,	  and	  religion,	  all	  of	  which	  add	  yet	  more	  complex	  dimensions	  to	  the	  task	  
of	  authenticaing	  claims.	  	  Constructing	  an	  identity	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  these	  areas	  is	  a	  
lifelong	  task	  for	  anyone,	  and	  yet	  refugees	  are	  asked	  to	  provide	  a	  succinct,	  coherent,	  and	  
consistent	   presentation	  of	   self	   that	   convinces	   a	   decision-­‐maker	   that	   they	   are	   genuine	  
and	   deserving	   of	   protection.	   	   Refugee	   sexual	   identity	   in	   a	   courtroom	   is	   often	  
constructed	   using	   unfamiliar	   tools	   since	   preconceptions	   about	   sexual	   identity	   vary	  
enormously	   from	  one	   set	   of	   cultural	   norms	   to	   the	   next.	   	   Faced	  with	   the	   challenge	   of	  
how	  to	  interpret	  refugees’	  claims,	  decision-­‐makers	  too	  often	  lean	  on	  stereotypes	  based	  
on	   appearance,	   relationships,	   social	   habits,	   and	   sexual	   practices.	   	   This	   practice	   has,	  
predictably,	   led	   to	   flawed	   judgments.	   	  As	  Victoria	  Neilson,	   legal	  director	  at	  New	  York-­‐
based	  Immigration	  Equality	  said	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Hollis	  V.	  Pfitsch,	  	  
“it	  really	  depends	  on	  the	  asylum	  officer	  and	  the	  immigration	  judge.	  You	  can	  tell	  
from	   the	  moment	   you	   sit	   down.	   Sometimes	   the	  officers	  or	   judges	   are	   just	  not	  
accepting	  of	  gay	  claims.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I've	  had	  cases	  where	  the	  officer	  gives	  
the	  [asylum	  seeker]	  a	  hug	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interview.”92	  	  
	  
Pfitsch	  asserts	  that	  US	  trial	  attorneys	  and	  immigration	  judges	  are	  not	  neutral	  decision-­‐
makers,	   but	   rather	   in	   many	   cases,	   vehicles	   of	   entrenched	   heterosexism	   and	  
homophobia.93	  	  Neither	  of	  these	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  US.	  	  Rather,	  heteronormativity	  looms	  
large	  in	  the	  decisions	  in	  all	  asylum	  systems	  that	  consider	  LGBT	  claims.	  
Remarks	   from	   RRT	   case	   0906110	   address	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   the	   challenges	   in	   sexual	  
identity	  claims	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  stereotypes:	  
Claims	   of	   a	   fear	   of	   persecution	   by	   virtue	   of	   homosexuality	   present	   decision-­‐
makers	  with	  a	  particularly	  challenging	  task.	  Whereas	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  able	  to	  




test	  the	  evidence	  of	  claims	  of	  persecution	  by	  virtue	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  or	  political	  
opinion	   by	   questioning	   the	   applicant	   about	   those	   beliefs	   or	   opinion	   it	   is	  
particularly	  difficult	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  applicant's	  claim	  to	  be	  homosexual	  is	  
genuine	  or	  merely	  contrived	  for	  migration	  purposes.	  It	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  assess	  
the	  applicant	  against	  a	  benchmark	  of	  stereotypical	  attributes	  and,	  as	  with	  other	  
refugee	   claims,	   unreasonable	   to	   expect	   an	   applicant	   to	   produce	   witnesses	   to	  
their	  homosexuality.94	  
	  
While	   this	   measured	   approach	   marks	   a	   major	   departure	   from	   earlier	   decisions	   that	  
betray	   severe	   bias	   on	   the	   part	   of	   decision-­‐makers,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   definitive.	   	   Even	  
contemporary	   cases	   continue	   to	   show	  mistakes	  based	  on	  assumptions	  about	  minority	  
sexual	  identities.	  	  	  	  
	   A.	  Stereotypes	  Based	  on	  Appearance	  and	  Demeanor	  
In	  Herrera	  v.	  Canada,	  the	  shift	  is	  clear.	  	  The	  IRB	  denied	  asylum	  to	  a	  Mexican	  man	  
based	  on	  a	  disbelief	  of	  his	  claim	  to	  be	  gay	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  an	  “allure	  efféminée”,	  an	  
effeminate	  demeanor.	  	  The	  Federal	  Court	  that	  overturned	  the	  decision	  declared	  that	  the	  
IRB	  had	  “breached	  […]	  a	  principle	  of	  natural	  justice”.	  	  The	  judge,	  explaining	  the	  decision,	  
stated	  that	  	  
There	   is	   really	   no	   reason	   for	   the	   Board	   to	   even	   mention	   the	   Applicant's	  
'effeminacy'	   or	   lack	   thereof	   in	   its	   decision	   unless	   it	   is	   assuming	   that	   someone	  
who	  is	  homosexual	  must	  be	  effeminate	  in	  appearance	  or	  behaviour	  [...]	  This	  is	  a	  
thoroughly	   discredited	   stereotype	   which	   should	   not	   have	   any	   bearing	   on	   the	  
Board's	   judgment	  of	   the	  Applicant's	  credibility.	   […]	  Homosexuals	  are	  subject	   to	  
extensive	   prejudice,	   of	   which	   effeminate	   stereotypes	   form	   a	   part.	   The	  
Applicant's	   lack	   of	   'effeminacy'	   is	   not	   a	   proper	   basis	   on	   which	   to	   impugn	   the	  
credibility	  of	  his	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  homosexual.95	  
	  
Explicitly	  inculpating	  the	  Board	  itself	  for	  prejudice,	  the	  judge	  continues,	  saying	  that	  the	  
decision	  “reveals	  a	  level	  of	  ignorance	  and	  prejudice	  which	  is	  not	  only	  unusual	  in	  general,	  
                                                
94	  0906110	  
95	  Herrera	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Citizenship	  and	  Immigration),	  2005	  FC	  1233	  (2005).	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but	   is	   particularly	   astonishing	   on	   the	   part	   of	   a	   decisionmaker	  who	   is	   in	   a	   position	   to	  
adjudicate	   sensitive	   claims	   that	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   involve	   homosexuality.”96	   	   This	  
example	   of	   an	   appellate	   jurisdiction	   rebuking	   a	   lower	   decision-­‐making	   body	   suggests	  
that	  the	  kind	  of	  ignorance	  and	  prejudice	  present	  in	  this	  case	  lingers	  at	  the	  initial	  levels	  of	  
adjudication.	  	  	  
The	   same	   is	   true	   of	   recent	   US	   cases	   from	   the	   2nd	   and	   10th	   Circuit	   Courts	   of	  
Appeals.	   	   The	   first	   case	   handled	   the	   appeal	   of	   a	   gay	   Guyanese	  man	  with	   a	   series	   of	  
criminal	  charges	  against	  him	  who	  was	  trying	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  US	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  his	  
deportation	  would	   violate	   his	   rights	   under	   the	   Convention	  Against	   Torture	   (CAT).	   	   He	  
claimed	  that	  he	  would	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  persecution	  both	  as	  a	  criminal	  deportee	  and	  a	  
gay	  man.	   	   The	   immigration	   judge	   (IJ)	   who	  made	   the	   initial	   decision	   not	   to	   grant	   the	  
applicant	   relief	   held	   that	   “violent	   dangerous	   criminals	   and	   feminine	   contemptible	  
homosexuals	  are	  not	  usually	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  same	  people”	  and	  that	  therefore	  the	  
applicant	   “was	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   viewed	   in	   Guyana	   as	   a	   member	   of	   either	   disfavored	  
group”.97	  	  The	  2nd	  Circuit	  Court	  judge	  ruled	  that	  the	  IJ	  had	  made	  “gratuitous	  comments	  
on	   the	  petitioner’s	   sexuality,	  as	  well	  as	  unfounded	  speculations	  about	  homosexuals	   in	  
general”	   and	   that	   other	   of	   his	   comments	   betrayed	   “an	   impermissible	   reliance	   on	  
preconceived	  assumptions	  about	  homosexuality	  and	  homosexuals”	  and	  that	  therefore,	  
he	   had	   “clearly	   abrogated	   his	   ‘responsibility	   to	   function	   as	   a	   neutral,	   impartial	  
                                                
96	  Ibid.	  
97	  Ali	  v.	  Mukasey,	  2008	  Westlaw	  2437646	  (June	  18,	  2008)	  in	  Arthur	  Leonard,	  “2nd	  Circuit	  Blasts	  Biased	  
Immigration	  Judge	  on	  Gay	  CAT	  Claim”,	  Leonard	  Link	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arbiter’”.98	  	  The	  IJ	  whose	  decision	  was	  vacated	  by	  the	  10th	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  made	  
comments	  that	  echoed	  those	  of	  the	  initial	  decision-­‐maker	  quoted	  in	  Herrera,	  saying	  that	  
a	   Moroccan	   applicant’s	   “appearance	   does	   not	   have	   anything	   about	   it	   that	   would	  
designate	  [him]	  as	  being	  gay.	  [He]	  does	  not	  dress	  in	  an	  effeminate	  manner	  or	  affect	  any	  
effeminate	  mannerisms”,	   and	   determined	   as	   a	   result	   that	   he	   would	   not	   be	   at	   risk	   if	  
returned	  to	  Morocco.99	  	  The	  Circuit	  Court	  judge	  lambasted	  the	  decision	  finding	  that	  
The	   IJ’s	  homosexual	   stereotyping	   […]	  precludes	  meaningful	   review	   in	   this	   case.	  
The	   IJ’s	   reliance	   on	   his	   own	   views	   of	   the	   appearance,	   dress,	   and	   affect	   of	   a	  
homosexual	   led	   to	   his	   conclusion	   that	   Razkane	   would	   not	   be	   identified	   as	   a	  
homosexual.	  From	  that	  conclusion,	   the	   IJ	  determined	  Razkane	  had	  not	  made	  a	  
showing	  it	  was	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  that	  he	  would	  face	  persecution	  in	  Morocco.	  
This	  analysis	  elevated	  stereotypical	  assumptions	  to	  evidence	  upon	  which	  factual	  
inferences	   were	   drawn	   and	   legal	   conclusions	   made.	   To	   condone	   this	   style	   of	  
judging,	   unhinged	   from	   the	   prerequisite	   of	   substantial	   evidence,	   would	  
inevitably	  lead	  to	  unpredictable,	  inconsistent,	  and	  unreviewable	  results.	  […]	  Such	  
stereotyping	  would	  not	  be	  tolerated	  in	  other	  contexts,	  such	  as	  race	  or	  religion.100	  	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   also	   important	   to	  note	   that	  while	  many	   such	   cases	   involve	   gay	  men	   (who	  
originate	   a	   preponderance	   of	   refugee	   claims),	   lesbians	   are	   subjected	   to	   appearance-­‐
based	  prejudice	   as	  well.	   	   Rehaag	  provides	   as	   	   an	   example	   a	  Canadian	   case	  wherein	   a	  
Colombian	  woman’s	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  lesbian	  is	  not	  believed	  because	  the	  IRB	  found	  that	  she	  
“presents	   as	   an	   articulate,	   professional,	   well-­‐groomed,	   and	   attractive	   young	   woman.	  
Based	  on	  all	   of	   these	   considerations	   ...	   the	  panel	   cannot	   conclude	   that	   the	   claimant’s	  
sexual	   orientation	  would	   be	   physically	   obvious	   to	   intolerant	   and	   bigoted	   segments	   of	  
Colombian	  society”.101	   	  Despite	  more	  than	  a	  half	  decade	  of	  rulings	  by	  appellate	  courts	  
                                                
98	  Ibid.	  
99	  Razkane	  v.	  Holder,	  Attorney	  General,	  No.	  08-­‐9519	  (21	  April	  2009),	  6.	  
100	  Ibid.,	  10-­‐11.	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  Rehaag,	  71.	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opposing	   these	   kinds	   of	   stereotypes,	   such	  mistakes	   based	   on	   assumptions	   about	   the	  
appearances	  and	  demeanors	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  persist.	  	  	  
	  
	   B.	  Stereotypes	  Based	  on	  Relationships	  
Such	  blatant	  stereotyping	   is	  not	   limited	  to	  appearances,	  however.	   	  Stereotypes	  
about	  how	  sexual	  minorities	  interact	  relationally,	  sexually,	  and	  socially	  with	  one	  another	  
and	  with	  heterosexuals	  are	  readily	  apparent	  in	  many	  judgments.	  	  On	  the	  same	  day	  that	  
the	   RRT	   decision	   finding	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   applicant	  was	   published,	   a	   Federal	  
Court	  decision	  declared	  that	  another	  RRT	  ruling	  concerning	  gay	  refugees	  was	  “not	  made	  
in	  good	  faith”	  and	  was	  “unreasonable”,	  “contrived”,	  and	  “perverse”.102	  	  The	  appellants	  
in	  this	  case	  were	  the	  same	  two	  Bangladeshi	  men	  who	  were	  appellants	  in	  S395	  and	  S396.	  	  
Throughout	  the	  first	  several	  cases	   in	  which	  the	  appellants	  were	   involved,	  the	  fact	  that	  
they	  were	  homosexuals	  was	  never	  in	  doubt;	  the	  question	  at	  hand	  was	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  requirement	  for	  LGBT	  refugees	  to	  live	  “discreetly”	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  persecution.	  	  And	  
yet,	  after	  the	  case	  was	  remitted,	  a	  second	  Tribunal	  skirted	  the	  issue	  by	  alleging	  that	  the	  
appellants	  were	   not,	   in	   fact,	   homosexuals.	   	   Allegations	   that	   the	   couple	  were	   actually	  
cousins	  who	  had	  been	  married	  to	  women	  were	  used	  to	   justify	  this	  central	   finding,	  the	  
problems	  with	  which	   I	  will	  analyze	   later.	   	  An	  appeal	  of	  this	   finding	  was	  dismissed	  by	  a	  
Federal	   Magistrates	   Court,	   but	   ultimately	   resulted	   in	   a	   third	   RRT	   review	   again	  
unfavorable	  to	  the	  appellants.	  	  This	  review	  was	  then	  followed	  by	  a	  return	  of	  the	  case	  to	  
the	  High	  Court.	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i.	  Same-­‐Sex	  Sexual	  Activity	  
The	  RRT’s	   unfavorable	  decision	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   appellants	   during	   the	   third	   review	  
hinged	  on	  an	  adverse	  credibility	  finding	  based	  on	  the	  refusal	  of	  one	  of	  the	  appellants	  to	  
answer	   a	  question	  about	   the	   couple’s	   sex	   life.	   	   This	   after	   the	   couple	  had	  offered	   in	   a	  
letter	  to	  the	  tribunal	  to	  definitively	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  their	  homosexuality:	  
Should	   you	   require	   it	   (although	   such	   a	   step	   would	   cause	   us	   significant	  
embarrassment)	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  have	  an	  adult	  witness	  view	  us	  engaged	  in	  an	  
act	  of	  homosexual	  intercourse	  and	  then	  attest	  before	  you	  to	  that	  fact.	  It	  would	  
be	   illogical	   were	   you	   to	   refuse	   such	   an	   offer	   and	   then	   go	   on	   to	   find,	   as	   did	  
Member	  Hardy,	  that	  we	  are	  not	  homosexual.103	  
	  
The	   Tribunal	   declined	   the	   offer	   and	   then,	   according	   to	   the	   transcript	   as	   cited	   in	   the	  
document	  published	  by	  the	  High	  Court,	  the	  line	  of	  questioning	  proceeded	  as	  follows:	  
[THE	  TRIBUNAL]:	  Do	  you	  have	  sex	  in	  the	  morning?	  	  
THE	  INTERPRETER:	  This	  is	  a	  personal	  question.	  
[THE	  TRIBUNAL]:	  You	  don’t	  want	  to	  answer?	  
THE	  INTERPRETER:	  No.	  ...	  
[THE	  TRIBUNAL]:	  Do	  you	  have	  sex	  with	  him	  though?	  
THE	  INTERPRETER:	  Yes.	  
...	  
[THE	  TRIBUNAL]:	  Now	  you	  may	  not	  want	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  but	  when	  you	  
do	  have	  sex	  do	  you	  use	  a	  lubricant?	  	  
[NAOX]:	  I	  don’t	  want	  to.	  	  
[THE	  TRIBUNAL]:	  Don’t	  want	  to	  answer	  ...	  
(Emphasis	  added)104	  
	  
The	  Tribunal,	  in	  analyzing	  this	  exchange,	  explained	  that	  it	  had	  
difficulty	  understanding	  how	  viewing	  an	  act	  of	  homosexual	  intercourse,	  where	  a	  
lubricant	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   used,	   is	   less	   offensive	   to	   the	   applicants	   than	  
answering	  a	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  lubricant	  is	  used.	  Because	  of	  the	  refusal	  to	  
answer	  the	  Tribunal’s	  question,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  cogent	  response,	  the	  Tribunal	  
finds	  that	  the	  first	  applicant	  is	  not	  a	  truthful	  or	  credible	  witness.105	  	  	  






The	  exasperation	  and	  incredulity	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  were	  apparent	  when	  they	  found	  that	  
“the	   decision	   [of	   the	   third	   Tribunal]	   was	   perverse	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   as	   to	   exhibit	   a	  
serious	  failure	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process”	  and	  remitted	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  RRT	  for	  a	  
fourth	  review.	  
	   The	   significance	   attached	   to	   the	   specifics	   of	   sexual	   activity	   (and	   especially	   the	  
roles	  chosen	  by	  gay	  men	  in	  anal	  sex	  as	  well	  as	  stereotypes	  about	  how	  these	  roles	  relate	  
to	   gender	   identity	   and	   risk	   of	   persecution)	   are	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   reasoning	   in	   a	   2001	  
Canadian	  decision	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  gay	  Iranian	  man.	  	  The	  IRB	  concluded	  that	  though	  the	  
claimant	  was	  gay	  he	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  refugee	  protection	  because	  during	  anal	  sex	  he	  
“play[ed]	  the	  male	  role”	  and	  therefore	  would	  “likely	  not	  be	  given	  the	  same	  punishment	  
as	  the	  partner	  who	  plays	  the	  submissive	  role”.106	  	  The	  “male”	  role	  was	  assumed	  by	  the	  
adjudicator	  to	  be	  the	  insertive	  one.	   	  The	  IRB	  based	  its	  conclusions	  on	  a	  videotape	  of	  a	  
sex	  act	  submitted	  by	  the	  claimant	  and	  country	  information	  about	  homosexuality	  in	  Iran	  
provided	  by	  a	  French	  sociologist.	  	  The	  sociologist	  asserts	  that	  in	  Iran	  	  
A	  man	  who	  plays	  the	  active,	  penetrator	  role	  in	  a	  homosexual	  act	  behaves	  like	  a	  
man,	   and	   is	   therefore	   not	   considered	   “homosexual.”	   Passive	   homosexual	  
behaviour,	  however,	   implies	  being	  penetrated	   like	  a	  woman,	  and	   is	  considered	  
to	   be	   extremely	   scandalous	   and	   humiliating	   for	   a	  man,	   because	   it	   is	   feminine	  
behavior.107	  	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	   IRB’s	  acceptance	  of	   this	  dynamic	  as	  being	  the	  norm	  and	  despite	  using	  the	  
video	   evidence	   to	   decide	   the	   claimant	   played	   the	   “male”	   role,	   the	   videotape	   was	  
determined	   to	   have	   been	   filmed	   “purposely	   to	   be	   used	   as	   evidence”	   and	   was	   a	  
                                                
106	  VA0-­‐02318	  [2001]	  CanLII	  26999	  (21	  February	  2001).	  
107	  Ibid.	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“concoction	   to	   support	   his	   allegation	   that	   he	   was	   persecuted	   as	   a	   homosexual”.108	  	  
Strangely,	   the	   IRB	   found	   it	   suspect	   that	   the	   in	   the	   acts,	   the	   claimant	   was	   taking	   the	  
“virile”,	   “male”	   role	   and	   found	   lacking	   “smile	   and	   […]	   conversation”,	   “tenderness,	  
passion	  [and]	  affection”.109	  	  The	  IRB	  concludes	  that	  “[t]he	  sex	  acts	  appear	  so	  mechanical	  
it	  looks	  more	  like	  an	  encounter	  between	  a	  ‘John’	  and	  a	  male	  prostitute,	  rather	  than	  two	  
men	  very	  much	  in	  love	  with	  each	  other”.110	  	  The	  IRB	  relies	  on	  its	  own	  understanding	  of	  
what	   sexual	   activity	   between	   Iranian	   gay	   men	   should	   look	   like	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  
discounting	  evidence,	  but	  relies	  on	  independent	  evidence	  that	  portrays	  a	  very	  different	  
dynamic	  between	  sexual	  partners	   in	   Iran	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  deciding	  the	  claimant	  does	  
not	  merit	  refugee	  protection.	  
This	  fixation	  on	  sex	  roles	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  national	  asylum	  systems.	  	  UNHCR	  legal	  officers	  
too	  have	  asked	  overly	  invasive	  questions	  about	  sexual	  activity	  when	  conducting	  refugee	  
status	  determination	  (RSD)	  interviews.111	  	  
	   The	   third	   Tribunal’s	   probing	  questions	   rely	  problematically	  on	   the	  questioner’s	  
knowledge	  of	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  activity	  and	  assumptions	  about	  how	  that	  activity	  relates	  
to	  sexual	  identity.	  	  While	  the	  Tribunal	  admits	  that	  an	  act	  of	  homosexual	  intercourse	  may	  
or	  may	  not	   involve	   lubricant,	   the	  fact	   that	  the	  question	  was	  asked	  at	  all	   recalls	  earlier	  




111	  Neil	  Grungras,	  Rachel	  Levitan	  and	  Amy	  Slotek,	  “Unsafe	  Haven:	  Security	  Challenges	  Facing	  LGBT	  Asylum	  
Seekers	  and	  Refugees	  in	  Turkey”,	  24	  Praxis:	  The	  Fletcher	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Security	  (2009),	  48.	  	  It	  should	  
be	  noted	  that	  also	  according	  to	  this	  report,	  since	  the	  2008	  sexual	  orientation	  guidance	  note	  was	  issued,	  
practices	  have	  improved	  at	  the	  refugee	  agency.	  See	  pp.	  47-­‐48.	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asylum	  cases	  where,	   as	   in	   criminal	   cases112,	   adjudicators	  deemed	  anal	  examinations	  a	  
definitive	   indicator	   of	   homosexuality.	   	   “This	   form	   of	   medical	   examination”,	   Walker	  
points	  out,	  “is	  based	  on	  the	  incorrect	  notion	  that	  all	  gay	  men	  engage	  in	  receptive	  anal	  
sex	  and	  that	  no	  heterosexual	  men	  do	  so”.113	  	  This	  notion,	  as	  it	  affects	  refugees,	  has	  been	  
most	  written	  about	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Vraciu	  v.	  SSHD,	  a	  British	  case	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  
involving	   a	   Romanian	  man	   unwilling	   to	   expose	   the	   identity	   of	   his	   Romanian	   lover	   or	  
provide	   other	   evidence	   to	   the	   court	   corroborating	   his	   claim	   to	   be	   homosexual.	   	   The	  
lawyer	   representing	   the	   Home	   Office	   called	   for	   a	   physical	   examination,	   apparently	  
believing,	   along	  with	   the	   tribunal,	   that	   homosexual	   identity	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   and	  
identified	   by	   the	   evidence	   of	   anal	   or	   rectal	   scarring.114	   	   The	   applicant’s	   legal	  
representative	  proposed	  a	  psychiatric	  examination	  instead	  and	  no	  physical	  examination	  
was	   performed.	   	   Though	   physical	   examinations	   are	   increasingly	   discredited,115	   as	  
recently	   as	   2004,	   a	   Canadian	   adjudicator	   apparently	   relied	  on	   an	   anal	   examination	   as	  
the	  sole	  piece	  of	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  authenticated	  a	  Ugandan	  applicant’s	  claim	  to	  
be	   homosexual.116	   	   In	   2006,	   an	   immigration	   judge	   in	   the	   UK	   asked	   a	   solicitor	   “what	  
medical	   evidence”	   existed	   to	   prove	   that	   his	   Iranian	   client	   was	   gay.	   	   The	   question	  
centered	  on	  the	  role	  the	  applicant	  claimed	  to	  take	  in	  sexual	  intercourse.117	  
                                                
112	  See,	  for	  example,	  Amnesty	  International,	  Annual	  Report:	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Egypt	  (2009)	  for	  a	  
description	  of	  the	  forcible	  subjection	  to	  anal	  examinations	  of	  men	  accused	  of	  “habitual	  debauchery”	  in	  
Egypt.	  
113	  Walker	  (2000),	  185.	  
114	  See	  McGhee,	  29-­‐50.	  
115	  For	  example,	  the	  RRT	  in	  0805807	  [2008]	  RRTA	  420	  (21	  November	  2008)	  relied	  on	  evidence	  referring	  to	  
the	  practice	  of	  anal	  examination	  as	  “Invasive,	  abusive,	  and	  a	  form	  of	  torture	  in	  itself,	  the	  practice	  is	  
predicated	  on	  outdated	  pseudoscience,	  on	  myths—of	  the	  “marks”	  left	  by	  anal	  intercourse—which	  date	  
back	  nearly	  a	  century	  and	  a	  half.”	  
116	  TA2-­‐19317	  [2004]	  CanLII	  56794	  (1	  August	  2004).	  
117	  O’Leary,	  89.	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This	  lingering	  preoccupation	  with	  medical	  submissions	  is	  directly	  tied	  to	  decision-­‐
makers’	  discomfort	  with	  the	  minimal	  possibility	  for	  independent	  evidence.	  	  Physical	  and	  
psychiatric	  examinations	   fit	   in	  alongside	  “scientific	  police	  work	  and	  projective	   testing”	  
which	  Goffman	  cites	  as	  “extreme	  examples”	  of	  the	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  features	  of	  a	  
narrative	   that	   “cannot	   be	   readily	   manipulated”	   to	   relieve	   doubts	   about	   the	  
discernibleness	  of	  false	  claims.118	  	  	  
Psychiatric	  evaluations,	  which	  bind	  homosexuality	   to	   the	   realm	  of	   the	  medical,	  
are	  also	  problematic	  and	  have	  been	  rejected	  as	  a	  means	  of	  determining	  the	  authenticity	  
of	   sexual	   identity	   in	   some	   court	   cases.	   	  Walker	   offers	   the	   example	   of	   Australian	   case	  
N97/16114	   in	   which	   the	   Tribunal	   observes	   that	   the	   psychiatrist’s	   submission	   is	  
essentially	  a	  retelling	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  story.119	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  court	  has	  been	  more	  
likely	  to	  accept	  the	  evidence	  of	  psychiatrists	  and	  psychologists	  as	  legal	  evidence	  than	  a	  
refugee’s	  direct	  statements	  of	  “self-­‐knowledge”.	  	  McGhee	  attributes	  this	  to	  a	  “hierarchy	  
of	   discursive	   value”	   in	   the	   courtroom	   that	   requires	   the	   claimant’s	   narrative	   to	   be	  
processed	  and	  represented	  by	  an	  expert	  to	  carry	  weight,	  even	  if	  the	  representation	  by	  
the	   expert	   matches	   the	   narrative.120	   	   In	   UK	   case	   HS	   (Homosexuals:	   Minors,	   Risk	   on	  
Return)	  Iran	  v.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department,	  the	  court	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  
accepted	   the	   submissions	   of	   a	   psychologist	   because	   they	  were	   “not	   formed	   solely	   on	  
the	   basis	   of	   the	   account	   given	   by	   a	   patient”.121	   	   The	   psychologist	   “also	   based	   [her	  
conclusions]	   on	   the	   responses	   given	   to	  many	   questions	   posed	   during	   examination,	   to	  
                                                
118	  Goffman	  (1959),	  58.	  
119	  	  [1998]	  RRTA	  4882	  (2	  November	  1998)	  in	  Walker,	  185.	  
120	  McGhee,	  42.	  	  See	  42-­‐47	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  dynamic.	  
121	  [2005]	  UKAIT	  00120	  (4	  August	  2005),	  para.	  63.	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elicit	   further	   details	   of	   experiences,	   and	   the	   associated	   symptoms	   and	   emotional	  
responses.”122	  
ii.	  Opposite-­‐Sex	  Relationships	  and	  Sexual	  Activity	  
	   While	  the	  mistakes	  of	  the	  third	  Tribunal	  are	  glaring,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  return	  to	  
the	   findings	   of	   the	   second	   Tribunal	   where	   assumptions	   about	   gay	   identity	   lead	   the	  
adjudicator	   to	   fail	   to	   protect	   the	   appellants.	   	   Two	   primary	   assumptions	   are	   taken	   to	  
undermine	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  appellants	  to	  be	  gay	  and	  in	  a	  relationship	  with	  one	  another:	  
first,	   that	   they	   were	   close	   relatives	   and	   second,	   that	   they	   were	   married	   to	   women.	  	  
These	  two	  claims	  were	   later	   found	  to	  be	  spurious,	  but	  understanding	  the	   logic	  behind	  
them	   is	   important.	   	   The	   allegation	   that	   they	   were	   first	   cousins	   or	   first	   cousins	   once-­‐
removed	  had	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	   their	   identities	   as	   gay	  men,	  but	   rather	  was	   taken	   to	  
suggest	  that	  they	  had	  not	  met	  by	  chance	  as	  they	  asserted	  in	  their	   initial	  asylum	  claim.	  	  
As	  for	  the	  allegation	  that	  the	  men	  were	  married	  to	  women,	  the	  Principal	  Member	  of	  the	  
second	  Tribunal	   stated:	   “The	   fact	   that	   they	  are	  married	  knocks	  out	   their	   claims	  about	  
their	  aversion	  to	  heterosexual	  marriage”.123	  	  To	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  second	  Tribunal,	  then,	  
gay	  men	  cannot	  be	  both	  party	   to	  a	  heterosexual	  marriage	  and	  have	  an	  aversion	   to	   it.	  	  
This	   simplistic	   view	   is	   untenable	   when	   it	   is	   taken	   into	   consideration	   that	  marriage	   is	  
often	   entered	   into	   because	   of	   social	   pressures	   and	   societal	   expectations.	   	   Many	  
heterosexuals,	  especially	  women,	  who	  are	  unsure	  about	  or	  even	  resistant	   to	  marriage	  
                                                
122	  Ibid.	  	  Also,	  according	  to	  personal	  interviews	  with	  attorney	  Lisa	  L.	  Weinberg,	  telephone	  interview	  with	  
Michael	  Carl	  Budd	  (14	  August	  2009)	  and	  psychiatrist	  Joanne	  Ahola,	  MD,	  interview	  with	  Michael	  Carl	  Budd,	  
New	  York,	  NY	  (25	  August	  2009),	  psychiatric	  evaluations	  that	  do	  not	  identify	  “symptoms”	  of	  homosexuality	  
but	  rather	  symptoms	  of	  psychological	  disorders	  that	  LGBT	  victims	  of	  persecution	  are	  likely	  to	  exhibit	  
(PTSD,	  major	  depression,	  complicated	  bereavement,	  hyperactive	  startle	  reflex,	  substance	  abuse)	  have	  
contributed	  to	  the	  success	  of	  claims	  in	  US	  immigration	  cases.	  
123	  NAOX	  &	  Anor	  v.	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  &	  Anor	  [2006]	  FMCA	  434	  (13	  April	  2006).	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are	  forced	  to	  marry	  regardless.	  	  Why	  should	  this	  be	  any	  different	  for	  sexual	  minorities?	  	  
This	   is	   an	   especially	   salient	   question	   given	   that	   heterosexual	   marriage	   is	   seen	   as	   a	  
remedy	  for	  homosexuality	  across	  cultures.	  	  The	  2008	  UNHCR	  Guidance	  Note	  on	  Refugee	  
Claims	   Relating	   to	   Sexual	   Orientation	   and	   Gender	   Identity	   takes	   up	   the	   issue	   in	  
paragraph	  13:	  
LGBT	  persons	  may	  […]	  be	  forced	  into	  arranged	  marriages	  or	  experience	  extreme	  
pressure	   to	  marry.	  They	  might	   fear	   that	  a	   failure	   to	  marry	  will	  ultimately	  mark	  
them	  out	  as	  LGBT	  in	  the	  public	  eye.	  Social,	  cultural	  and	  other	  restrictions	  which	  
require	   them	   to	   marry	   persons	   of	   the	   opposite	   sex	   can	   have	   the	   effect	   of	  
violating	  the	  right	   to	  marry	  with	   full	  and	  free	  consent,	  and	  the	  right	   to	  respect	  
for	  private	  life.	  Such	  community	  pressure	  could	  escalate	  beyond	  general	  societal	  
expectations	  and	  reach	  the	  threshold	  of	  persecution.124	  
	  
The	   Guidance	   Note	   goes	   on	   to	   describe	   forced	   marriage	   as	   a	   “persecutory	   act”.125	  	  
Therefore,	  not	  only	  was	  the	  second	  Tribunal	  remiss	   in	  their	  finding	  that	  the	  appellants	  
were	   not	   gay	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	   married	   despite	   an	   aversion	   to	   it,	   but	   it	   failed	   to	  
appreciate	   entirely	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   people	   forced	   into	  marriage	   could,	   by	   virtue	   of	  
such	   circumstances,	   be	  entitled	   to	   refugee	  protection.	   	   Juxtaposing	   the	   finding	   in	   this	  
case	  with	   another	   Australian	   decision	   reveals	   a	   contradictory	   expectation	   that	   would	  
seem	   to	   leave	   sexual	  minorities	   damned	   if	   they	  marry	   and	  damned	   if	   they	   don’t:	   the	  
Tribunal	  in	  this	  second	  decision	  “asked	  whether	  [the	  applicant]	  had	  considered	  living	  a	  
secret	  gay	  life	  and	  […]	  marrying,	  as	  many	  had	  and	  did.”126	  	  This	  remark	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  
was	  decried	  as	  discriminatory	  by	  a	  Federal	  Court.	  	  Five	  years	  later,	  prior	  to	  the	  ruling	  of	  
the	   second	   Tribunal	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Bangladeshi	   couple,	   an	   Australian	   Federal	  
                                                
124	  UNHCR.	  
125	  Ibid.,	  para.	  27.	  
126	  Bhattachan	  v.	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  and	  Multicultural	  Affairs	  [1999]	  FCA	  547	  (27	  April	  1999).	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Magistrate	  Court	  decided	  that	  pressure	  to	  marry	  could	  amount	  to	  persecution	  based	  on	  
Convention	  standards.127	  	  The	  intent	  of	  the	  second	  Tribunal	  therefore	  appeared	  to	  be	  to	  
fault	  the	  appellants	  for	  being	  victims	  of	  persecution.	  
	   In	   addition	   to	   heterosexual	   marriage,	   opposite-­‐sex	   sexual	   activity	   can	   cast	  
aspersions	  on	  the	  verisimilitude	  of	  a	  refugee’s	  claimed	  sexual	  identity	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  an	  
adjudicator	   even	  where	   it	   is	   not	   central	   to	   that	   identity.	   	   In	  RRT	   case	  V97/06483,	   the	  
Tribunal	  member	  declared	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  single	  “unsatisfactory”	  sexual	   relationship	  
between	   an	   applicant	   and	   his	   female	   neighbor	   that	   she	   could	   not	   “rule	   out	   the	  
possibility	  that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  function	  heterosexually	  also”.128	  	  Walker	  points	  out	  that	  the	  
Tribunal	  member	  failed	  to	  appreciate	  that	  “it	   is	  rare	  to	  find	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians	  who	  
have	   not	   had	   some	   sexual	   contact	   with	   members	   of	   the	   opposite	   sex,	   sometimes	  
‘satisfactorily’,	  sometimes	  not,	  and	  often	  because	  of	  social	  pressure	  to	  do	  so”	  and	  that	  
“This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   they	   are	   not	   ‘really’	   gay	   or	   lesbian”.129	   	   Contrast	   this	   with	  
another	  case	  involving	  a	  Pakistani	  man	  where	  the	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  
the	  Applicant	  might	  have	  enjoyed	  sexual	  play	  with	  other	  males	  when	  he	  was	  a	  
teenager,	   noting	   from	   country	   information	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   behaviour	   is	  
common	  in	  Islamic	  cultures	  [...]	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  is	  not	  prepared	  to	  accept	  
on	   the	   evidence	   before	   it	   that	   this	   was	   anything	   but	   a	   transient,	   youthful	  
phase.130	  
	  
“Sexual	   play”	   during	   adolescence	   because	   of	   social	   pressure	   is	   accepted	   as	   not	   being	  
fundamental	   when	   it	   is	   homosexual	   in	   nature	   while	   opposite-­‐sex	   encounters,	   even	  
                                                
127	  See:	  SZANS	  v	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  [2004]	  FMCA	  445	  (13	  August	  2004).	  
128	  V97/06483	  [1998]	  RRTA	  27	  (5	  January	  1998).	  
129	  Walker	  (2000),	  186.	  
130	  N05/50659	  [2005]	  RRTA	  207	  (17	  May	  2005).	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isolated	   and	   “unsatisfactory”	   ones	   are	   considered	   to	   clearly	   disprove	   homosexuality.	  	  
Walker	  offers	  another	  example	  of	  this	  double	  standard,	  citing	  N98/23086:	  
I	  accept	  that	  the	  Applicant	  engaged	  in	  sexual	  activities	  with	  a	  group	  of	  his	  male	  
school	   friends.	   	  However,	   I	  note	   that	   the	  activities	  he	  described	  were	  activities	  
which	   are	   relatively	   common	   amongst	   young	   people	   involved	   in	   sexual	  
experimentation.	   	   Further,	   the	   Applicant	   has	   had	   no	   contact	   whatsoever	   with	  
young	  women	  his	  own	  age.	   	  His	  only	  sexual	  experience	  with	  a	  woman	  involved	  
sexual	   intercourse	   with	   a	   prostitute.	   	   […]	   In	   the	   circumstances,	   I	   have	   some	  
difficulty	  accepting	  that	  the	  Applicant	  has	  a	  settled	  homosexual	  orientation.131	  
	  
The	  suggestion	  here	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  applicant	  has	  not	  had	  enough	  heterosexual,	  
that	   is	   to	   say	   “normal”,	   sexual	   experiences	   to	   know	   for	   certain	   that	   he	   has	   a	   deviant	  
(homosexual)	  sexuality.	  
	   Just	   as	   is	   the	   case	   with	   same-­‐sex	   activity,	   opposite-­‐sex	   activity	   may	   also	   be	  
involuntary	  and	  violent,	  a	  fact	  that	  is	  usually	  taken	  to	  show	  past	  persecution.	  	  However,	  
in	   the	   context	  of	   heterosexual	  marriages,	  marital	   rape	  has	  been	  used	   to	  discredit	   the	  
claims	   of	   lesbian	   asylum-­‐seekers.	   	   O’Leary	   describes	   and	   example	   of	   a	   woman	   from	  
Sierra	  Leone	  who,	  after	  being	  outed	  as	  a	  lesbian,	  was	  forced	  into	  marriage	  with	  a	  man	  
who	   subsequently	   raped	   and	   impregnated	   her.	   	   The	   immigration	   official	   deciding	   her	  
case	  disbelieved	  her	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  lesbian	  simply	  because	  she	  had	  a	  child.132	  
	   iii.	  Social	  and	  Sexual	  Relationships	  in	  the	  Host	  Country	  
	   The	   difficulty	   of	   verifying	   claims	   about	   a	   refugee’s	   past	   relationships	   in	   his	  
country	   of	   origin	   sometimes	   leads	   adjudicators	   to	   focus	   on	   participation	   in	   the	   host	  
country’s	  LGBT	  community	  and	  romantic	  relationships	  entered	  into	  after	  arrival.	  	  This	  is	  
particularly	   problematic	   when	   adjudicators	   expect	   refugees	   in	   their	   “free”	   host	  
                                                
131	  Walker	  (2000),	  186.	  
132	  O’Leary,	  89.	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countries	   to	   be	   capable	   and	   desirous	   of	   entering	   into	   a	   same-­‐sex	   relationship.	   	   In	   a	  
British	  case,	  a	   lesbian	  applicant	  was	  notified	  in	  a	  refusal	   letter	  that	  her	  claim	  to	  sexual	  
identity	  was	  disbelieved	  “because	  during	   the	   […]	   interview	  you	  were	  asked	   if	  you	  had	  
been	   in	   a	   relationship	  with	   another	  woman	   in	   this	   country	   (U.K.)	   and	   you	   stated	   that	  
you	  had	  not.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  if	  you	  were	  attracted	  to	  other	  women	  then	  with	  all	  the	  
freedom	   to	   choose	   a	   sexual	   partner	   of	   your	   choice	   in	   this	   country	   you	  would	   have	   a	  
relationship	   with	   another	   woman”.133	   	   Such	   a	   decision	   fails	   to	   take	   into	   account	  
economic	   factors,134	   cultural	   differences,	   psychological	   conditions,	   and	   the	   possibility	  
that	  the	  applicant	   is	  already	   in	  a	  committed	  relationship.	   	  Furthermore,	  applicants	  are	  
often	  expected	   to	   forge	   relationships	   in	   the	  context	   that	   they	  perceive	   the	   local	   LGBT	  
community	  operating	  in	  (i.e.	  gay	  clubs,	  the	  Internet).	  	  	  
An	  Albanian	  man	  seeking	  asylum	  in	  Canada	  was	  determined	  not	  to	  be	  a	  refugee	  
in	  part	  because	  “He	  has	  never	  had	  any	  sexual	  relations	  with	  any	  man	  (either	  in	  Albania	  
or	   in	  Canada),	  he	   is	   too	   shy”.135	   	   This	   finding	   came	  despite	   the	   fact	   the	  applicant	  was	  
“raped	   and	   brutalized”	   by	   four	   men	   when	   he	   had	   sought	   out	   a	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	  
encounter	  in	  the	  past.	  	  Though	  the	  court	  doubted	  his	  homosexuality,	  they	  modulated	  an	  
understandably	  deeply	  fearful	  response	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  sexual	  assault	  to	  shyness.136	  	  An	  
adverse	  claim	  based	  on	  this	  reasoning	  is	  perverse	  and	  fails	  to	  consider	  the	  affect	  PTSD	  
and	  other	  psychological	  conditions	  that	  can	  negatively	   impact	  an	   individual’s	  ability	   to	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  Secretary	  of	  State	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  O’Leary,	  90.	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  Ibid,	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  Menaj	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form	   relationships.	   	   A	   lesbian	   claimant	   explained	   her	   not	   having	   entered	   into	   a	  
relationship	  this	  way:	  	  
I	   have	   interpersonal	   problems	   after	   what	   I	   suffered.	   It	   is	   hard	   for	   me	   to	  
communicate	  what	  is	  on	  my	  mind.	  I	  feel	  that	  if	  I	  speak	  up,	  I	  will	  be	  rejected.	  Why	  
am	  I	  still	  unable	  to	  have	  a	  girlfriend	  in	  this	  country?	  It	  is	  my	  fear	  of	  rejection.	  The	  
strong	  fears	  are	  still	  there.137	  
	  
This	  comes	  despite	  attempts	  to	  become	  involved	  with	  the	  gay	  community.	  
	  
The	   second	   component	   of	   these	   kinds	   of	   expectations,	   that	   a	   genuine	   LGBT	  
refugee	  will	   straightaway	  be	   involved	   in	   the	   “gay	   ‘scene’”,	   is	  manifested	   in	   “repeated	  
and	  often	  detailed	  questioning	  about	  the	  names	  and	  street	  addresses	  of	  gay	  nightclubs”	  
and	  betrays	  a	  belief	   that	   “same-­‐sex	  attracted	   individuals	   from	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  world	  
should	   know	   about	   and	   visit	   gay	   bars	   and	   clubs	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   course	   upon	   their	  
relocation”.138	   	   This	   logic	   is	   based	   upon	   a	   problematic	   two-­‐pronged	   line	   of	   thinking,	  
according	  to	  Millbank:	  first,	  because	  this	   is	  what	  Western	  LGBTs	  supposedly	  do,	  taking	  
part	   authenticates	   a	   refugee’s	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	   identity	   claims;	   and	   second,	   refugees	  
escaping	  oppression	  and	  an	  obligation	  to	   live	   their	  sexuality	  covertly	  will	   inevitably	  be	  
enthusiastic	  in	  participating	  in	  “cultural	  manifestations	  of	  gayness,	  because	  that	  is	  how	  
‘freedom’	  is	  expressed”.139	  	  These	  stereotypes	  and	  untested	  assumptions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
adjudicators	  not	  only	  essentialize	   the	   local	   gay	   community,	  but	   they	   ignore	   important	  
pieces	  of	  LGBT	  refugee	  identity	  and	  its	  accompanying	  challenges.	   	  Refugees	  who	  have,	  
like	  the	  Albanian	  man	  in	  the	  above	  case,	  suffered	  sexual	  assault	  and	  other	  traumas	  and	  
may,	  as	  a	  result,	  experience	  depression	  or	  PTSD	  may	  not	  have	  the	  energy,	  wherewithal,	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or	   desire	   to	   go	   out	   to	   a	   gay	   venue.	   	   The	   cultural	   and	   language	   barriers	  may	   also	   be	  
intimidating	  just	  as	  they	  are	  for	  any	  refugee,	  regardless	  of	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  And	  some	  
may	   simply	   not	   enjoy	   socializing	   in	   a	   club	   context	   or	   find	   it	   inconsistent	   with	   their	  
morality.	  
In	  an	  Australian	   case,	   a	  Nigerian	  man’s	   claim	  was	   rejected	   in	   the	   first	   instance	  
because	  of	  his	   lack	  of	   romantic	   relationships	  and	   the	   fact	   that	  he	  did	  not	  “visit	  places	  
where	   he	   could	   meet	   homosexual	   people”.140	   	   This	   decision	   was	   overturned	   by	   a	  
Tribunal	   that	   sympathized	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   that	   applicant	   had	   “no	   need	   to	   do	   so	  
because	  he	  has	  someone	  overseas	  with	  whom	  he	  has	  had	  a	  continued	  relationship.	  He	  
owes	  him	  fidelity	  and	  plans	  to	  be	  re-­‐united	  with	  him	  someday”.141	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  
put	  simply	  that	  “He	  is	  also	  not	  a	  club	  person	  and	  does	  not	  drink	  or	  smoke”	  nor	  does	  he	  
“enjoy	  nightclub	  culture”.142	  	  This	  image	  of	  a	  monogamous	  homebody	  who	  happens	  also	  
to	   be	   gay	   is	   an	   image	   that	  would	   no	   doubt	   be	   unfamiliar	   in	   a	   refugee	   system	  where	  
promiscuity	   and	   “blatant	   gayness”	   are	  what	   is	   taken	   to	   set	   at-­‐risk	   gay	  male	   refugees	  
apart143.	  	  And	  yet,	  paradoxically,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “respectable”	  gay	  man	  (the	  Tribunal	  was	  
moved	   by	   the	   appellant’s	   sadness	   at	   his	   having	   to	   leave	   seminary	   and	   abandon	   his	  
dreams	  of	  becoming	  a	  priest)	  seems	  to	  have	  impacted	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  
first	   instance.144	   	   This	   disconnect	   in	   stereotypes	   reflects	   the	   broader	   social	   discourse	  
that	   attempts	   to	   determine	  whether	   authentic	  male	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality	   is	   “naturally”	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promiscuous	   or	  monogamous	   and	  whether	   gay	  men	   can	   be	   “civilized”	   with	   idealized	  
heterosexual	  norms.145	  
	   C.	  Explanations	  of	  Prejudice	  
	   It	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   an	   adjudicator’s	   personal	   beliefs	   about	   gay	  
identity	  can	  directly	  impact	  the	  fate	  of	  LGBT	  asylum-­‐seekers,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  
try	   to	  understand	  why	   this	  happens.	   	  According	   to	  Berg	  and	  Millbank,	  “In	   the	   refugee	  
context,	   it	   is	   always	   the	   decision-­‐maker	   and	   not	   the	   applicant	  who	   has	   the	   power	   to	  
name,	   the	   authority	   to	   decide	  who	   the	   applicant	   ‘really’	   is	   and	  what	   sexuality	   ‘really’	  
means”.146	   Similarly,	   McGhee	   reveals	   that	   “the	   person	   who	   is	   alleging	   to	   be	   a	  
homosexual	  cannot	  be	  the	  author	  of	  his	  own	  subjectivity	  before	  the	  law;	  he	  remains	  an	  
object	   whose	   legal	   subjectivity	   must	   be	   made	   for	   him	   by	   an	   authorized	   knower	   and	  
speaker	  of	  it”.147	  	  Thus,	  because	  the	  decision	  rests	  with	  the	  adjudicator,	  it	   is	  ultimately	  
her	   preconceptions	   that	   are	   paramount	   and	   will	   color	   whatever	   submissions	   the	  
applicant	  provides	  about	  his	   identity.	   	  Often,	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  only	  satisfied	  with	  a	  
self-­‐presentation	   that	   fits	   within	   specific	   familiar	   parameters.	   	   Cultural	   dimensions	  
inform	  expectations,	  making	  the	  problem	  more	  than	  just	  an	  imperfect	  understanding	  of	  
non-­‐normative	  sexuality.	   	  This	   is	  evident	   in	  cases	  decided	  by	  Luke	  Hardy,	   the	  principal	  
member	  of	  the	  second	  Tribunal	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Bangladeshi	  couple	  and	  the	  principal	  
member	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  man.	  	  Hardy,	  himself	  gay,	  148	  was	  found	  by	  a	  federal	  
magistrate’s	   review	   of	   a	   different	   appeal	   to	   hold	   “preliminary	   views	   incapable	   of	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  See,	  for	  example,	  Christian	  Klesse,	  The	  spectre	  of	  promiscuity:	  gay	  male	  and	  bisexual	  non-­‐monogamies	  
and	  polyamories	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Company,	  2007).	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  208.	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  McGhee,	  34.	  
148	  Paul	  Toohey,	  “Under	  the	  gaydar,”	  The	  Bulletin	  (21	  May	  2007).	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alteration	   regarding	   male	   homosexuals”.149	   	   In	   this	   case,	   WAAG	   v.	   Minister	   for	  
Immigration,	   the	   federal	  magistrate	   further	   stated	   that	   the	   questions	  Hardy	   posed	   to	  
the	   applicant	   (aimed	   at	   discovering	   the	   authenticity	   of	   his	   claim	   to	   be	   a	   homosexual)	  
revealed	   “a	   pre-­‐formed	   template	   into	   which	   the	   Tribunal	   considered	   all	   homosexual	  
males	   would	   fit	   and	   that	   if	   an	   applicant	   who	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   homosexual	   did	   not	  
respond	  appropriately	  to	  these	  questions	  he	  must	   ipso	  facto	  not	  be	  a	  homosexual.”150	  	  
In	   the	   appeal	   under	   review,	   Hardy	   betrayed	   a	   thoroughly	   Western	   and	   indeed	  
stereotypical	   conception	   of	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	   identity	   in	   casting	   doubt	   upon	   the	  
appellant’s	  claims	  essentially	  because	  the	  appellant	  did	  not	  identify	  with	  gay	  icons:	  
There	   can	  be	  no	   tried	  and	   true	   inquisitorial	   test	   for	  establishing	  beyond	  doubt	  
whether	  a	  person	  is	  or	  is	  not	  homosexual,	  especially	  given	  subjective	  states	  and	  
conditions	   of	   homosexuality.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Tribunal	   attempted	   to	   gain	  
insights	   into	   the	  Applicant's	  outlook	  as	  a	  homosexual	   and	   the	  experiences	  and	  
other	  phenomena	  that	  contributed	  to	  it.	  The	  Tribunal	  asked	  the	  Applicant	  which,	  
if	   any,	   art,	   literature,	   song	   lyrics	   or	   popular	   culture	   icons	   spoke	   to	   him	   in	   his	  
isolation	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  society.	  The	  Applicant	  provided	  not	  one	  example.	  
He	  said	  he	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  question.	  The	  Tribunal	  asked	  him	   if	  his	  ears	  
pricked,	  say,	  when	  he	  heard	  of	  any	  famous,	  perhaps	  foreign	  artist,	  performer	  or	  
author	  being	  banned	   in	   Iran	   for	   reasons	  of	   immorality.	   In	   reply,	  he	  said	  he	  did	  
not	   understand	   the	   question.	   The	   Tribunal	   was	   not	   demanding	   that	   the	  
Applicant	   be	   a	   leading	   Gide	   scholar	   or	   even	   a	  Marilyn	  Monroe	   fan,	   but	   it	   did	  
seem	   odd	   that	   the	   sexuality	   he	   was	   forced	   to	   suppress	   in	   Iran	   did	   not	   find	  
expression	  in	  any	  phenomena	  at	  all,	  whether	  in	  high	  culture	  or	  low151	  
	  
If	  Massad	  and	  others	  greatly	  limit	  the	  possibility	  for	  an	  authentic	  same-­‐sex	  sexuality	  in	  
the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  by	   assigning	   gay	   and	   lesbian	   identities	   a	   foreign	  origin,	  Hardy	  
limits	  the	  possibility	  for	  authentic	  non-­‐Western	  same-­‐sex	  sexualities	  by	  expecting	  them	  
to	  correspond	  to	  Western	  ones.	  	  Despite	  his	  apparent	  attention	  to	  the	  “subjective	  states	  
                                                




and	   conditions	   of	   homosexuality”,	   Hardy	   did	   not	   recognize	   the	   appellant’s	   subjective	  
experience	  of	  homosexuality	  as	  valid.	   	   Indeed,	  contradicting	  himself,	  Hardy	  seemed	  to	  
lay	  out	  exactly	  what	  the	  attentions	  of	  gay	  men	  should	  be	  focused	  on:	  	  
The	   Tribunal	   thus	   well	   understands	   that	   it	   should	   not	   expect	   all	   or	   any	  
homosexual	  men	   in	   Iran	   to	   take	  an	   interest,	   for	  example,	   in	  Oscar	  Wilde,	  or	   in	  
Alexander	  the	  Great,	  or	   in	  Naguib	  Mahfooz,	  or	   in	  Greco-­‐Roman	  wrestling,	  or	   in	  
the	   songs	   of	   Egypt's	   tragic	  muse	  Oum	  Khalsoum,	   let	   alone,	   say,	   in	   the	   alleged	  
mystique	  of	  Bette	  Midler	  or	  Madonna.	  ...	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  surprised	  to	  
observe	  a	  comprehensive	  inability	  on	  the	  Applicant's	  part	  to	  identify	  any	  kind	  of	  
emotion-­‐stirring	  or	  dignity-­‐arousing	  phenomena	  in	  the	  world	  around	  him.152	  
	  
The	   suggestion	   that	   for	  a	  man	   to	  have	  a	   capacity	   for	  emotional,	   romantic,	   and	   sexual	  
attraction	   to	   other	   men,	   he	   must	   also	   show	   a	   serious	   interest	   in	   divas	   or	   gay	   (or	  
purportedly	  gay)	  literary	  and	  historical	  figures	  exposes	  a	  troublingly	  narrow	  conception	  
of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  gay.	   	  Hardy	  further	  encumbered	  gay	  identity	  with	  expectations	  
that	  a	   gay	  man	   in	  a	   country	  where	  pervasive	  attitudes	  and	  homophobia	  do	  not	  allow	  
him	  to	  live	  openly	  in	  regard	  to	  his	  sexual	  orientation	  should	  have	  a	  gay	  circle	  of	  friends	  
and/or	   contact	   with	   the	   “‘gay’	   underground”.153	   	   He	   fails	   to	   consider	   the	   isolating	  
context	   of	   being	   a	   sexual	   minority	   in	   a	   place	   where	   it	   is	   unacceptable,	   but	   he	   also	  
assumes	  that	  the	  person	  in	  this	  situation	  would	  have	  a	  well	  enough	  developed	  sense	  of	  
self,	   confidence,	  and	   the	  courage	   to	   reach	  out	   to	  others	  he	  may	  perceive	  correctly	  or	  
incorrectly	  as	  being	  like	  him.	  	  This	  is	  a	  terrible	  risk	  to	  expect	  a	  person	  to	  take	  to	  meet	  the	  
minimum	  standards	  of	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  identity	  or	  gender	  discordant	  identities.	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153	  Ibid.	  	  Hardy	  is	  certainly	  not	  along	  in	  making	  this	  kind	  of	  mistake—according	  to	  Thibault	  Raisse,	  
“Réfugiés	  homosexuels	  :	  la	  grande	  loterie”,	  Le	  Monde	  (20	  June	  2008),	  in	  France,	  a	  Pakistani	  asylum-­‐seeker	  
appealing	  his	  case	  to	  the	  CNDA	  was	  asked	  to	  asked	  to	  name	  the	  colors	  of	  the	  gay	  flag	  as	  part	  of	  a	  line	  of	  
questioning	  meant	  to	  determine	  the	  authenticity	  of	  his	  claim	  to	  be	  gay.	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   Though	  he	  explicitly	  said	  that	  the	  he	  “should	  not	  expect”	  (emphasis	  added)	  that	  
a	   refugee	   conform	   to	   the	   rubric	   for	   gay	   identity,	   in	  effect,	  Hardy’s	   line	  of	  questioning	  
discredits	  his	  commitment	  to	  this	  idea.	  	  Hardy	  says	  to	  the	  appellant:	  
Well	  I	  put	  it	  to	  you	  that	  this	  isn't	  something	  that	  you	  can	  switch	  on	  and	  off,	  it's	  
something	  that,	  particularly	  if	   it	   isolates	  you,	  it	  can	  take	  over	  your	  whole	  life.	  It	  
can	  be	  the	  lens	  through	  which	  you	  see	  the	  whole	  world,	  if	  you're	  lonely	  enough	  
as	  a	   result	  of,	  or	   feel	   isolated	  enough	  as	  a	   result	  of	  being	  different	   from	  other	  
people	   ...	   um	   here,	   sorry	   here's	   an	   example.	   Here's	   an	   example.	   If,	   if	   say,	   a	  
famous	  Egyptian	  novelist	  wins	  the	  Nobel	  Prize,	  but	  he's	  also	  a	  homosexual	  who	  
writes	  about,	  ah,	  you	  know,	  the	  love	  between	  two	  men.	  It	  mightn't	  be	  a	  big	  part	  
of	   his	   story	   but	   it	   might	   be	   an	   element	   in	   the	   novel,	   right.	   Just	   say	   he	   gets	  
banned	   in	   Iran,	   okay.	   Might	   not	   your	   ears	   prick	   up	   when	   you	   hear	   that	   that	  
author	  has	  been	  banned	  in	  Iran,	  and	  you	  go,	  oh,	  yeah,	  that's	  another,	  that's	  just	  
another	  case,	  just	  another	  problem.154	  
	  
While	   the	   latter	   part	   of	   the	   above	   quote	   presses	   the	   matter	   of	   the	   appellant’s	  
identification	   with	   supposedly	   gay	   figures,	   the	   first	   sentence	   is	   telling	   and	   brings	   up	  
another	  problematic	  assumption.	   	   The	  Tribunal’s	  Principal	  Member	  would	   seem	  to	  be	  
equating	   disruptions	   in	   the	   consistency	   of	   the	   expression	   gay	   identity	   with	  
inauthenticity.	   	   This	   view	   relies	   too	   heavily	   on	   “Western	   conceptions	   of	   the	   linear	  
formation	   and	   ultimate	   fixity	   of	   sexual	   identity”	   to	   which	   Berg	   and	  Millbank	   refer	   in	  
their	  discussion	  of	  the	  flawed	  approaches	  of	  Western	  adjudicators.155	  	  	  
	   That	  Hardy’s	  mistake	  in	  this	  case	  is	  based	  on	  a	  failure	  to	  appreciate	  the	  diversity	  
in	  minority	  sexual	  identities	  is	  made	  even	  clearer	  when	  taking	  into	  account	  his	  decision	  
in	  N96/10584	  (2006).	  	  This	  case	  was	  a	  review	  of	  a	  decision	  by	  a	  primary	  adjudicator	  to	  
deny	  refugee	  status	  to	  a	  gay	  Chinese	  man	  who,	  it	  was	  ruled,	  could	  avoid	  persecution	  by	  
acting	  discreetly.	  	  Hardy	  relied	  largely	  on	  the	  testimony	  of	  a	  witness	  brought	  forward	  by	  
                                                
154	  Ibid.	  
155	  Berg	  and	  Millbank,	  p.	  197.	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the	  applicant	  for	  his	  favorable	  determination.	  	  The	  witness,	  who	  corroborated	  the	  claim	  
of	  the	  applicant	  to	  be	  a	  homosexual,	  discussed	  the	  discrimination	  and	  harassment	  that	  
Chinese	  men	   faced	  after	  meeting	   socially	   in	  a	  Shanghai	   restaurant	  known	   to	  be	  a	  gay	  
meeting	  place.	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  the	  published	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  applicant	  
himself	   visited	   this	   restaurant,	   but	   Hardy	   seemed	   to	   attribute	   this	   kind	   of	   overt	  
expression	  to	  the	  applicant.	  	  Hardy	  went	  on	  to	  talk	  about	  public	  bathrooms	  and	  parks	  in	  
Shanghai	   and	   the	   practice	   of	  meeting	   in	   such	   spaces	   for	   anonymous	   sex.	   	   It	   is	   again	  
unclear	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  applicant	  frequented	  parks	  in	  Shanghai.	  	  Though	  Hardy	  was	  
using	   these	   examples	   to	   prove	   a	   general	   point	   about	   discrimination	   in	   China	   against	  
homosexuals,156	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   parallels	   (attributed	   or	   real)	   between	   familiar	  
aspects	   of	   Western	   gay	   identity	   and	   the	   expression	   of	   gay	   identity	   in	   China	   were	  
sufficient	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  applicant	  was	  homosexual.	  	  A	  corroborating	  witness	  and	  the	  
frequenting	   of	   gay	   spaces	   (the	   restaurant	  mentioned,	   public	   bathrooms	   and	  parks)	   in	  
the	   country	   of	   origin	  were	   elements	   impossible	   for	   the	   Iranian	  man	   in	  WAAG	   or	   the	  
Bangladeshi	  couple	  in	  NAOX	  to	  employ	  to	  authenticate	  their	  sexual	  identity	  claims.	  
	   To	  understand	  Hardy’s	  decisions,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  them	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  
Goffman’s	   theories	  on	  social	  stigma.	   	   In	  his	  1963	  book	  Stigma,	  Goffman	  observes	  that	  
the	  stigmatized	  individual	  absorbs	  the	  social	  identity	  standards	  of	  the	  unstigmatized	  (or	  
“normals”)	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  herself	  fails	  to	  conform	  to	  them.	  	  The	  resulting	  
ambivalence	   toward	   her	   own	   identity	   may	   lead	   her	   to	   attempt	   to	   “normify”	   herself.	  	  
Goffman	  defines	  normification	  as	  “the	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  stigmatized	  individual	  to	  
                                                
156	  See	  the	  published	  decision	  in	  case	  N96/10584	  [1996]	  RRTA	  1131	  (15	  May	  1996)	  for	  further	  detail	  on	  
Hardy’s	  arguments.	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present	   himself	   as	   an	  ordinary	   person,	   although	  not	   necessary	  making	   a	   secret	   of	   his	  
failing”.157	   	   This	   process	   is	   also	   called	   “covering”	  wherein	   “persons	  who	   are	   ready	   to	  
admit	  possession	  of	  a	  stigma	  (in	  many	  cases	  because	  it	  is	  known	  about	  or	  immediately	  
apparent)	   may	   nonetheless	   make	   a	   great	   effort	   to	   keep	   the	   stigma	   from	   looming	  
large”.158	  	  Identity	  ambivalence	  can	  also	  cause	  a	  stigmatized	  person	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  
between	  herself	  and	  others	   like	  her	   (within	  the	  group	  of	   those	  sharing	  her	  stigma)	  on	  
the	  one	  hand	  and	  those	  more	  demonstratively	  or	  stereotypically	  stigmatized	  than	  she.	  	  
In	   some	   cases,	   the	   less	   overtly	   stigmatized	   will	   engage	   not	   only	   in	   normification	   of	  
themselves,	   but	   also	   the	   stigmatized	   group	   as	   a	  whole.	   	   Goffman	   calls	   this	   “in-­‐group	  
purification”.159	  	  Those	  who	  do	  not	  or	  cannot	  cover	  are	  othered	  as	  a	  result,	  stigmatized	  
within	   an	   already-­‐stigmatized	   group,	   as	   it	   were.	   	   Those	   who	   refuse	   to	   normify	  
themselves	   may	   be	   accused	   of	   engaging	   in	   “minstrelization”	   whereby	   they	   act	   out	  
stereotypes	   and	   external	   expectations	   of	   the	   characteristics	   imputed	   to	   their	   stigma	  
“consolidating	  a	  life	  situation	  into	  a	  clownish	  role”.160	  	  They	  are	  seen	  as	  damaging	  to	  the	  
dignity	  of	  the	  group.161	  
	   And	   yet,	   excluding	   the	   less	   or	   un-­‐normified	   is	   only	   one	   form	   of	   in-­‐group	  
purification.	   	   Goffman	   states	   that	   the	   stigmatized	   individual	   is	   also	   warned	   against	  
normification	  or	  “deminstrelization”	  and	  is	  	  
                                                
157	  Erving	  Goffman,	  Stigma:	  Notes	  on	  the	  management	  of	  spoiled	  identity	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  NJ:	  Prentice-­‐
Hall,	  Inc.,	  1963),	  31.	  
158	  Ibid.,	  102.	  	  For	  further	  analysis	  of	  covering	  in	  the	  LGBT	  context,	  see:	  Kenji	  Yoshino,	  Covering:	  The	  
Hidden	  Assault	  on	  Our	  Civil	  Rights	  (2006).	  
159	  Ibid.,	  108.	  
160	  Ibid.,	  110.	  
161	  See	  Michael	  Warner,	  The	  Trouble	  with	  Normal:	  Sex,	  Politics,	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Queer	  Life	  (2000)	  for	  a	  
discussion	  of	  in-­‐group	  purification	  in	  the	  LGBT	  community.	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encouraged	   to	   have	   distaste	   for	   those	   of	   his	   fellows	   who,	   without	   actually	  
making	  a	  secret	  of	  their	  stigma,	  engage	  in	  careful	  covering,	  being	  very	  careful	  to	  
show	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  appearances	  they	  are	  […]	  gentlemen	  deviants,	  nice	  persons	  
like	  ourselves	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  reputation	  of	  their	  kind162	  
	  
On	  this	  basis,	  the	  would-­‐be	  out	  group	  who	  are	  more	  demonstratively	  or	  stereotypically	  
associable	  with	  the	  stigma	  they	  possess	  reject	  the	  more	  normified	  as	  inauthentic.	  	  This	  is	  
the	  context	  into	  which	  I	  suggest	  placing	  Hardy’s	  approach	  in	  NOAX	  and	  WAAG.	  	  Rather	  
than	   understanding	   that	   minority	   sexualities	   may	   manifest	   themselves	   differently	   in	  
different	  concepts,	  Hardy	  chooses	  to	  use	  the	  rubric	  of	  Western	  gay	  identity.	  	  Therefore,	  
not	  being	  connected	  with	  politicized	  gay	  movements,	  not	   frequenting	  gay	   spaces,	  not	  
identifying	  with	  Western	  gay	  cultural	  figures,	  and	  being	  in	  a	  heterosexual	  marriage	  are	  
all	  pieces	  of	   the	  applicants’	   identities	   (imputed	  or	   real)	   that	  push	   them	   further	  out	  of	  
the	  “in-­‐group”	  whose	  authenticity	  Hardy	  is	  tasked	  with	  maintaining	  both	  as	  a	  gay	  man	  
and	  as	  an	  adjudicator.	   	  This	   is	  especially	   ironic	  given	  a	  statement	  he	  made	  in	  a	  case	  in	  
which	  he	  denied	  asylum	  to	  a	  gay	  Malaysian	  appellant	  wherein	  he	  decried	  the	  “labelling	  
of	  a	  person	  as	  a	  homosexual	  merely	  over	  his	  or	  her	  […]	  stated	  philosophy,	  taste	  in	  music	  
or	  marital	  status.”163	  
While	   Hardy’s	   rulings	   are	   particular,	   their	   analysis	   is	   indispensible.	   	   Hardy,	   in	  
addition	  to	  his	  position	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Review	  Tribunals	  of	  Australia	  was	  a	  
UNHCR	  officer	  and	  executive	  director	  of	  the	  Refugee	  Council	  of	  Australia.	  	  He	  was	  thrice	  
part	   of	   the	  Australian	   delegation	   to	  UNHCR’s	   Executive	  Committee	   in	  Geneva.	   	   These	  
positions,	   in	   addition	   to	   work	   on	   TV	   documentaries	   and	   publications	   on	   refugee	  
                                                
162	  Goffman	  (1963),	  110.	  
163	  N97/14443	  [1998]	  RRTA	  387	  (27	  January	  1998).	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issues,164	   indicate	  a	  high	   level	  of	   influence.	   	  This	   is	  particularly	  salient	  given	  Goffman’s	  
assertion	   that	   “verbal	   and	   vocal	  members”	  of	   a	   stigmatized	   group	   “present	   in	   a	  well-­‐
rounded	   version”	   the	   character	   of	   the	   stigma	   and	   the	   stigmatized	   to	   the	   rest	   of	  
society.165	   	   Goffman	   further	   describes	   this	   role,	   saying	   that	   “once	   a	   person	   with	   a	  
particular	   stigma	   attains	   high	   occupational,	   political,	   or	   financial	   position	   […]	   a	   new	  
career	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  thrust	  upon	  him,	  that	  of	  representing	  his	  category”.166	  Hardy	  and	  
those	   in	   similar	   positions	   help	   to	   define	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   society	   (and,	   importantly,	   for	  
others	   in	   the	   refugee	   adjudication	   community)	   what	   constitutes	   an	   authentic	   gay	  
identity.	  	  Outsiders	  endeavoring	  in	  good	  faith	  to	  move	  past	  stereotypes	  accept	  that	  he	  
and	   others	   like	   him	   are	   insiders	   and	   that	   he	   therefore	   has	   special	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
group.	   	  When	   these	  outsiders	  are	  other	  adjudicators,	   this	  presumed	   insight	   is	  used	   to	  
determine	  an	  authentic	  gay	  identity	  for	  legal	  purposes	  in	  “‘an	  idiosyncratic	  practice	  that	  
seeks	   systematically	   to	   appropriate,	   privilege	   and	   secure	   a	   specific	   and	   limited	   set	   of	  
meanings,	   accents,	   and	   connotations	   by	  means	   of	   displacing	   and	   rejecting	   alternative	  
and	  competing	  meanings…’”.167	  	  	  
In	  a	  courtroom,	  where	  objective	  standards	  and	  precedents	  are	  indispensible,	  the	  
breadth	  of	  minority	  sexual	  identity	  becomes	  a	  formidable	  challenge.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  
the	  influence	  of	  Hardy	  and	  others	  in	  the	  LGBT	  community	  who	  have	  the	  ears	  and	  eyes	  of	  
refugee	   adjudicators	   is	   that	   these	   are	   primarily	   from	  Western	   “spokesmen”.	   	   Sexual	  
minorities	  in	  the	  West	  are	  often	  freer	  to	  be	  more	  verbal	  and	  vocal	  and	  tend	  to	  dominate	  
                                                
164	  Migration	  Review	  Tribunal	  and	  Refugee	  Review	  Tribunal,	  “Appendix	  1:	  Members	  of	  the	  Tribunals,”	  
Annual	  Report	  2005-­‐2006	  (2006).	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  Goffman	  (1963),	  112.	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  Ibid.,	  26.	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  Leslie	  J.	  Moran	  in	  McGhee,	  34.	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the	   identity	  discourse.	   	  While	  Massad	  errs	   in	  negating	  the	   importance	  of	  non-­‐Western	  
sexual	   identities	   (suggesting	   there	   are	   only	   “desires	   and	   practices”168	   rather	   than	  
identities),	   there	   is	   validity	   in	   his	   general	   point	   that	  Western	  minority	   sexual	   identity,	  
even	   as	   it	   conceives	   of	   itself	   as	   universal,	   fails	   to	   incorporate	   the	   realities	   of	   non-­‐
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  363.	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V.	  Multiple	  Identities,	  Multiple	  Marginalities	  
	   A	   refugee	   who	   is	   a	   member	   of	   a	   sexual	   minority	   suffers	   on	   account	   of	   her	  
individual	  multiple	   identities	   and	   at	   their	   intersection.	   	   In	   no	   country	   in	   the	  world	   do	  
lesbians,	   gay	   men,	   bisexuals,	   and	   transgender	   individuals	   enjoy	   full	   equality	   with	  
exclusively	   heterosexual	   people.	   	   In	   the	   best	   cases,	   sexual	   minorities	   in	   states	   that	  
provide	  them	  legal	  rights	  such	  as	  marriage,	  the	  ability	  to	  adopt	  children,	  and	  protection	  
against	  discrimination	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  in	  healthcare	  still	  face	  the	  stigma	  of	  having	  
rejected	   the	  heteronormative	   standards	  of	   the	  majority.	   	   In	   the	  worst	   cases,	   they	  are	  
executed	   by	   the	   state,	   tortured,	   subjected	   to	   sexual	   violence,	   disowned	   by	   their	  
families,	  and	  deprived	  of	  their	  fundamental	  human	  dignity.	  
	  	   Driven	   to	   the	   margins	   on	   account	   of	   a	   characteristic	   either	   innate	   and	  
immutable,	   or	   so	   fundamental	   to	   their	   human	   dignity	   they	   should	   not	   be	   forced	   to	  
change	  it,	  refugees	  of	  any	  sexual	  orientation	  have	  by	  definition	  faced	  persecution	  or	  live	  
in	   fear	   of	   it.	   	   Once	   in	   a	   host	   state,	   they	   are	   often	   regarded	   with	   suspicion	   or	   as	   an	  
additional	   burden.	   	   Language,	   culture,	   values,	   and	   beliefs	   that	   distinguish	   them	   from	  
their	  host	  society	  mark	  them	  as	  different,	  even	  undesirable.	  	  Along	  the	  way,	  they	  can	  be	  
pigeonholed	  as	   vulnerable	  by	   those	  whose	  goal	   it	   is	   to	  help	   them	  and	  unintentionally	  
dispossessed	  of	  their	  agency.	  
	   At	  the	  intersection	  of	  these	  identities	  are	  a	  host	  of	  unique	  problems,	  combining	  
the	  worst	  of	  both	  experiences.	  	  When	  a	  refugee	  who	  shares	  and	  respects	  the	  values	  of	  
his	   coreligionists	   or	   those	   belonging	   to	   his	   ethnic	   group	   (these	   two	   categories	   often	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coincide),	  he	  enjoys	  the	  possibility	  of	   reconstructing	  his	   life	   in	  a	  host	  country	  with	  the	  
support	  of	   the	   refugee	  community	   there.	   	  He	  will	   find	  a	  network	  of	  people	  who	  have	  
something	   in	   common	  with	  him	  who	  can	  help	  him	  navigate	   the	  challenges	  of	   refugee	  
life.	  	  Not	  so	  in	  many	  cases	  for	  the	  LGBT	  refugee	  who	  is	  shunned	  by	  his	  own	  community	  
for	  his	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  Left	  with	  fewer	  resources	  and	  limited	  connections	  because	  of	  
his	   status	   as	   a	   sexual	  minority,	   he	   is	   often	   also	   unable	   to	   seek	   the	   assistance	   of	   the	  
“native”	  LGBT	  community	   in	  the	  host	  society	  because	  of	  his	  status	  as	  a	  foreigner.	   	  Cut	  
off	   from	   assistance,	   the	   LGBT	   refugee	   often	   lacks	   vital	   information,	   exacerbating	  
problems	   such	   as	   those	   revolving	   around	   filing	   claims	   within	   a	   fixed	   amount	   of	   time	  
after	   arrival.169	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   organizations	   that	   bring	   together	   LGBT	  members	   of	   a	  
particular	  ethnic	  group	  or	  religious	  background	  do	  exist	  and	  can	  provide	  something	  like	  
a	  surrogate	  family	  for	  refugees.	   	  Only	  in	  rare	  cases	  do	  LGBT	  refugee	  organizations	  that	  
bring	  together	  refugees	  from	  diverse	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  backgrounds	  exist.	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  double-­‐marginality	  that	  results	  from	  the	  double	  LGBT/refugee	  
identity,	  I	  have	  explained	  that	  blind	  spots	  exist	  for	  adjudicators	  who	  rely	  on	  a	  familiarity	  
with	   Western	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality	   to	   understand	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality	   in	   refugees’	  
countries	   of	   origin.	   	   However,	   this	   dual	   identity	   also	   intersects	   with	   other	   identities,	  
causing	   further	   particular	   problems	   for	   the	   member	   of	   a	   sexual	   minority	   who	   flees	  
persecution.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  refugees,	  in	  fact,	  has	  multiple	  identities.	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  O’Leary,	  93.	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A.	  Gender	  
At	  the	  intersection	  of	  LGBT	  refugee	  identity	  and	  gender,	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  male	  
and	  female	   is	  paralleled	  by	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres.	   	  The	  
locations	  of	  two	  elements	  are	  at	  play	  in	  this	  division:	  the	  expression	  of	   identity	  (which	  
may	   be	   an	   activity)	   and	   persecution.	   	   According	   to	  Victoria	  Neilson,	   for	   gay	  men,	   the	  
occurrence	   of	   one	   or	   both	   of	   these	   elements	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	   is	   far	  more	   likely,	  
whereas	  for	  lesbians,	  both	  frequently	  occur	  in	  the	  private	  sphere.170	  	  	  
Because,	  according	  to	  the	  UN’s	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  violence	  against	  women,	  
there	  is	  a	  “traditional	  division	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  and	  the	  emphasis	  
in	   human	   rights	   discourse	   on	   public	   sphere	   violations”,171	   the	   often	   private	   nature	   of	  
lesbian	  identity	  expression	  and	  persecution	  creates	  unique	  challenges.	  According	  to	  the	  
special	   report,	   human	   rights	   guarantees	   no	   longer	   apply	   only	   to	   the	   public	   realm,	   a	  
development	   that	   obliges	   the	   state	   “to	   act	  with	   due	   diligence	   to	   prevent,	   investigate	  
and	  punish	  violations”	  within	  the	  private	  realm,	   including	   in	  the	  family.172	   	   In	  practice,	  
however,	  violence	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  persecution	  of	  women	  (like	  forced	  marriage)	  that	  
takes	  place	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  family	   is	  still	  hidden	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  persistent	  
ideas	   about	   the	   inviolability	   of	   the	   private	   sphere.	   	   These	   ideas	   have	   proven	   a	  
formidable	  challenge	  for	  lesbians	  and	  other	  female	  asylum-­‐seekers.	  	  	  	  
Across	   cultures	   and	   national	   boundaries,	   women	   are	   inordinately	   more	   likely	  
than	  men	  to	  be	  the	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  	  This	  violence	  is	  very	  often	  a	  form	  of	  
                                                
170	  Neilson,	  427.	  
171	  OHCHR,	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  the	  Family	  E/CN.4/1999/68	  (1999),	  para.	  6.	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  Ibid.	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persecution	   intended	   to	  maintain	  a	  male-­‐dominated	  power	  dynamic	  within	   the	   family	  
and,	  by	  extension,	  in	  the	  community	  and	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  
extremely	  high	  proportion	  of	  sexual	  assault	  visited	  upon	  women	  together	  with	  the	  fact	  
that	  sexual	  minorities	  are	  more	  often	  victims	  of	  sexual	  assault	  than	  heterosexuals,	   it	   is	  
not	   unsurprising	   that	   lesbians	   are	   uniquely	   vulnerable.173	   	   Given	   the	   extremely	   high	  
significance	  of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  transfer	  point	  for	  power,174	  transgressive	  female	  sexuality	  
may	  be	  regarded	  as	  among	  the	  most	  flagrant	  violations	  of	  patriarchal	  norms.	  	  The	  state	  
is	  often	  tolerant	  of	  or	  even	  complicit	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  such	  dynamics.	  	  According	  to	  
the	   Rapporteur,	   “State-­‐tolerated	   violence	   [is]	   intended	   to	   control	  women	   in	   their	   so-­‐
called	  private	  lives”.175	  
An	  American	  case,	   In	   re	  R-­‐A-­‐,	  was	   the	   first	  Board	  of	   Immigration	  Appeals	   (BIA)	  
review	  to	  examine	  whether	  or	  not	  domestic	  violence	  could	  be	  considered	  tantamount	  
to	   persecution.	   	   While	   the	   case	   is	   still	   awaiting	   the	   final	   decision	   of	   an	   Immigration	  
Judge,	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Homeland	   Security	   and	   the	   Obama	  
administration	  has	  been	  to	  find	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  claimant.	  	  This	  precedent,	  important	  for	  
female	   asylum-­‐seekers	   in	   general	   as	   well	   as	   lesbians,	   would	   presumably	   clarify	   that	  
violence	  in	  the	  private	  sphere	  rises	  to	  the	  level	  of	  persecution	  and	  thus	  can	  form	  part	  of	  
the	  basis	  of	  an	  asylum	  claim.	  	  	  
                                                
173	  See	  Millbank	  (2003),	  75	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  distinctness	  of	  anti-­‐lesbian	  violence.	  
174	  Supra	  29.	  
175	  OHCHR,	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  violence	  against	  women,	  its	  causes	  and	  	  
consequences	  E/CN.4/1996/53	  (1996),	  para.	  26.	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There	  is	  only	  one	  specific	  precedential	  decision	  relating	  to	  lesbian	  refugees	  in	  the	  
US,176	   unsurprising	   given	   the	   degree	   of	   lesbian	   invisibility:	   Pitcherskaia	   v.	   INS,	   while	  
important	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	   (particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
relevance	   of	   intent	   in	   persecution),	   does	   not	   address	   the	   problems	   originating	   in	   the	  
private	   realm.	   	   According	   to	   Millbank,	   when	   the	   question	   has	   been	   addressed	   in	  
Australia,	   the	  RRT	  has	   generally	   been	   “unable	   to	   see	   the	   sexuality	   component	   in	   that	  
violence	  in	  that	  it	  was	  directed	  specifically	  at	  lesbians	  as	  lesbians”,	  failing	  to	  understand	  
that	   sexual	   minorities	   are	   often	   targeted	   with	   sexual	   violence	   as	   a	   punishment	   or	  
cure.177	   	   Even	  more	   problematic	   for	   lesbian	   claims	   in	   Australia	   (but	   also	   for	  women’s	  
claims	   there	   in	   general),	   the	  RRT	  has	  been	   slow	   to	   recognize	   the	  extension	  of	  human	  
rights	  guarantees	  into	  the	  home.	  	  Millbank	  provides	  as	  an	  example	  an	  unpublished	  1999	  
case	   involving	  a	  Bolivian	   lesbian	  who	  was	   the	  victim	  of	  violence	  and	  sexual	  assault	  by	  
men	  in	  her	  neighborhood	  after	  being	  outed	  by	  a	  relative	  who	  believed	  that	  insults	  and	  
physical	  attacks	  would	  convinced	  her	  to	  “change”.	  	  The	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  it	  was	  	  
[A]	  purely	  private	  matter	  and	  […]	  not	  for	  reasons	  of	  the	  Applicant's	  membership	  
of	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  of	  homosexuals.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  
[…]	  other	  homosexuals	  were	  threatened	  or	  harmed	  by	  [the	  male	  relative	  or	  his	  
associates	   …	   ]	   The	   tribunal	   accepts	   that	   although	   Bolivian	   society,	   and	   many	  
other	   societies	   or	   communities	   generally	   disapprove	   of	   homosexuality,	   the	  
Applicant's	   relative's	  motivation	   to	   'cure'	   her	   of	   her	   homosexuality	   is	   directed	  
solely	  at	  the	  Applicant,	  a	  family	  relation.178	  
	  
Writing	   in	   2003,	  Millbank	   provided	   examples	   of	   several	   other	   cases	   in	   Australia	   that	  
used	   similar	   reasoning,	   while	   noting	   that,	   in	   distinction,	   Canadian	   adjudicators	   were	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  Neilson,	  427.	  
177	  Millbank	  (2003),	  77.	  
178	  N98/23425	  (Apr.	  28,	  1999)	  in	  Millbank	  (2003),	  78.	  
 67	  
“generally	   very	   sensitive	   to	   the	   interplay	  of	   gender	  and	   sexuality”.179	   	  However,	  more	  
recent	   cases	   have	   reflected	   an	   understanding	   that	   violence	   and	   other	   forms	   of	  
persecution	   in	   the	   private	   realm	   can	   be	   sufficient	   to	   qualify	   lesbians	   for	   protection	  
under	   the	   Convention.	   	   In	   a	   2008	   ruling	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   Vietnamese	   applicant,	   the	   RRT	  
stated:	  	  
This	  harm,	  carried	  out	  by	  individual	  members	  of	  society,	  but	  reflecting	  a	  general	  
antithesis	  towards	  	  lesbians	  ,	  is	  premeditated,	  intended	  and	  targeted	  towards	  	  
lesbians,	  and	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  applicant,	  because	  of	  her	  membership	  of	  the	  
particular	  social	  group,	  	  lesbians	  	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  acts	  of	  
serious	  harm	  are	  carried	  out	  by	  private	  actors,	  their	  actions	  are	  officially	  
tolerated	  and	  sometimes	  condoned	  by	  the	  forces	  of	  law	  and	  order.180	  
	  
In	   France	   and	   Germany	   where	   persecution	   by	   non-­‐state	   actors	   was	   long	   considered	  
insufficient	  for	  a	  refugee	  claim,	  the	  problem	  of	  public	  versus	  private	  realms	  complicated	  
claims	  involving	  domestic	  violence	  and	  family-­‐	  or	  community-­‐based	  persecution.181	  
	   If	   the	   gender	   norms	   in	   many	   refugee-­‐generating	   countries	   lead	   to	   women	  
expressing	   their	   sexuality	   and	  being	   persecuted	   in	   the	   private	   realm,	   they	   often	  push	  
men	   in	   the	  other	   direction.182	   	   Public	   (often	   anonymous)	   sexual	   encounters	   are	   often	  
seen	  as	  the	  only	  recourse	  for	  men	  looking	  for	  same-­‐sex	  encounters.	  	  A	  1996	  case	  review	  
by	  the	  RRT	  found	  that	  in	  some	  countries	  “reconnoitring	  in	  public	  places	  where	  the	  risk	  
of	  danger	  is	  heightened”	  was	  “virtually	  the	  only	  way”	  gay	  men	  could	  “give	  expression	  to	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  Millbank	  (2003),	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  071862642	  [2008]	  RRTA	  40	  (19	  February	  2008).	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  See:	  Karen	  Musalo,	  “Revisiting	  Social	  Group	  and	  Nexus	  in	  Gender	  Asylum	  Claims:	  A	  
Unifying	  Rationale	  for	  Evolving	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  DePaul	  Law	  Review	  (2003)	  777-­‐808.	  
182	  See	  Millbank	  (2003),	  91	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  public	  sex	  along	  gender	  lines	  and	  possible	  
reasons	  behind	  them.	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their	  sexuality”.183	  	  Despite	  this	  recognition,	  stereotypes	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  West	  about	  the	  
promiscuity	  of	  gay	  men	  are	  all	  too	  often	  used	  by	  adjudicators	  to	  explain	  the	  expression	  
of	   gay	   sexuality	   in	   public	   and	   semi-­‐public	   places.	   	   As	   Kendall	   explains,	   gay	   refugees	  
whose	  “narratives	  reveal	  ‘promiscuity’	  […]	  may	  well	  be	  rejected	  for	  performing	  gender	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  unacceptable	  to	  [decision-­‐makers’]	  heterosexist	  mores”.184	  
	   A	  Canadian	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  case	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  which	  
the	   adjudicator	   relied	   on	   a	   medical	   examination	   that	   concluded	   the	   applicant	   had	  
engaged	  in	  anal	  intercourse	  while	  disbelieving	  most	  of	  the	  evidence	  and	  claims	  provided	  
in	  the	  claimant’s	  personal	  narrative.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  is	  surprised	  by	  the	  
“indiscreetness”	   of	   alleged	   sexual	   activities	   the	   applicant	   describes	   in	   his	   narrative.	  	  
According	   to	   the	  published	  court	  decision,	   these	  consisted	   in	   the	  applicant	  having	   sex	  
with	  another	  student	   in	  a	  classroom	  at	  11	  o’clock	  at	  night	  after	  he	  had	  believed	  other	  
students	  had	  left	  and,	  on	  another	  occasion,	  having	  sex	  with	  his	  partner	  in	  a	  bedroom	  (of	  
a	  private	  home)	  in	  which	  the	  curtains	  were	  open.185	  	  The	  decision-­‐maker	  disbelieved	  the	  
applicant’s	   claim	   because,	   in	   her	   estimation,	   “Given	   the	   stigma	   of	   homosexuality	   in	  
Uganda,	   it	   is	   surprising	   the	   claimant	  would	   have	   engaged	   in	   such	   risky	   behaviour”.186	  	  
The	  implication	  is	  that	  there	  was	  another,	  more	  “discreet”	  way	  for	  the	  applicant,	  were	  
he	  reasonable,	  to	  express	  his	  sexual	  identity	  through	  same-­‐sex	  contact.	  	  This	  is	  but	  one	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  V95/03527	  [1996]	  RRTA	  246	  (9	  February	  1996).	  	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  described	  in	  Laud	  Humphreys’	  
Tearoom	  trade	  :	  a	  study	  of	  homosexual	  encounters	  in	  public	  places	  (London:	  Duckworth	  1970).	  	  While	  the	  
specific	  context	  is	  Western,	  the	  general	  reasons	  for	  anonymous	  encounters	  between	  gay	  men	  in	  the	  
public	  sphere	  (i.e.,	  the	  insulation	  of	  non-­‐normative	  expressions	  of	  sexuality	  identity	  from	  both	  the	  private	  
norm-­‐conforming	  roles	  in	  the	  family	  and	  the	  public	  norm-­‐conforming	  roles	  in	  public)	  exist	  outside	  the	  
West.	  




case	   that	   betrays	   a	  misunderstanding	   of	   the	   circumstances	   that	   constrain	   gay	  men	   in	  
refugee-­‐generating	  countries.	  
	   Because	   of	   their	   incorrect	   transposition	   of	   Western	   expectations	   of	   the	  
availability	   of	   the	   private	   sphere	   for	   male-­‐male	   sexual	   intimacy187,	   decision-­‐makers	  
qualify	  their	  recognition	  that	  public	  places	  may	  be	  virtually	  the	  only	  place	  gays	  “may	  be	  
able	  to	  give	  expression	  to	  their	  own	  sexuality”	  with	  an	  understanding	  that	  the	  public	  or	  
semi-­‐public	   venue	   is	   appropriate	   only	   for	   a	   mutual	   acknowledgment	   of	   sexual	  
orientation	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  private	  expression	  of	  sexuality.188	  	  This	  is	  little	  
more	  progressive	  than	  an	  early	  Canadian	  decision	  in	  which	  an	  IRB	  member	  declared	  “It	  
would	   be	   foolhardy	   to	   flaunt	   ones	   sexual	   preference	   in	   the	   face	   of	   one’s	   country[’s]	  
legally	  established	  laws	  which	  prohibit	  expression	  of	  open	  sexual	  activities	  ...	  judged	  ...	  
to	  be	  objectionable	  ...”.189	  	  This	  statement	  relies	  either	  upon	  the	  same	  assumption	  that	  
gay	  men	  have	  alternative	  ways	  of	  expressing	  their	  sexual	   identity	  or,	  more	  likely	  given	  
the	   IRB	  member’s	   other	   statements,	   a	   discriminatory	   expectation	   that	   anyone	  whose	  
sexual	  identity	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  heteronormative	  expectations	  of	  his	  society	  does	  
not	   deserve	   to	   have	   any	   private	   context	   for	   the	   expression	   of	   such	   an	   identity.	   	   The	  
effect	  of	  denying	  sexual	  minorities’	  access	  to	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  realms	  is	  one	  
that	  creates	  refugees	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
                                                
187	  In	  the	  US,	  for	  example,	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas,	  539	  U.S.	  558,	  578	  (2003)	  both	  reaffirmed	  the	  taboo	  of	  
“public”	  sexual	  activity	  and	  reinforced	  its	  perceived	  immorality	  by	  explicitly	  stating	  that	  the	  case	  did	  not	  
“involve	  public	  conduct	  or	  prostitution”.	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Gay	  men	  are	  thus	  seen	  to	  be	  acting	  promiscuously,	  provocatively,	  and	  immorally	  
when	   forced	   (or	   choosing190)	   to	   pursue	   sex	   in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   	   These	   stereotypes	  
cause	  some	  adjudicators	  to	  stray	  into	  an	  inappropriate	  “respectability	  discourse”	  akin	  to	  
the	  one	  that	  has	  informed	  decisions	  to	  protect	  of	  wives	  but	  not	  prostitutes	  from	  rape.191	  	  
Whereas	   other	   adjudicators	   fault	   applicants	   for	   not	   participating	   in	   the	   “gay	   scene”,	  
these	  adjudicators	  come	  to	  regard	  what	  Goffman	  describes	  as	  “gentlemen	  deviants”192	  
who	   “appear	   to	   mimic	   idealised	   heterosexual	   paradigms	   of	   monogamy”193	   as	   more	  
worthy	  of	  protection.	  	  Three	  Australian	  examples	  are	  found	  in	  cases	  analyzed	  by	  Walker	  
where	  the	  successful	  applicants	  were	  involved	  in	  long-­‐term	  monogamous	  relationships	  
and	   an	   unsuccessful	   applicant	   was	   not.194	   	   In	   one	   of	   these,	   we	   find	   the	   ideal	  
representation	  of	   the	  “gentleman	  deviant”:	  a	  Chinese	  homosexual	  who	  had	  been	   in	  a	  
relationship	   “to	   which	   he	   had	   strong	   commitment”,	   “whose	   expression	   of	   his	  
homosexuality	   was	   not	   through	   numerous	   fleeting	   sexual	   encounters”,	   and	   who	   had	  
converted	  to	  Christianity	  and	  joined	  an	  LGBT-­‐friendly	  Anglican	  parish.	  	  He	  did	  “not	  visit	  
gay	  bars	  and	  discos	  in	  Sydney	  but	  is	  content	  to	  mix	  with	  homosexual	  Christians”.195	  
If	  the	  expectations	  described	  earlier	  of	  gay	  men	  (and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  lesbians)	  
to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   “gay	   scene”	   (i.e.	   by	   frequenting	   gay	   bars,	   sex	   venues,	   etc.)	   and	  
through	   sexual	   relationships	   in	   the	   host	   country	   parallel	   the	   minstrelization	   demand	  
                                                
190	  See:	  Jenni	  Millbank,	  “Imagining	  Otherness:	  Refugee	  Claims	  On	  The	  Basis	  Of	  Sexuality	  In	  Canada	  And	  
Australia”,	  26	  Melbourne	  University	  Law	  Review	  (2002)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  articulating	  an	  
expression	  of	  public	  sexuality	  in	  a	  human	  rights	  framework	  if	  it	  involves	  choice.	  
191	  Kendall,	  748.	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  Goffman	  (1963),	  110.	  
193	  Kendall,	  748.	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  Walker	  (1996).	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  N93/00846	  	  [1994]	  RRTA	  347	  (8	  March	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described	  by	  Goffman,	  then	  the	  favor	  shown	  the	  “gentlemen	  deviants”	  corresponds	  to	  
the	  demand	  for	  normification	  or	  covering.	  
B.	  Ethnicity	  &	  Nationality	  
	   When	   LGBT	   refugees	   are	   part	   of	   an	   ethnic	   population	   displaced	   by	   conflict	   or	  
persecution,	  their	  ethnic	  or	  national	  identity	  can	  obscure	  their	  sexual	  identity	  in	  relation	  
to	  decision-­‐makers.	   	  They	  can	  be	   left	  vulnerable	  and	  their	  need	   for	  protection,	  unmet	  
when	   adjudicators	   focus	   on	   ethnic	   or	   national	   background	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   sexual	  
identity.	   	   Lauren	  Fouda	  provides	   as	   an	  example	  of	   this	  mistake,	   the	   situation	  of	   LGBT	  
members	  of	  the	  Sudanese	  refugee	  population	  in	  Cairo.196	  	  While	  under	  the	  OAU	  refugee	  
guidelines,	  many	  Sudanese	  fleeing	  conflict	  would	  likely	  qualify	  as	  refugees,	  a	  temporary	  
protection	   arrangement	   has	   been	   set	   up	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   large	   influx.	   	   UNHCR,	  
responsible	  for	  refugee	  status	  determination	  in	  Egypt,	  devised	  this	  scheme	  (which	  gives	  
limited	  protection	  prima	   facie)	  after	   the	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  was	   signed	  
between	  opposing	  factions	  in	  the	  Sudanese	  Civil	  War.	   	   It	  was	  decided	  in	  2004	  that	  the	  
expected	   peace	  made	   individual	   refugee	   status	   determinations	   unnecessary,	   not	   only	  
for	  those	  who	  had	  fled	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South	  but	  all	  Sudanese	  
asylum-­‐seekers,	   including	   those	   who	   had	   escaped	   the	   conflict	   in	   Darfur	   and	   those	  
persecuted	  for	  unrelated	  reasons.	  	  Some	  two	  percent	  of	  registered	  asylum-­‐seekers	  from	  
Sudan	  gave	  persecution	  based	  on	  sexual	  orientation	  as	  their	  primary	  reason	  for	  flight197.	  
If,	  by	  extrapolation,	  this	  percentage	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	  Sudanese	  asylum-­‐
                                                
196	  Lauren	  Fouda,	  “Compulsory	  Voluntary	  Repatriation:	  Why	  Temporary	  Protection	  For	  Sudanese	  Asylum-­‐
Seekers	  In	  Cairo	  Amounts	  To	  Refoulement”,	  14	  Georegtown	  Journal	  on	  Poverty	  Law	  &	  Policy	  (2007),	  511-­‐
537.	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seekers	   in	   Egypt,	   LGBT	   refugees	   in	   that	   population	   could	   number	   in	   the	   thousands.	  	  
These	  people	  who,	  given	  the	  climate	  of	  hostility	  toward	  LGBTs	   in	  Egypt	  (itself	  an	  LGBT	  
refugee-­‐generating	  country),	  are	  especially	  in	  need	  of	  resettlement	  but	  are	  left	  to	  face	  
the	  risks	  of	  attempting	  to	  integrate	  locally	  or	  those	  of	  “voluntary”	  repatriation.	  
Sudanese	  fleeing	  to	  Israel	  have	  been	  denied	  proper	  protection	  because	  of	  their	  
nationality,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  persecuted	  by	  groups	  tolerated	  by	  or	  agents	  of	  
the	  Sudanese	  government	  that	  is	  technically	  at	  war	  with	  Israel.	  	  While	  according	  to	  the	  
Geneva	  Conventions,	  people	  who	  are	  not	  protected	  by	  any	  government	  are	  not	  meant	  
to	   be	   considered	   “enemy	   aliens”	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   nationality	   de	   jure	   of	   an	   “enemy	  
state”,198	   hundreds	   of	   Sudanese	   have	  were	   put	   in	   prison	   in	   Israel	   between	   2005	   and	  
2007	  under	   the	  1954	  Prevention	  of	   Infiltration	   law.199	   	   This,	  of	   course,	   is	  not	   the	  only	  
case	  where	  a	  focus	  on	  nationality	  occludes	  the	  need	  for	  protection	  against	  persecution.	  	  
According	  to	  Michael	  Kagan	  and	  Anat	  Ben-­‐Dor,	  LGBT	  Palestinians	  are	  at	  particular	   risk	  
because	  of	   Israel’s	  rigid	  restrictions	  against	  “enemy	  nationals”,	  restrictions	  that	  violate	  
the	  Convention	  on	  Refugees.200	  	  Palestinian	  LGBTs	  cannot,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  ethnic	  and	  
national	  identity,	  seek	  protection	  in	  the	  nearest	  and	  most	  logical	  state	  to	  do	  so.	  	  While	  
not	   the	   result	   of	   prejudice	   on	   the	   part	   of	   specific	   adjudicators,	   this	   gap	   in	   protection	  
represents	  a	  systemic	  identity-­‐related	  failure	  in	  the	  Israeli	  asylum	  system.	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199	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Sinai	  Perils:	  Risks	  to	  Migrants,	  Refugees	  and	  Asylum	  Seekers	  in	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C.	  Religion	  
	   Just	   as	   adjudicators’	   views	   of	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality	   may	   reflect	   a	   narrow	  
understanding	   specific	   to	   their	   cultural	   context,	   their	   views	   about	   religion	   and	   the	  
authenticity	   of	   religious	   claims	   may	   fail	   to	   incorporate	   diversity	   within	   religion.	   	   For	  
LGBT	  refugees	  who	  are	  also	  religious,	  this	  has	  proven	  an	  obstacle	  to	  asylum.	  	  	  
	   In	   2004,	   a	   Federal	   Magistrates	   Court	   overturned	   an	   RRT	   ruling	   that	   a	   gay	  
Ukrainian	  should	  not	  be	  granted	  asylum	  in	  Australia.	  	  The	  RRT	  stated:	  
at	  the	  hearing	  when	  asked	  how	  as	  a	  practicing	  Roman	  Catholic	  he	  reconciled	  his	  
homosexuality	   with	   the	   Catholic	   faith	   his	   response	   was	   that	   he	   had	   never	  
considered	  the	  matter.	  This	   response,	   together	  with	  his	  confusion	  with	  respect	  
to	   his	   homosexuality	   is	   sufficient	   to	   satisfy	   me	   that	   the	   Applicant's	   claims	   of	  
being	  homosexual	  are	  not	  genuine.	  Having	  regard	  to	  the	  current	  teachings	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  Church,	   I	  am	  firmly	  of	   the	  view	  that	  a	  person	  of	  single	  sex	  orientation	  
must	   have	   at	   least	   considered	   their	   position	   in	   the	   Church	   and	   whether	   they	  
wished	   to	   continue	   practise	   (sic)	   Catholicism.	   ...	   As	   I	   am	   not	   satisfied	   that	   the	  
claims	  of	  the	  Applicant	  that	  he	  is	  a	  homosexual	  are	  genuine,	  it	  follows	  that	  I	  do	  
not	   accept	   that	   there	   is	   a	   real	   chance	   of	   him	   suffering	   Convention	   based	  
persecution	  upon	  his	  return	  to	  Ukraine	  for	  the	  reason	  of	  his	  being	  a	  member	  of	  a	  
particular	  social	  group	  -­‐	  homosexuals	  in	  Ukraine201	  
	  
The	  FMC	  in	  its	  ruling	  found	  that	  the	  RRT’s	  decision	  was	  “based	  on	  a	  personal	  assessment	  
by	   the	   presiding	   member	   of	   what	   could	   have	   been	   expected	   of	   a	   practising	   Roman	  
Catholic”	  and	  that	  
no	   indication	   that	   the	   presiding	   member	   made	   any	   enquiry	   through	   an	  
assessment	  of	   independent	   information.	   It	  was	   simply	  a	   subjective	  assessment	  
[…]The	  rationality	  [behind	  which]	  is	  dubious.	  It	  assumes	  that	  a	  practising	  Catholic	  
[…]	   would	   necessarily	   give	   consideration	   to	   doctrinal	   issues	   concerning	  
homosexuality.202	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Similarly,	  in	  Trembliuk	  v.	  Canada,	  a	  Canadian	  appellate	  court	  overturned	  a	  ruling	  against	  
another	  gay	  Catholic	  man	  from	  Ukraine.	  	  The	  initial	  decision	  by	  the	  RPD	  found	  that	  the	  
claimant	   was	   not	   gay	   in	   part	   because,	   in	   its	   opinion,	   a	   genuine	   homosexual	   would	  
dissociate	  himself	   from	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  Catholic	  schools.203	   	  Furthermore,	   the	  
claimant’s	  narrative	  included	  that	  he	  had	  lived	  with	  a	  Catholic	  priest	  in	  an	  arrangement	  
set	  up	  by	  his	  godmother	  so	  he	  could	  be	  closer	  to	  the	  Catholic	  school	  he	  attended.	  	  The	  
RPD	  found	  this	  implausible	  “given	  the	  current	  climate	  in	  North	  America	  […]	  with	  respect	  
to	   the	   sexual	   abuse	   of	   minors	   and	   young	   adults	   by	   Roman	   Catholic	   clergy”.204	   	   The	  
appellate	   court	   stated	   that	   such	  “inferences	  were	  based	  on	   stereotypical	  profiles	   that	  
simply	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  appropriate	  to	  all	  persons	  of	  homosexual	  orientation	  
and	  to	  all	  Roman	  Catholic	  priests”.205	  
	   While	   these	   two	   cases	   represent	   a	   failure	   to	   recognize	   the	   possibility	   that	   a	  
refugee	   may	   be	   both	   LGBT	   and	   religious	   (and	   indeed	   these	   sorts	   of	   cases	   are	   not	  
particularly	  common),	  the	  larger	  mistake	  in	  the	  asylum	  system	  is	  one	  of	  not	  appreciating	  
the	   significance	   on	   religious	   grounds	   of	   the	   intersection	   of	   sexual	   and	   religious	  
identities.	   	   Religious	   LGBTs	   for	   whom	   international	   law	   consultant	   Jeffrey	   A.	   Redding	  
coins	  the	  term	  “homo-­‐sectuals”,206	  in	  addition	  to	  seeking	  freedom	  from	  persecution	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	   their	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  often	  also	  seeking	  to	  be	  able	  to	  practice	  their	  
religion	  freely.	  	  The	  interpretations	  of	  their	  religion	  that	  many	  LGBTs	  have	  will	  often	  be	  
at	   odds	  with	   the	   interpretations	   of	   those	   around	   them	   given	   that	   the	   suppression	   of	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non-­‐normative	   sexualities	   is	  often	  driven	  by	   religious	  beliefs	  or	   framed	  using	   religious	  
arguments.	   	   In	   failed	   asylum	   claim	   in	   Australia,	   a	   gay	   transgender	   Muslim	   man	   had	  
claimed	  that	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  freely	  practice	  his	  religion.	  	  Because	  of	  his	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	   identity,	   he	   was	   made	   to	   sit	   in	   the	   back	   of	   the	   mosque	   and	   forbidden	   from	  
reading	   the	  Qur’an	   allowed.	   	   Taking	   a	   leadership	   role	   in	   any	   sort	   of	  Muslim	   religious	  
group	  was	  forbidden	  to	  him.	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  claimed	  that	  people	  at	  the	  mosque	  would	  
laugh	  and	  deride	  him	  and	  even	  grope	  him	  and	  touch	  his	  genitalia.	  	  The	  court	  found	  that	  
this	  treatment	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  serious	  harm	  “as	  the	  applicant	  was	  still	  able	  to	  attend	  
the	  Mosque	  and	  practice	  his	  religion”.207	  	  This	  conclusion	  was	  reached	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	   court	   accepted	   that	   the	   applicant	   was	   likely	   to	   be	   barred	   from	   Qur’anic	  
readings	  and	   leadership	   roles	   in	  mosques	  elsewhere	   in	  Thailand.	   	  Whether	  or	  not	   this	  
amounts	  to	  persecution,	  glossing	  over	  this	  kind	  of	  discrimination	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  a	  
fair	  and	  thorough	  risk	  assessment.	  
	   A	   further	   and	   perhaps	   even	   more	   compelling	   argument	   may	   be	   made	   that	  
persecution	   on	   both	   religious	   and	   social	   grounds	   is	   in	   play	   when	   religious	   LGBTs	   are	  
barred	  from	  having	  a	  say	  in	  how	  their	  religion	  is	  constructed	  and	  functions	  if	  they	  either	  
suffer	   “serious	   harm”	   in	   the	   process	   of	   trying	   to	   exercise	   their	   freedom	   of	   religion	  
(attempting	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  discourse	  that	  shapes	  their	  religion)	  or	  are	  so	  afraid	  of	  
this	  possibility	  that	  they	  remain	  silent	  and	  suffer	  discrimination	  as	  a	  result.	   	  This	   latter	  
scenario	  finds	  its	  parallel	  in	  the	  increasing	  findings	  that	  a	  refugee’s	  living	  discreetly	  out	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of	  fear	  cannot	  be	  held	  against	  him	  and	  cannot	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  he	  should	  continue	  
to	  live	  discreetly	  to	  avoid	  persecution.	  
	   	  





















VI.	  The	  “Lying	  Refugee”208	  
	   The	   shift	   from	   adjudication	   focused	   on	   determining	   whether	   LGBT	   refugees	  
could	  return	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  and,	  by	  behaving	  discreetly,	  avoid	  persecution	  
to	  adjudication	  concerned	  with	  the	  genuineness	  of	  their	  claims	  to	  be	  lesbians,	  gay	  men,	  
bisexuals	  or	  transgender	  people	  brought	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  into	  the	  thick	  of	  one	  
of	   the	  biggest	   challenges	   for	   all	   refugees—credibility	  determination.	   	   From	  a	   sense	  of	  
guilt	  and	  obligation	  that	  led	  to	  the	  initial	  formulation	  of	  international	  refugee	  law	  and,	  
later,	   an	   opportunistic	   view	   of	   the	   intellectual	   and	   ideological	   capital	   Soviet	   refugees	  
provided	  to	  First	  World	  receiving	  states,	  attitudes	  toward	  refugees	  shifted	  sharply	  with	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   the	   increasing	   number	   of	   refugees	   from	   developing	  
countries.	   	   Suddenly,	   the	   concern	   that	   waves	   of	   cheats,	   freeloaders,	   and	   infiltrators	  
were	  threatening	  receiving	  states	  gained	  primacy,	  modifying	  the	  image	  of	  a	  vulnerable,	  
helpless	  refugee	  to	  a	  deceitful,	  undeserving	  one.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  “claim	  
of	   being	   homosexual	   is	   in	   many	   ways	   an	   easy	   one	   to	   make,	   and	   a	   difficult	   one	   to	  
dispute”,209	  credibility	  is	  an	  especially	  heavy	  burden	  for	  LGBT	  refugees.	  
	   All	   of	   the	   stereotypes	   discussed	   earlier	   are	   brought	   into	   play	   in	   response	   to	   a	  
performance	   by	   the	   claimant.	   	   She	   gives	   the	   decision-­‐maker	   the	   raw	   materials	   to	  
construct	   an	   identity,	   either	   that	   of	   a	   genuine	   refugee	   or	   that	   of	   a	   fraudster.	   	   The	  
decision-­‐maker	   examines	   the	   performance	   for	   consistency,	   relying	   on	   the	   assumption	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that	  the	  “honest	  performer”	  is	  able	  to	  avoid	  discrepancies	  and	  contradictions	  by	  simple	  
virtue	  of	   the	  genuineness	  of	  her	   claim.210	   	  Goffman	  explains	   that	   this	   “common-­‐sense	  
view	  has	  limited	  analytical	  utility”211	  	  because	  “there	  is	  often	  no	  reason	  for	  claiming	  that	  
that	  the	  facts	  discrepant	  with	  the	  fostered	  impression	  are	  any	  more	  the	  real	  reality	  than	  
is	  the	  fostered	  reality	  they	  embarrass.”212	  	  Discrepancies	  do	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  an	  
act	   of	   dissimulation.	   	   In	   fact,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   that	   can	   account	   for	  
inconsistency	  in	  the	  self-­‐presentation	  of	  an	  LGBT	  claimant	  that	  have	  nothing	  whatsoever	  
to	  do	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  genuineness.	  
	   Among	   these	   issues	   is	   the	   assumption	   that	   a	   hesitancy	   to	   speak	   frankly	   about	  
sexual	  experiences	  must	  necessarily	  be	  equated	  with	  dishonesty.	  	  This	  is	  exemplified	  by	  
the	   review	   by	   the	   third	   Tribunal	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Bangladeshi	   couple.	   	   It	   is	   a	   trying	  
demand	   to	   ask	   anyone	   to	   bring	   forward	   for	   intense	   scrutiny	   deeply	   personal	  
experiences,	   especially	  when	   previous	   responses	  may	   have	   been	   persecutory	   and	   for	  
LGBT	   claimants,	   who	   “often	   have	   feelings	   of	   shame	   and	   self-­‐hatred	   or	   internalized	  
homophobia”	   and	   thus	   “may	   find	   answering	   questions	   about	   their	   sexuality	   very	  
difficult,”	   the	   demand	   is	   all	   the	   more	   anxiety-­‐producing.213	   	   As	   Berg	   and	   Millbank	  
explain,	   there	   is	   a	   dominant	   view	   in	   the	  West	   that	   sexuality	   is	   fixed.	   	   Situated	   in	   this	  
context	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  LGBT	  experience	  as	  a	  linear	  one	  marked	  by	  a	  moment	  
of	   coming	   out	   followed	   by	   the	   consistent	   expression	   of	   a	   stabilized	   sexual	   identity.	  	  
When	  adjudicators	  espouse	  this	  view,	  this	  makes	  refugees	  who	  are	  unsure	  or	  conflicted	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about	   their	   sexuality	   vulnerable	   to	   being	   seen	   as	   inauthentic.214	   	   Many	   refugees	   will	  
speak	   of	   their	   sexuality	   as	   a	   “sexual	   problem”	   or	   an	   “addiction”.215	   	   Rather	   than	  
understanding	   this	  as	   internalized	  homophobia,	  adjudicators	   take	   this	   to	  be,	  at	  worst,	  
the	  mark	  of	  a	  faker	  who	  is	  not	  adept	  enough	  to	  play	  the	  part	  by	  using	  the	  proper	  labels;	  
or	  at	  best,	  someone	  whose	  ambivalence	  suggests	  he	   is	  merely	  flirting	  with	  the	   idea	  of	  
homosexuality.	  	  The	  genuineness	  of	  the	  process	  of	  wrestling	  with	  one’s	  sexual	  identity	  is	  
expressed	  by	  an	  Indian	  lesbian	  claimant:	  	  	  
It	   is	   still	   there	   deep	   down,	   there	   is	   something	   in	   there;	   I	   am	   not	   normal.	  
Something	   is	  wrong	  with	  me	   that	   I	   am	   gay,	   that	   is	  why	   people	   don’t	   like	  me,	  
don’t	  accept	  me.	  I’m	  trying	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  that	  nothing	  is	  wrong	  with	  me,	  
that	  I	  am	  normal.216	  
	  	  	  	  
There	   is	   some	   evidence,	   however,	   that	   at	   least	   in	   appellate	   courts,	   adjudicators	   are	  
beginning	   to	   admit	   that	   an	   unsettled	   sexual	   identity	   need	   not	   be	   equated	   with	  
dishonesty.	   	   In	  a	  2008	  RRT,	   case	   for	  example,	   the	  Tribunal	  overturned	  a	   first	   instance	  
decision	  not	  to	  grant	  a	  gay	  Pakistani	  claimant	  asylum.	   	  Though	  the	  Tribunal	  put	  to	  the	  
appellant	  that	  he	  was	  being	  “evasive”	  and	  that	  he	  showed	  no	  “introspection	  about	  his	  
homosexuality	   and	   the	   choices	   he	   […]	  made	   in	   relation	   to	   it	   [nor	   any]	   explanation	   or	  
awareness	  about	  his	  own	  experience	  as	  a	  homosexual	  or	  how	  he	  was	  able	  to	  reconcile	  
that	   to	  his	   strict	  adherence	  to	   Islam”,217	   	   it	  nonetheless	   found	   in	  his	   favor.	   	  When	  the	  
appellant	   was	   questioned	   about	   his	   evasiveness,	   “he	   was	   confused,	   ashamed	   and	  
                                                
214	  In	  the	  Australian	  case	  SZAKD	  v	  Minister	  for	  Immigration,	  the	  FMC	  overturned	  an	  RRT	  decision	  not	  to	  
grant	  asylum	  in	  which	  the	  Tribunal	  stated:	  “At	  hearing	  the	  applicant	  admitted	  to	  still	  being	  confused	  
about	  his	  sexual	  identity.	  Although	  the	  applicant	  sought	  to	  explain	  this	  statement	  it	  causes	  me	  to	  have	  
serious	  doubts	  that	  the	  applicant	  is	  a	  homosexual.”	  
215	  Berg	  and	  Millbank,	  199.	  
216	  Joanne	  Ahola,	  correspondence	  with	  author	  (30	  August	  2009).	  
217	  0803755	  [2008]	  RRTA	  331	  (1	  September	  2008),	  para.	  77.	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unsettled”218	  and	  he	  also	  mentioned	  that	  he	  felt	  his	  children	  should	  not	  be	  exposed	  to	  
the	  “reality	  of	  their	  father	  being	  homosexual”.219	  	  This	  uncertainty,	  despite	  his	  enduring	  
involvement	   in	   a	   same-­‐sex	   relationship,	   was	   not	   held	   against	   him	   by	   the	   RRT	   which	  
recognized	  that	  “[b]y	  their	  very	  nature,	  [sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  cases]	  involve	  private	  
issues	  of	  self-­‐identity	  and	  sexual	  conduct	  and	  sometimes	  personal	  issues	  for	  individuals	  
that	  may	  be	  sensitive,	  stressful	  or	  unresolved.	  Social,	  cultural	  and	  religious	  attitudes	  to	  
homosexuality	  in	  an	  applicant’s	  society	  may	  exacerbate	  such	  problems.”220	  
Compounding	  the	  difficulty	  of	  presenting	  a	  coherent	  image	  of	  one’s	  sexuality	  are	  
cases	  where	  sexual	  violence	   is	   involved.	   	  This	   is	  an	   important	  consideration	  given	  that	  
the	   research	   of	   Berg	   and	   Millbank	   has	   uncovered	   “high	   levels”	   of	   “sexual	   assault	   in	  
refugee	  claims	  based	  upon	  sexual	  orientation”.221	   	  Guidelines,	  such	  as	  those	  in	  Canada	  
that	   recognize	   that	   “decision-­‐makers	   should	  be	  aware	  of	   the	   specific	   impact	  of	   sexual	  
assault	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  seek	  help,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  sexual	  violence	  at	  the	  
hands	   of	   state	   actors	   will	   increase	   the	   difficulty	   of	   substantiating	   a	   claim”,222	   go	  
unheeded	  in	  many	  cases.	  	  Refugees	  with	  claims	  on	  any	  ground	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  sexual	  
violence	  but	  when	  the	  weight	  of	   this	  kind	  of	  violence	  falls	  especially	  hard	  on	  refugees	  
with	  gender	  and	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  claims.	  	  Unlike	  other	  refugees,	  they	  are	  forced	  
to	  confront	  and	  present	  before	  the	  court	  the	  very	  aspect	  of	  their	  identity	  most	  affected	  
by	  the	  psychological	  violence	  of	  the	  sexual	  assault.	  	  It	  is	  entirely	  natural	  that	  this	  would	  
affect	   not	   only	   the	   applicant’s	   ability	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   assault,	   but	  
                                                
218	  Ibid.	  
219	  Ibid.,	  para.	  79.	  
220	  Ibid.,	  para.	  75.	  
221	  Berg	  and	  Millbank,	  201.	  
222	  Immigration	  and	  Refugee	  Board	  in	  Berg	  and	  Millbank,	  203.	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about	  her	  sexuality	  in	  general	  as	  the	  two	  are	  tragically	  tied	  together.	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  
an	   expectation	   that,	   upon	   arrival	   and	   quite	   possibly	   with	   no	   previous	   psychological	  
treatment,	  a	  claimant	  should	  be	  able	  to	  coherently	  and	  spontaneously	  give	  full	  accounts	  
of	   sexual	   assault.	   	   When	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case,	   and	   instances	   of	   sexual	   violence	   are	  
introduce	   later	   in	   the	   process,	   decision-­‐makers	   hold	   the	   inconsistency	   against	   the	  
claimant.	  	  In	  Australia,	  a	  Ugandan	  lesbian	  who	  had	  been	  initially	  denied	  asylum	  after	  an	  
adverse	   credibility	   finding	   (a	   decision	   upheld	   by	   the	   RRT)	   told	   a	   Federal	   magistrate,	  
“There	   is	   no	  way,	   there	   is	   no	  way	   I	   could	   tell	   anybody	   about	   that	   [her	   experience	   of	  
sexual	  assault]	  when	  I	  had	  first	  come,	  delegate.	  I	  am	  human	  just	  like	  you	  are	  and	  I	  can’t	  
meet	  a	  stranger	  and	  just	  tell	  them	  about	  my	  life.	  I	  mentioned	  it	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  come	  out	  
clearly.”223	  	  This	  is	  something	  that	  would	  seem	  common	  sense—that	  someone	  who	  had	  
been	  sexually	  assaulted,	  an	  experience	  that	  can	  leave	  deep	  psychological	  problems	  in	  its	  
wake	  would	  not	  be	  willing	  or	  even	  capable	  to	  discuss	  it	  at	  length	  and	  with	  coherency—
and	  yet	   it	   is	   routinely	  held	  against	   claimants.224	   	  Additionally,	  while	   some	  may	   refrain	  
from	  talking	  about	  a	  traumatic	  sexual	  assault	  experience	  either	  to	  avoid	  reliving	  the	  pain	  
or	  because	  there	  is	  not	  significant	  trust	  in	  the	  questioner	  (or	  both),	  others	  may	  reframe	  
their	   experiences	   to	   lessen	   the	   psychological	   impact	   of	   the	   event.	   	   According	   to	  
Christopher	   Nugent,	   an	   immigration	   lawyer	   who	   has	   represented	   LGBT	   claimants,	  
                                                
223	  MZXFJ	  v	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  &	  Anor	  [2006]	  FMCA	  1465	  (10	  October	  2006).	  
224	  Berg	  and	  Millbank	  on	  202-­‐203	  give	  the	  example	  of	  Mahmood,	  a	  Canadian	  case	  wherein	  a	  tribunal	  
member	  disbelieved	  the	  applicant	  because	  he	  was	  reticent	  to	  discuss	  his	  first	  sexual	  experience	  which	  
involved	  being	  raped	  by	  older	  boys	  at	  the	  age	  of	  15.	  	  The	  tribunal	  member	  was	  surprised	  that	  the	  
claimant,	  25	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  hearing,	  “who	  has	  now	  had	  multiple	  gay	  sex	  partners”	  did	  not	  recount	  
“details	  of	  his	  sexual	  experience	  […]	  in	  a	  more	  straightforward	  manner	  than	  what	  occurred”.	  	  According	  to	  
the	  tribunal	  member,	  the	  claimant	  had	  omitted	  “core	  evidence”	  that	  would	  have	  consisted	  in	  
spontaneously	  reporting	  pain	  or	  bleeding.	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refugees	  also	  do	  not	  want	  to	  conceive	  of	  themselves	  as	  victims,	  but	  rather	  as	  survivors.	  	  
In	  representing	  themselves	  this	  way	  (both	  internally	  and	  externally),	  they	  may	  minimize	  
the	  harm	  they	  have	  suffered.225	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  landmark	  case	  Toboso-­‐Alfsonso,	  it	  
was	   stated	   that	   the	   immigration	   judge	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   decision	   “perceive[d]	   that	  
[Toboso]	  was	  restrained	  in	  his	  testimony	  as	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  his	   life	  during	  the	  years	  
that	  he	  lived	  in	  Cuba”226	  
Another	  issue	  that,	  despite	  an	  authentic	  claim,	  may	  lead	  to	  discrepancies	  in	  self-­‐
presentation	  is	  that	  of	  the	  interpreter.	  	  Goffman	  says	  that	  if	  perception	  (in	  this	  case	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  the	  decision-­‐maker)	  “is	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  contact	  […]	  then	  control	  over	  what	  
is	  perceived	   is	   control	  over	   contact	   that	   is	  made,	  and	   the	   limitation	  and	   regulation	  of	  
what	   is	   shown	   is	   a	   limitation	   and	   regulation	   of	   contact”.227	   	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   forget	  when	  
looking	   at	   translated	   transcriptions	   or	   picturing	   a	   lone	   claimant	   standing	   before	   a	  
decision-­‐maker	   or	   a	   panel	   of	   decision-­‐makers	   that	   in	   many	   cases	   there	   is	   an	  
intermediary.	   	   The	   refugee	   rarely	  makes	   direct	   “contact”	  with	   the	   judge	   because	   the	  
judge’s	   perception	   of	   the	   refugee	   is	   defined	   by	   interpreters	   and	   interviewers.	   	   The	  
refugee’s	   identity	   and	   story	   are	   handled,	   sometimes	   roughly,	   by	   these	   participants	   in	  
the	  identity-­‐construction	  process.228	  
Beyond	  the	  general	  difficulties	  of	  recounting	  traumatic	  stories	  of	  persecution	  or	  
difficult	  details	  of	  one’s	  struggles	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  his	  sexual	  identity,	  the	  identity	  
                                                
225	  Telephone	  interview,	  8	  April	  2009.	  
226	  Matter	  of	  Toboso-­‐Alfonso,	  823.	  
227	  Goffman	  (1959),	  67.	  
228	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  many	  layers	  of	  the	  LGBT	  claimant’s	  narrative	  that	  are	  lost	  or	  warped	  in	  
translation,	  see	  Juana	  María	  Rodríguez,	  “The	  Subject	  on	  Trial:	  Reading	  In	  re	  Tenorio	  as	  Transnational	  
Narrative”	  in	  Queer	  latinidad	  :	  identity	  practices,	  discursive	  spaces	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  
2003),	  84-­‐113.	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of	   the	   interpreter	   can	   also	   be	   an	   impediment	   to	   obtaining	   a	   thorough,	   forthright	  
narrative	  from	  a	  claimant.	  	  Talking	  to	  an	  interpreter	  of	  a	  different	  gender,	  for	  example,	  
can	   render	   a	   claimant	   too	   uncomfortable	   to	   speak	   about	   his	   sexuality.229	   	   This	   is	  
increasingly	   being	   taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   decision-­‐making	   bodies	   like	   the	  
UNHCR230,	  the	  Swedish	  Migration	  Board231,	  and	  the	  RRT232,	  but	  such	  efforts	  are	  limited	  
by	   scarce	   resources	   and	   personnel	   shortages.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   gender,	   the	   ethnic	  
background	  of	   the	   interpreter	   can	  be	  an	  obstacle	   to	   the	   claimant’s	   ability	   to	  be	  open	  
about	  her	  sexuality.	  	  An	  interpreter	  from	  the	  same	  ethnic	  community	  may	  be	  identified	  
with	  those	  from	  whom	  she	  is	  feeling	  and/or	  as	  someone	  who	  may	  be	  untrustworthy	  and	  
reveal	   her	   sexual	   identity	   to	   the	   community.	   	   In	   the	   previously-­‐described	   case	   of	   the	  
Pakistani	   appellant	  who	   lacked	   “introspection”	   regarding	   his	   sexuality,	   his	   interpreter	  
was	   “of	   the	   same	  background”	   from	  whom	  he	   felt	   “compelled	  him	   to	  hide	   the	   truth”	  
and	  through	  whom	  he	  “he	  felt	  humiliated	  having	  to	  answer	  such	  questions	  and	  provide	  
such	  detail	  as	  the	  Tribunal	  sought”.233	  	  While	  the	  perceptions	  of	  interpreters	  may	  impact	  
refugees’	   ability	   to	   be	   forthcoming,	   interpreters	   have	   also	   actively	   and	   negatively	  
interfered	   in	   refugee	   status	   determination	   and	   asylum	   cases.	   	   This	   sometimes	   occurs	  
when	  untrained	   (if	   not	  outright	  homophobic)	   interpreters	  use	  pejorative	   terms	   rather	  
                                                
229	  Millbank	  (2009a)	  provides	  the	  examples	  of	  case	  N01/37891	  [2001]	  RRTA	  889	  (16	  October	  2001)	  in	  
which	  an	  Iranian	  man	  was	  denied	  asylum—the	  initial	  interviewer	  and	  the	  interpreter	  were	  both	  women,	  
something	  the	  claimant	  said	  made	  him	  unable	  to	  discuss	  his	  sexuality;	  and	  case	  N01/37352,	  where	  
another	  Iranian	  man	  who	  was	  denied	  asylum	  said	  that	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  disclose	  his	  sexuality	  to	  an	  female	  
Afghan	  interpreter.	  
230	  Grungras,	  Levitan	  and	  Slotek,	  22-­‐23.	  
231	  Swedish	  Migration	  Board,	  Guidelines	  for	  Investigation	  and	  Evaluation	  of	  Asylum	  Cases	  in	  Which	  
Persecution	  Based	  on	  Given	  Sexual	  Orientations	  is	  Cited	  as	  a	  Ground	  (28	  January	  2002).	  
232	  Millbank	  (2009b),	  note	  41.	  
233	  0803755,	  para.	  77.	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than	   neutral	   alternatives	   to	   describe	   LGBTs.	   	   According	   to	   Grungras	   et	   al.,	   a	   Farsi	  
interpreter	  in	  the	  employ	  of	  UNHCR	  referred	  to	  gay	  men	  as	  hamjensbaz	   (        ),	  a	  
Persian	   word	   implying	   prostitution,	   rather	   than	   the	   more	   neutral	   hamjensgara	  
(        ).234	  	  Incidentally,	  hamjensbaz	  is	  the	  word	  Ahmadinejad	  used	  to	  describe	  gays	  
in	  his	  speech	  at	  Columbia.	  	  While	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  applicants	  for	  refugee	  status	  in	  
the	   cases	   where	   this	   Farsi	   interpreter	   was	   used	   are	   unclear,	   there	   are	   failed	   asylum	  
cases	   that	   have	   hinged	   on	   interpreters’	   mistranslations.	   	   In	   2006,	   for	   example,	   an	  
Albanian	  man	   applying	   for	   asylum	   in	   Canada	  was	   denied	   by	   a	   first	   instance	   decision-­‐
maker	  because	  he	  was	  found	  not	  to	  be	  credible.	  	  This	  adverse	  finding	  relied	  in	  part	  on	  
the	   apparent	   fact	   that	   the	   applicant	   “did	   not	   know	   what	   a	   gay	   bar	   was”.235	   	   This	  
testimony	  was	  conveyed	  by	  an	  interpreter	  who	  was	  later	  found	  by	  the	  IRB	  “to	  have	  had	  
difficulty	  translating”,	  something	  to	  which	  the	  Board	  gave	  great	  weight	  in	  deciding	  that	  
the	  finding	  was	  in	  error.	  	  According	  to	  the	  IRB,	  the	  	  
finding	   was	   based	   upon	   references	   in	   Mr.	   Lekaj's	   testimony	   to	   some	   bars	   as	  
being	   "normal"	   bars,	   and	   that	   women	   were	   "not	   allowed"	   into	   some	   bars	   in	  
Toronto.	   The	   Board	   found	   that	   it	   "is	   common	   knowledge	   that	   public	   facilities	  
such	   as	   restaurants	   or	   bars	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   discriminate	   based	   on	   sex	   or	  
sexual	  orientation	  in	  Canada".	  
	  
[9]	  	   Mr.	  Lekaj's	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  "normal"	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  considered	  in	  
the	  context	  that	  he	  was	  testifying	  in	  Albanian	  through	  an	  interpreter.	  Thus,	  the	  
Board	   was	   required	   to	   consider	   whether	   in	   the	   Albanian	   language	   there	   is	   a	  
word	   for	   gay	   or	   homosexual	   which	   is	   not	   pejorative,	   and	   to	   consider	   what	  
alternatives	   a	   native	   Albanian	   speaker	   would	   have	   when	   referring	   to	  
heterosexuals.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  consideration	  the	  Board	  erred	  by	  applying	  
North	  American	  logic	  to	  Mr.	  Lekaj's	  use	  of	  the	  word	  "normal"	  […]	  The	  Board	  did	  
not	   pursue	   this	  with	  Mr.	   Lekaj,	   but	   simply	   seized	   upon	  his	   observation	   that	   in	  
                                                
234	  Note	  55.	  
235	  Lekaj	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Citizenship	  and	  Immigration),	  CanLII	  2006	  FC	  909	  (2006),	  para.	  3.	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Toronto	  some	  bars	  (including	  the	  one	  he	  named)	  are	  only	  for	  men,	  and	  women	  
are	  not	  allowed	  to	  enter.236	  
	  
In	  many	   languages	  widely	   spoken	   in	   LGBT	   refugee-­‐generating	   countries,	   there	   are	   no	  
commonly	  used	  neutral	  terms	  for	  sexual	  minorities.	   	   In	  Arabic,	  for	  example,	  the	  use	  of	  
the	   recent	   coinage	   methliyya	   jensiyya	   (           ),	   a	   calque	   of	   the	   word	  
homosexuality,	   remains	   limited	   while	   more	   popular	   terms	   like	   al-­‐shudhudh	   al-­‐jensi	  
(ييسسننججللاا ذذووذذششللاا),	   meaning	   “sexual	   deviance”,	   remain	   the	   common	   “polite”	   term.237	  	  
Terms	   that	  might	  be	  equivalent	   to	  “queer”	  or	   “gay”	  have	  not	  been	   reclaimed,	   leaving	  
even	  those	  applicants	  who	  do	  not	   feel	  conflicted	  about	  their	  sexuality	   to	  use	  negative	  
labels	   to	   describe	   themselves.	   	   How	   these	   nuances	   or	   difference	   in	   terminology	   are	  
relayed	  relies	  on	  the	  acumen	  and	  objectivity	  of	  the	  interpreter.	  
	   In	  addition,	  there	  can	  be	  problems	  of	  terminology	  that	  relate	  more	  to	  decision-­‐
makers’	  knowledge	  of	  country	  conditions.	  	  Variations	  in	  dialect	  and	  differences	  between	  
popular	   terms	   and	   language	   that	   is	   used	   in	   an	   activist	   or	   an	   academic	   context	   can	  
introduce	  suspicion	  where	  it	  need	  not	  exist.	  	  In	  an	  RRT	  case	  involving	  a	  gay	  Bangladeshi	  
man,	   the	   Tribunal	   told	   the	   applicant	   that,	   in	   “read[ing]	   about	  men	  who	   had	   sex	  with	  
men	  in	  Bangladesh”,	  it	  “came	  across	  the	  Bengali	  word	  ‘koti’”.238	  	  When	  the	  applicant,	  in	  
response	   to	   a	   description	   of	   what	   the	   Tribunal	   took	   the	   word	   to	   mean,	   expressed	  
confusion	  over	  the	  exact	  meaning,	  but	  offered	  a	  synonym	  familiar	  to	  the	  court	  as	  well	  as	  
a	   similar	   term	   in	   Chittagonian	   (a	   language	   related	   to	   but	   distinct	   from	   Bengali),	   the	  
Tribunal	   remained	   skeptical	   saying	   “that	   it	   seemed	   unusual	   that	   he	   would	   not	   have	  
                                                
236	  Ibid.,	  paras.	  8-­‐9.	  
237	  Joseph	  A.	  Massad,	  Desiring	  Arabs	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  2007),	  172.	  
238	  N04/49626	  [2005]	  RRTA	  6	  (23	  March	  2005).	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come	  across	  that	  word	  before	   if	  he	  had	  been	  having	  sex	  with	  men	  for	  some	  years”.239	  	  
The	  court,	  divorced	  from	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  applicant	  was	  immersed	  presumed	  to	  
























	   The	   most	   general	   mistake	   in	   refugee	   status	   determination	   and	   asylum	   claim	  
adjudication	  is	  an	  ill-­‐founded	  cynicism	  toward	  the	  claimant.	  	  That	  an	  important	  number	  
of	   people	   who	   do	   not	   fit	   the	   1951	   Convention	   definition	   of	   a	   refugee	   have	  
misrepresented	   themselves	   to	   adjudicators	   for	   any	   number	   of	   reasons	   is	   not	   in	  
question.	  	  Limiting	  abuse	  of	  refugee	  status	  and	  asylum	  is	  certainly	  a	  legitimate	  concern,	  
one	   that	   in	   its	  purest	   form	  has	   the	  wellbeing	  of	  genuine	   refugees	   in	  mind.	   	   In	   sorting	  
between	  the	  genuine	  claims	  and	  the	  fake,	  however,	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  often	  forced	  to	  
rely	  on	  the	  testimony	  of	  claimants	  alone.	  	  A	  discomfort	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  objective	  evidence	  
in	   such	   cases	   leads	  many	   decision-­‐makers	   into	   error.	   	   Some	   put	   too	  much	  weight	   on	  
consistency,	  failing	  to	  appreciate	  that,	  as	  Goffman	  puts	  it,	  “the	  performance	  offered	  by	  
impostors	   and	   liars	   […	   and]	   ordinary	   performances	   […]	   are	   similar	   in	   the	   care	   their	  
performers	  must	  exert	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  impression	  that	  is	  fostered”.240	  	  Both	  the	  
genuine	   refugee	   and	   the	   fraudster	   risk	   raising	   suspicion	   through	   an	   over-­‐polished	  
narrative	  or,	  contrariwise,	  through	  a	  disorganized	  and	  implausible	  presentation	  of	  their	  
experiences.	   	   The	   impressions	   fostered	  by	  any	  narrative	  are	   subject	   to	  disruption	  and	  
such	   disruptions	   are	   colored	   by	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   audience.241	   	   Other	   decision-­‐
makers	   have	   erred	   by	   trying	   through	  medical	   examinations	   to	   restore	   objective	   fact-­‐
finding	  to	  reconcile	  the	  subjective	  milieu	  of	  the	  refugee	  narrative.	  	  In	  an	  LGBT	  context,	  
this	  relies	  on	  the	  problematic	  view	  that	  sexual	  identity	  can	  be	  accurately	  determined	  by	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  (1959),	  66.	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forensic	  medicine,	  a	  view	  that	   in	   turn	  rests	  on	  stereotypes	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  sexual	  
activity	  between	  gay	  men	  and	  the	  relationships	   that	  LGBTs	   in	  general	  have	   (or	  do	  not	  
have).	   	   It	   is	   in	  grappling	  with	   the	  challenge	  of	  a	   lack	  of	   independent	  evidence	   (in	   turn	  
made	   extraordinarily	   important	   by	   the	   focus	   on	   credibility	   brought	   about	   by	   a	  
heightened	   skepticism	  about	   the	   genuineness	  of	   refugee	   claims)	   that	  decision-­‐makers	  
most	   often	   fail	   LGBT	   asylum-­‐seekers.	   	   Exhausting	   the	   possibilities	   for	   documentary	  
evidence,	   they	  often	   turn	   to	   their	  own	   stereotypes	  as	   tools	  of	  measurement	   that	   can	  
lead,	  not	  unsurprisingly,	  to	  inconsistent	  judgments.	  
In	  parsing	  the	  solutions	  of	  UNHCR’s	  2008	  Guidance	  Note	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  gauge	  
what	  issues	  have	  been	  widely	  accepted	  as	  problematic.	  	  The	  Note	  refers	  to	  specific	  cases	  
in	  Western	  asylum	  systems	  and	  also	  articulates	  trends	  and	  areas	  of	  growing	  consensus.	  	  
It	   recognizes	   and	   deals	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   “disruptions”	   Goffman	   describes	   in	  
several	  ways,	   effectively	   agreeing	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   judging	  a	   claimant’s	   genuineness	  
according	  to	  inconsistencies	  is	  not	  useful	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool.	  	  After	  acknowledging	  the	  
inevitability	   that,	   in	   some	  cases,	   they	  will	   have	   to	   “rely	  on	   [the	  applicant’s]	   testimony	  
alone”,	   the	   Note	   enjoins	   decision-­‐makers	   not	   to	   let	   a	   cynicism	   about	   refugees’	  
intentions	  predispose	  them	  against	  the	  refugee.	  	  This	  reiterates	  the	  text	  that	  appears	  in	  
the	  UNHCR	  Handbook	  on	  RSD242:	   	   “if	   the	   applicant’s	   account	   appears	   credible,	   he	   [or	  
she]	  should	  unless	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  the	  contrary,	  be	  given	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  
doubt”.243	  	  It	  goes	  on	  to	  list	  several	  possibilities	  for	  perceived	  inconsistencies	  that	  should	  
                                                
242	  Formally	  the	  Handbook	  on	  Procedures	  and	  Criteria	  for	  Determining	  Refugee	  Status	  under	  the	  1951	  
Convention	  and	  the	  1967	  Protocol	  relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	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  UNHCR	  (2008),	  para	  3.	  
 89	  
not	  be	  held	  against	  the	  applicant,	  including	  a	  lack	  of	  relationships	  in	  either	  the	  country	  
of	   origin	   or	   the	   country	   of	   asylum244	   and	   a	   reluctance	   to	   talk	   openly	   about	   “intimate	  
matters”	   relating	   to	   sexual	   orientation,245	   as	   discussed	   earlier.	   	   Importantly,	   the	  Note	  
then	  declares,	  “Even	  where	  the	  initial	  submission	  for	  asylum	  contains	  false	  statements,	  
[…]	  the	  applicant	  can	  still	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  credible	  claim.”246	  	  For	  states	  to	  accept	  
and	   implement	  this	  directive,	  there	  must	  be	  an	  understanding	  that	   initial	   ignorance	  of	  
the	   ability	   to	  make	   a	   claim	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   one’s	   sexual	   orientation247	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
possibility	   of	   the	   presentation	   of	   inaccurate	   or	   false	   information	   early	   in	   the	   process	  
may	   lead	   to	   adverse	   credibility	   findings	   in	   first	   instance	   decisions.	   	   Appellate	  
jurisdictions	  must	  be	  allowed	  to	  review	  fully	  the	  credibility	  findings	  of	  lower	  courts.	  
The	  Note	   does	   explicitly	   address	   the	   problems	   inherent	   in	   the	   use	   of	  medical	  
examinations.	  	  It	  does	  mention	  however,	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  threat	  of	  “serious	  harm”	  
should	  be	  “assessed	  in	  light	  of	  the	  opinions,	  feelings	  and	  psychological	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  
applicant”.248	   	  While	  physical	   examinations	   should	  be	   rejected	  outright	   as	   a	  means	  of	  
determining	   the	   credibility	   of	   an	   applicant’s	   sexual	   identity	   claim,	   psychological	  
evaluations	   may	   have	   some	   utility.	   	   Because	   some	   adjudicators	   see	   a	   mental	   health	  
professional	  as	  being	  able	  to,	  in	  effect,	  transform	  the	  raw	  testimony	  (together	  perhaps	  
                                                
244	  According	  to	  ibid.,	  para	  38,	  “The	  fact	  that	  an	  applicant	  has	  not	  had	  any	  significant	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  in	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  of	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  in	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  of	  asylum	  does	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  mean	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  not	  LGBT.	  It	  may,	  
rather,	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  been	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  harm	  as	  explained	  above	  in	  paragraphs	  
23-­‐26	  [i.e.	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  “discreetly”	  to	  avoid	  persecution]”.	  
245	  Again	  in	  ibid.,	  the	  applicant	  may	  be	  hesitant	  to	  discuss	  “such	  intimate	  matters,	  particularly	  where	  his	  or	  
her	  sexual	  orientation	  would	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  shame	  or	  taboo	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  or	  
she	  may	  at	  first	  not	  feel	  confident	  to	  speak	  freely	  or	  to	  give	  an	  accurate	  account	  of	  his	  or	  her	  case”.	  
246	  Ibid.	  
247	  Ibid.:	  “The	  applicant	  will	  not	  always	  know	  that	  sexual	  orientation	  can	  constitute	  a	  basis	  for	  refugee	  
status”.	  
248	  Ibid.,	  para.	  10.	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with	  behavioral	   indicators)	  of	  an	  applicant	   into	  objective	  evidence,	  the	   involvement	  of	  
such	   experts	   may	   be	   a	   way	   to	   assuage	   the	   discomfort	   with	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   ability	   to	  
determine	   objective	   truth.	   	   Given	   the	   harm	   done	   to	   LGBTs	   and	   LGBT	   refugees	   in	  
particular	   by	   the	  medicalization	   of	   the	   discourse	   surrounding	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality,	   it	   is	  
imperative	  that	  psychological	  submissions	  do	  not	  pathologize	  the	  applicant’s	  sexuality.	  	  
Mental	  health	  professionals	  analyzing	  LGBT	   refugees	   should	  not	  be	  asked	   to	  diagnose	  
homosexuality	   anymore	   than	   they	   should	   be	   asked	   to	   diagnose	   political	   opinion	   or	  
religion.	   	   Rather,	  mental	   health	   affects	   associated	  with	   persecutory	   acts	   like	   physical,	  
emotional,	  and	  sexual	  abuse,	  torture,	  and	  other	  traumas	  should	  be	  identified	  to	  confirm	  
or	   disconfirm	   claims	   of	   past	   persecution.	   	   Furthermore,	   a	  mental	   health	   professional	  
may	  be	  able	  to	  make	  the	  refugee’s	  experience	  more	  understandable	  to	  an	  adjudicator.	  	  
There	   are	   several	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   refugee’s	   narrative	  may	   not	   simply	   be	   retold,	   but	  
“translated”.249	  	  Given	  the	  societal	  role	  of	  psychologists	  and	  psychiatrists	  as	  care-­‐givers,	  
the	   forensic	   role	   they	   play	   in	   an	   asylum	   case	   should	   be	   clearly	   defined	   and	   should	  
indeed	   be	   one	   in	   which	   the	   mental	   health	   professional	   clarifies	   or	   interprets.250	   	   An	  
adversarial	  role	  would	  be	  inappropriate.	  	  For	  example,	  because	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  agreed	  
that	   sexual	  orientation	   is	   so	   fundamental	   to	  human	  dignity	   that	   it	   is	  a	  characteristic	  a	  
                                                
249	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  Joanne	  Ahola,	  MD	  (25	  August	  2009),	  she	  explained	  that	  she	  has	  found	  
administering	  the	  Klein	  Sexual	  Orientation	  Grid	  allows	  her	  to	  succinctly	  describe	  an	  applicant’s	  sexual	  
orientation	  based	  on	  his	  behavior,	  desires,	  self-­‐identification,	  and	  experiences.	  	  The	  use	  of	  this	  grid,	  
developed	  to	  show	  sexual	  orientation	  along	  a	  spectrum	  from	  exclusively	  heterosexual	  to	  exclusively	  
homosexual,	  may	  seem	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  a	  retelling	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  narrative,	  but	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  sexual	  identity	  that	  she	  may	  
not	  arrive	  at	  herself,	  it	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  tool.	  
250	  In	  a	  review	  of	  an	  Australian	  case	  in	  which	  a	  gay	  Pakistani	  refugee	  failed	  to	  gain	  asylum,	  the	  RRT	  noted	  
that	  “The	  psychologist’s	  report	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  counselling	  and	  in	  fact	  stated	  that	  the	  interview	  goal	  
was	  to	  ascertain	  the	  applicant’s	  sexual	  orientation”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  lawyers	  “were	  seeking	  to	  
have	  counselling	  arranged	  for	  [him…and]	  requested	  that	  a	  hearing	  be	  deferred	  until	  he	  had	  received	  
counselling”,	  V97/06971	  [1999]	  RRTA	  260	  (1	  February	  1999).	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person	  should	  not	  be	   required	   to	  change,	  decision-­‐makers	  must	  not	   task	  experts	  with	  
discovering	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  applicant’s	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  	  reversible.251	  
Psychiatric	   reports	   and	  other	   solutions	   that	   aim	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	   lack	  of	  
objective	   evidence	   cannot	   be	   relied	   upon	   exclusively.	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   imperative	   that	  
decision-­‐makers	  responsible	  for	  protecting	  refugees	  from	  harm	  are	  sufficiently	  aware	  of	  
the	  experiences	  of	  LGBT	  refugees	  and	  the	  legal	  questions	  that	  accompany	  their	  cases.252	  	  
To	   increase	  awareness	  and	  to	  enable	  decision-­‐makers	   to	  avoid	  relying	  on	  stereotypes,	  
the	  Note	  recommends	  	  
short	   targeted	   training	   sessions,	   mainstreaming	   of	   issues	   relating	   to	   sexual	  
orientation	   and	  gender	   identity	   into	   the	   induction	  of	   new	   staff	   and	   training	  of	  
existing	  staff,	  ensuring	  awareness	  of	  websites	  with	  expertise	  on	  LGBT	  issues,	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   development	   of	   guidance	   relating	   to	   appropriate	   enquiries	   and	  
interview	   techniques	   to	   use	   during	   the	   different	   stages	   of	   the	   asylum	  
procedure.253	  
	  
As	  part	  of	  this	  training,	  decision-­‐makers	  should	  also	  be	  sensitized	  to	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  
problem	   of	   persecution	   based	   on	   sexual	   identity.	   	   The	  Guidelines	   on	   Gender-­‐Related	  
Persecution	  which	  the	  2008	  Guidance	  Note	  is	  meant	  to	  supplement	  (and	  with	  which	  it	  is	  
meant	   to	   be	   read	   in	   conjunction)	   states	   that	   an	   asylum-­‐seeker	   “is	   not	   required	   to	  
identify	   accurately	   the	   reason	   why	   he	   or	   she	   has	   a	   well-­‐founded	   fear	   of	   being	  
persecuted”.254	  	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  incumbent	  upon	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  to	  be	  open	  to	  
the	   possibility	   that	   a	   sexual	   orientation-­‐based	   claim	  may	   need	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   a	  
                                                
251	  Aiming	  to	  medically	  discover	  whether	  the	  “discretion	  requirement”	  could	  be	  viable	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  
certain	  applicants,	  German	  courts	  have	  required	  psychological	  examinations	  to	  prove	  the	  irreversibility	  of	  
their	  sexual	  orientation.	  Lambda	  Legal	  Defense	  and	  Education	  Fund	  in	  Walker	  (2000),	  185.	  	  
252	  UNHCR	  (2008),	  para.	  1.	  
253	  Ibid.,	  para.	  37.	  
254	  UNHCR,	  Guidelines	  on	  International	  Protection	  No.	  1:	  Gender-­‐Related	  Persecution	  Within	  the	  Context	  of	  
Article	  1A(2)	  of	  the	  1951	  Convention	  and/or	  its	  1967	  Protocol	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	  (7	  May	  
2002),	  para.	  23.	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political	   or	   religious	   context	   in	   addition	   to,	   or	   outside	   of,	   a	   particular	   social	   group	  
context.255	  
	   That	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  claims	  (as	  well	  as	  gender-­‐based	  claims)	  are	  usually	  
considered	  on	  grounds	  of	  membership	  in	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  
a	   failure	   to	   give	   due	   consideration	   to	   the	   political	   and	   religious	   dimensions	   of	   sexual	  
identity.256	   	  The	  Note	  addresses	  this	   issue	   in	  regard	  to	  the	  first	  dimension	  by	  clarifying	  
that	  “’political	  opinion’	  should	  be	  broadly	  interpreted	  to	  incorporate	  any	  opinion	  on	  any	  
matter	   in	  which	  the	  machinery	  of	  State,	  society,	  or	  policy	  may	  be	  engaged”.257	   	  While	  
the	  Note	  does	  not	  expound	  the	  “machinery	  of	  […]	  society”,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  must	  include	  
constituent	  parts	   like	   the	   family	  and	  the	   local	  community.	   	   In	  every	  society,	   the	  state,	  
the	  family,	  and	  the	  community	  are	  engaged	  in	  defining	  and	  upholding	  gender	  roles	  and	  
regulating	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  among	  those	  who	  play	  these	  roles.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  
expression	   of	   non-­‐normative	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   identities—of	   refusing	   to	   accept	  
normative	  definitions	  and	  regulations—may	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  act.258	   	  This	   is	  
                                                
255	  Para.	  29	  of	  UNHCR	  (2008)	  reads,	  “Convention	  grounds	  contained	  in	  the	  refugee	  definition	  are	  not	  
mutually	  exclusive	  and	  may	  overlap.	  As	  such,	  the	  transgression	  of	  social	  or	  religious	  norms,	  including	  by	  
expressing	  one’s	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  identity,	  may	  be	  analyzed	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  opinion,	  religion	  or	  
membership	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group.	  This	  opinion,	  belief	  or	  membership	  may	  also	  be	  imputed	  or	  
attributed	  to	  the	  applicant	  by	  the	  State	  or	  the	  non-­‐State	  agent	  of	  persecution”.	  
256 See	  Alice	  Edwards,	  “Age	  and	  gender	  dimensions	  in	  international	  refugee	  law”	  in	  Refugee	  Protection	  in	  
International	  Law:	  UNHCR’s	  Global	  Consultations	  on	  International	  Protection,	  ed.	  Erika	  Feller,	  Volker	  Türk,	  
and	  Frances	  Nicholson	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  68-­‐69	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  
political	  and	  religious	  grounds	  are	  neglected	  in	  cases	  involving	  gender-­‐based	  claims. 
257	  Ibid.,	  para.	  30.	  
258	  In	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  In	  a	  Time	  of	  Torture,	  The	  Assault	  on	  Justice	  In	  Egypt's	  Crackdown	  on	  
Homosexual	  Conduct	  (29	  February	  2004),	  an	  Egyptian	  man	  entrapped	  by	  State	  Security	  via	  the	  Internet	  
reported	  being	  “‘asked	  who	  knew	  [he]	  was	  gay’”.	  	  When	  he	  refused	  to	  give	  names,	  his	  interrogator	  
reiterated,	  “‘We’re	  looking	  for	  members	  of	  this	  political	  organization’”	  and	  told	  him	  that	  if	  he	  signed	  the	  
arrest	  report	  he	  could	  “prove”	  that	  he	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  it.	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true	   regardless	   of	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   individual	   expressing	   the	   identity,	   given	   that	  
persecution	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  imputed	  political	  opinion	  is	  grounds	  for	  asylum.	  
	   In	  many	  LGBT	  refugee-­‐generating	  countries,	  politics	  and	  religion	  are	  interwoven.	  	  
Because	   of	   the	   important	   role	   religion	   plays	   in	   power	   relations	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   these	  
societies,	   gender	   and	   sexual	   identity	   expression	   that	   does	   not	   conform	   to	   religious	  
norms	  and	  expectations	  has	  both	  political	  and	  religious	  implications.	  	  	  	  Paragraph	  31	  of	  
the	  Guidance	  Note	  explains	  that:	  
[r]eligion	   may	   be	   a	   relevant	   1951	   Convention	   ground	   where	   the	   attitude	   of	  
religious	  authorities	   towards	  LGBT	  people	   is	  hostile	  or	  discriminatory	  or	  where	  
being	   LGBT	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   affront	   to	   religious	   beliefs	   in	   a	   given	   society.	  Where	  
someone	  has	  a	  well-­‐founded	  fear	  of	  persecution	  because	  he	  or	  she	  is	  seen	  as	  not	  
conforming	   to	   the	   interpretation	  given	   to	  a	  particular	   religious	  belief,	   a	   link	   to	  
that	  ground	  may	  be	  established.259	  
	  
This	  clarification	  is	  important	  but	  speaks	  only	  incompletely	  to	  the	  complexities	  that	  exist	  
at	   the	   intersection	   of	   gender,	   sexuality,	   and	   religion.	   	   Redding’s	   “homo-­‐sectuals”,	  
religious	  LGBTs	  who	  remain	  committed	  to	  their	  religion,	  are	  not	  clearly	  accounted	  for.	  	  
When	   LGBTs	   reject	   religion	   altogether	   because	   of	   proscriptions	   of	   non-­‐normative	  
sexuality	  or	  because	  of	  its	  restrictions	  on	  gender	  roles	  in	  states	  where	  the	  lines	  between	  
religion	   and	   politics	   are	   blurred,	   they	   are	   indeed	   acting	   politically.	   	   They	   are,	  
intentionally	  or	  not,	  questioning	  the	  place	  of	  religion	  in	  politics	  as	  well	  as	   in	  their	  own	  
lives.	   	   Homo-­‐sectuals,	   however,	   do	   not	   reject	   religion	   but	   rather	   seek	   “to	   escape	  
hegemonic	   articulations	   and	   enforcements	   of	   religious	   morality	   with	   which	   they	  
disagree”.260	   	   Proposed	   solutions	   should	   therefore	   not	   frame	   the	   problem	   as	   one	   of	  
                                                
259	  UNHCR	  (2008).	  
260	  Redding,	  para.	  142.	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homosexuality	  versus	   religion,	  but	   rather	   the	  deprivation	  of	  marginalized	  groups	   from	  
having	  a	  say	  in	  shaping	  the	  religion	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	  
	   The	   relegation	   of	   LGBTs	   and	   women	   as	   categories	   into	   the	   membership	   in	   a	  
particular	  social	  group	  category	  and	  the	  underuse	  of	  political	  and	  religious	  grounds	   to	  
explain	   their	   persecution	   mirrors	   their	   exclusion	   from	   the	   dominant	   channels	   of	  
participation	  in	  social,	  religious,	  and	  political	  life.	  	  The	  hegemonic	  heteronormative	  and	  
patriarchal	   status	  quo	  was	  constructed	   largely	  without	   the	  consent	  or	  participation	  of	  
these	   groups.	   	   LGBTs	   and	   women	   have	   not	   been	   allowed	   access	   to	   the	   religious	  
institutions	   that	   shape	   doctrine	   and	   practice	   nor	   to	   political	   institutions	   that	   regulate	  
society.	  	  Transgressing	  the	  norms	  that	  are	  imposed	  upon	  them	  without	  their	  consent	  is	  
therefore	  virtually	  their	  only	  way	  to	  “participate”	  in	  the	  shaping	  and	  reshaping	  of	  norms,	  
social	  values,	  and	  power	  relationships.	  	  To	  properly	  adjudicate	  refugee	  claims	  based	  on	  
sexual	   orientation,	   decision-­‐makers	   must	   reframe	   their	   understanding	   of	   LGBTs	   with	  
this	  in	  mind.	  	  LGBT	  refugees,	  like	  refugees	  conventionally	  considered	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  
suffering	  persecution	  because	  of	   their	   political	   opinions	  or	   religious	  beliefs,	   belong	   to	  
marginalized	  groups	   that	  have	  been	  deprived	  of	  power	  and	  have	  been	  excluded	   from	  
the	   discourses	   that	   shape	   the	   “machinery	   of	   State	   and	   society”.	   	   The	   question	   that	  
adjudicators	   should	   be	   asking	   about	   LGBTs	   fleeing	   persecution,	   then,	   is	   not	   “is	   this	  
refugee	   a	   homosexual?”	   but	   instead	   “does	   persecution	   result	   from	   the	   assertion	   of	   a	  
sexual	  or	  gender	  identity	  that	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  dominant	  norms?”261	  	  This	  would	  negate	  
                                                
261	  No	  doubt	  Scaperlanda	  and	  others	  who	  fear	  a	  “slippery	  slope”	  that	  begins	  with	  protecting	  LGBTs	  and	  
ends	  with	  sanctioning	  of	  pedophilia	  would	  take	  issue	  with	  this	  shift.	  	  I	  am	  not	  proposing	  that	  non-­‐
normative	  sexual	  identities	  whose	  expression	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  international	  human	  right	  law	  be	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the	   reflex	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   set	   of	   stereotypes	   about	   specific	   labels	   such	   as	   “homosexual”,	  
“lesbian”,	  or	  “gay”,	  something	  that	  is	  especially	  important	  given	  that	  LGBT	  refugees,	  as	  
mostly	  non-­‐white	  non-­‐Westerners,	  have	  also	  been	  largely	  excluded	  from	  participating	  in	  
the	   construction	   of	   those	   categories.	   	   Furthermore,	   viewing	   LGBT	   claims	   through	   a	  
political	   lens	   would	   obviate	   the	   preoccupation	   with	   the	   immutability,	   innateness,	   or	  
fundamentality	   of	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality.	   	   Choosing	   to	   live	   out	   a	   non-­‐normative	   sexual	  
orientation	   could	   be	   considered	   a	   political	   act.262	   Affecting	   this	   change	   would	   likely	  
involve	   integrating	   these	   principles	   into	   the	   kind	   of	   training	   recommended	   by	   the	  
UNHCR	  and	  others	  for	  decision-­‐makers	  as	  well	  as	  interviewers	  and	  interpreters.	  
	   While	   this	   shift	   is	   an	   ideal,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   it	   can	   only	   feasibly	   be	   achieved	  
piecemeal.	  	  Because	  sexual	  orientation-­‐based	  asylum	  claims	  are	  for	  the	  present	  tied	  to	  
the	  particular	   social	  group	  membership	  ground	  and	  because	   the	  categories	  and	   labels	  
attached	   to	   same-­‐sex	   sexuality	   continue	   to	   be	   invoked,	   it	   is	   important	   for	   decision-­‐
makers	   to	   be	   sensitized	   to	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   related	   to	   sexuality.	   	   This	   will	   require	  
them	   stepping	   back	   from	   their	   own	   preconceived	   notions	   and	   “common	   sense”	  
assumptions	  that	  are	  in	  reality	  influenced	  by	  social	  constructions	  and	  hegemonic	  norms.	  	  
Even	   decision-­‐makers	   with	   non-­‐normative	   sexual	   orientations	   are	   not	   exempt	   from	  
many	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  preconceptions,	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
It	  must	  be	  understood	  that	  not	  only	   is	   sexuality	  a	   fundamental	  part	  of	   identity	  
and	  so	  fundamental	  to	  human	  dignity	  that	  no	  one	  must	  be	  asked	  to	  change	  it,	  but	  that	  
                                                                                                                                            
protected.	  	  The	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  protects	  children	  from	  sexual	  abuse	  and	  
exploitation	  and	  thus	  proscribes	  pedophilia.	  	  
262	  Edwards,	  69.	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the	   expression	   of	   this	   identity	   is	   also	   to	   be	   protected.	   	   Requiring	   “discretion”	   in	   this	  
expression	  can	  be	  tantamount	  to	  asking	  a	  refugee	  to	  participate	  in	  her	  own	  persecution.	  	  
Adjudicators	  must	   also	   accept	   that	   their	   notions	   of	  masculine	   and	   feminine	   behavior	  
and	  appearance	  are	  not	  necessarily	   accurate	   indicators	  of	   sexual	   orientation	  and	   that	  
likewise	   stereotypes	   about	   involvement	   in	   a	   “gay	   scene”,	   particular	   kinds	   of	   sexual	  
activity,	   and	   both	   same-­‐sex	   and	   opposite-­‐sex	   relationships	   cannot	   be	   relied	   upon	   to	  
discern	   the	   veracity	   of	   a	   sexual	   orientation	   claim.	   	   The	   persistent	   paradigm	   of	   a	  
heterosexual/homosexual	  binary	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  sexual	  identity	  development	  as	  a	  linear	  
process	   that	   culminates	   in	   a	   fixed	   sexuality,	   though	   both	   entrenched	   in	   the	  Western	  
understanding	  of	  sexuality,	  must	  be	  understood	  by	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  be	  specific	  to	  a	  
particular	  cultural	  context	  and	  a	  particular	  era.	   	  These	   ideas	  may	  not	  only	   inaccurately	  
describe	  Western	  experiences,	  but	  may	  be	  wholly	  alien	  to	  non-­‐Western	  asylum-­‐seekers.	  	  
In	   sum,	   it	   must	   be	   understood	   that	   conceptualizations	   of	   homosexuality,	   bisexuality,	  
and	   indeed	   heterosexuality	   are	   socially	   constructed	   as	   are	   categories	   like	   lesbian	   and	  
gay.	   	   They	   are	   imbued	   by	   the	   individual	   employing	   these	   categories	   with	   particular	  
meanings	   and	   particular	   boundaries	   such	   that	   they	   are	   susceptible	   to	   failing	   to	  
correspond	   with	   the	   reality	   of	   human	   experiences.	   	   For	   these	   reasons,	   the	   decision-­‐
maker	   must	   actively	   recognize	   and	   restrain	   internal	   stereotypes	   of	   sexuality	   while	  
grappling	  with	  the	  nuances	  of	   individual	  narratives.	   	  This	  approach	  would	  be	  rendered	  
all	   the	  more	  difficult	  where	  a	  general	  cynicism	  about	  the	   intentions	  of	  refugees	  colors	  
how	  decision-­‐makers	  handle	  inconsistencies	  and	  information	  that	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  
their	   existing	   notions	   of	   sexuality.	   	   In	   balancing	   their	   role	   as	   agents	   of	   humanitarian	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protection	  with	   their	   responsibility	   to	  protect	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	  asylum	  system,	   they	  
must	   expect	   that	   the	   refugee’s	   testimony	  may	   be	   their	   only	   window	   into	   a	   different	  
understanding	  of	  sexuality.	   	   It	   is	   in	  this	  context,	  and	  not	  the	  context	  of	  Western	  same-­‐
sex	  sexuality	  that	  the	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  claimant’s	  flight	  occurred.	  	  Especially	  where	  
specific	   country	   information	   is	   lacking,	   it	   is	   often	   through	   the	   claimant	   alone	   that	   a	  
picture	  of	   the	  particular	   societal	  mores	  and	  beliefs	  about	   sexuality	   (and	   thus	   those	  of	  
the	  persecutor	  or	  potential	  persecutor)	  that	  have	  led	  her	  to	  seek	  protection.	  	  It	   is	  only	  
with	  these	  factors	  taken	  into	  an	  account	  that	  a	  decision-­‐maker	  can	  effectively	  and	  justly	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